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DPHIL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
 
STATE INCAPACITY BY DESIGN 
Unused Grants, Poverty and Electoral Success in Bihar 
 
SUMMARY 
This thesis offers a perspective on why majority-poor democracies might fail to pursue pro-
poor policies. In particular, it discusses why in Bihar, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) party 
led by Lalu Prasad Yadav, which claimed to represent the poor and under-privileged, did not 
claim and spend large amounts of centre–state fiscal transfers that could have reduced 
poverty, provided employment and benefitted core supporters. Despite this failure, the RJD 
and Yadav enjoyed repeated electoral success between 1990 and 2005, in a context of 
credible elections and a majority of poor voters. I have called this combination of events the 
‘Bihar paradox’.  
I explore this paradox by: 
1. Creating two panel data sets on fiscal transfers in the form of Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes and State Plan Allocations made from the Government of India to sixteen 
main states over an eight-year period from 1997-98 to 2004-05. 
2. Using the panel data sets to show that, during this period: 
a) Poor states in India claimed and spent less of the centre–state fiscal transfers 
available to them than wealthier states 
b) Relative to other states, the Government of Bihar claimed and spent less fiscal 
transfers than expected of a state at its level of poverty.  
3. Explaining how Yadav’s electoral strategy contributed to this under-claiming and 
under-spending. For Yadav, the political imperative was to marginalize the upper 
castes and provide selective benefits to key supporters. This led to large numbers of 
public sector vacancies which eroded state administrative capacity in all but a few 
‘pockets of productivity’, which in turn led to poor results for general development 
outcomes. 
iv 
The Bihar story is relevant to areas of research variously labelled as ‘state-building’, 
‘capacity development’ and ‘public sector reform’. It is another warning about how easy it is 
to foster pessimism by attributing governance problems in poor countries to deeply embedded 
historical or cultural factors, when they may have more immediate, political and tractable 
causes. 
v 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This thesis is about governance in Bihar. Through it, I attempt to explain the paradox 
that a regime was repeatedly endorsed by poor voters in successive free elections from 
1990 to 2005, yet failed to deliver on pro-poor outcomes. However, besides an 
academic exercise, this thesis is a personal journey through which I try to make sense of 
my encounters with politics, public administration and development over the last 25 
years in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS)
1
.  
In the following sections, I will introduce this topic and my research by presenting a 
brief introduction to: Bihar and its politics, my work in the IAS, the existing literature 
relevant to this topic, my findings and the organisation of this thesis.  
1.1 The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
I joined the Bihar cadre of the IAS in 1985. Life in Bihar was a sharp contrast to the 
urban and not-so-poor India I grew up in. Bihar, with its unimaginable levels of poverty 
and social exploitation, and the IAS, with its huge budgets and the might of the Indian 
state, presented an opportunity to make a difference to India’s underdevelopment and to 
global poverty.  
                                                 
1
 Right through this thesis wherever it has been possible I have cited the source of my 
information. However quite a lot of the analysis is dependent on my own knowledge. Therefore 
where ever a source has not been mentioned it can be assumed that the source is 25 years of 
personal observations and experience. 
2 
As collector and district magistrate (DM) in Bihar, you are the administrative head of a 
district
2 
and the public face of government. You hold the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence. You work at the intersection between politics and administration. All 
district department heads report to you, including heads of police, jails, health services, 
education, agriculture and engineering. Your responsibilities include supervision of 
public expenditure, law and order and government employees in the district. You 
occupy this position at the pleasure of the state government, but the state government 
depends on you to get everything done within your jurisdiction. There is a delicate 
balance of power vis-à-vis the state government, but because you are the person on the 
ground, you enjoy considerable autonomy and there is much that you can do. 
The office of the collector and district magistrate was created by the British colonial 
administration and dates back to 1787 (Parashar 2003). Though much has changed since 
then, the following abstract gives a flavour of the kind of work a district collector in 
Bihar does to this day: 
Upon his energy and personal character depends ultimately the efficiency of 
our Indian Government. His own special duties are so numerous and so 
various as to bewilder the outsider... Police, jails, education, municipalities, 
roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local taxation, and the imperial revenues 
of his District, are to him matters of daily concern... He should be a lawyer, 
an accountant, a surveyor, and a ready writer of State papers. He ought to 
posses no mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy, and 
engineering. (Hunter 1886: 436) 
This translates to power—power to pursue the public good or private gain. Life in the 
district is very political, but different from politics in the state capital, where you help 
                                                 
2 There are 28 states and seven union territories in India. Each state and union territory is 
divided into a number of districts and each district into sub-divisions. There are 38 districts in 
Bihar and 626 in India. Below the sub-division you have community development blocks, which 
in turn are divided into a number of panchayats. 
3 
your departmental minister and the state cabinet take decisions and supervise their 
implementation.  
The years I spent in the districts and in the Bihar state capital coincided with the 
dominance of Lalu Prasad Yadav, who first became chief minister of Bihar in 1990 and 
was re-elected in 1995. In 1997, Yadav was incarcerated, pending a trial for corruption 
in a case that became famous as the ‘fodder scam’, but he retained power by installing 
his wife as chief minister. The husband and wife duo remained in power until 2005. One 
of the things I could not understand about this 15-year period was the lack of interest 
both the district and state-level political leadership seemed to exhibit in pursuing 
schemes related to poverty reduction, education and agricultural production that could 
have benefitted the poor, who were their core supporters. This was puzzling because the 
vast majority of voters in Bihar were poor and India has credible elections (i.e., it was 
not the case that a rich minority had fixed the elections to favour their candidates). 
Instead, political energy went into ensuring that certain individuals were favoured in 
postings, procurement and prosecution. The following section introduces these unique 
conditions. 
1.2 Bihar: A Brief Introduction 
Bihar is a state in northern India. To the north, it shares an international border with 
Nepal, and to the east and west it borders the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal. In 2000, the southern, tribal parts of Bihar were carved out to create the new 
state of Jharkhand.  
 
4 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Population map of Bihar 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/census2001/population/population-bihar.htm 
In 1992/3, Bihar was the poorest state in India, with 57 per cent of its predominantly 
rural population living in poverty (Himanshu 2007). If Bihar were a country, it would 
be the tenth most populous nation in the world with 90 million people. Caste is an 
important fact of everyday life, particularly in politics (Witsoe 2007b). Until 1990, 
upper castes (only 13 per cent of the population) had traditionally dominated politics 
and the state bureaucracy. As Blair describes, 
... it is only the upper and middle caste groups, with their resources of 
wealth and numbers, that have enjoyed the fruits of caste-oriented 
5 
democracy, while the lower castes have been left for all practical purposes 
outside the political arena. (Blair 1972: 107) 
Though Bihar has one of the lowest economic inequalities among Indian states (Dreze 
and Sen 2002: Table A.3), the particular form of social and economic inequality in 
which power and privilege from class, caste and gender mutually reinforce, has led to a 
situation in which ‘insecurity and fear have always been part of the daily lives of the 
poor’ (Bhatia 2005: 1544). For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 3. 
However, in elections for the state legislative assembly held in 1990, more backward 
than upper caste members were elected for the first time. Among these was Lalu Prasad 
Yadav, a young and energetic Backward Caste (BC)
3
 leader who promised to end 
upper-caste hegemony and was elected chief minister (Witsoe 2007b). However, Yadav 
did very little to economically empower poor and backward castes, and Bihar became 
notorious for bad governance and the break down of the rule of law
4
. Large amounts of 
fiscal transfers from the Government of India (GOI) meant for poverty reduction and 
social security remained unclaimed and unspent (World Bank 2005). Some even went to 
the extent of writing that Bihar represented the Marxian utopia ‘... where the state had 
withered away’ (Sharma 1995: 2587). 
                                                 
3 
Backward Castes are a grouping of socially deprived castes who, unlike Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, did not benefit from affirmative action in the early constitution of India. I 
use this term in the sense that it was used in the Mungeri Lal Commission report on Backward 
Classes in Bihar. It consists of castes listed as Backward Castes in Annexure II and Extremely 
Backward Castes in Annexure I. Details of these are available in Robin (2009).  
4 This is the popular perception about Bihar. For example, the Economist magazine ran an 
editorial on 28 January 2010, which among other things said ‘... Lalu Prasad Yadav, a shrewd, 
roguish politician… ruled Bihar, India’s most depressed and unruly state, for 15 years...’ (2010). 
Crime statistics for the period however show no dramatic difference in the levels of overall crime 
compared with the period before Yadav was chief minister (Witsoe 2007b). In Chapter 7, I put 
forward a hypothesis on the reason for this dichotomy between public perception and official 
statistics. 
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There are various reasons to believe that governance in Bihar was not always thus, at 
least in terms of the functioning of the public service. Though the quality of public 
administration and life in general began to decline long before the 1990 ascension of 
Yadav and his backward-caste dominated party, the 1950s and 1960s are universally 
described in the literature as having been a period when Bihar was a well-functioning 
state (Appu 2002; Rorabacher 2008). 
1.3 Motivation for This Research 
In what follows, I use three examples from my work in the IAS in Bihar between 1990 
and 2004 to show how there was an overall lack of interest in pro-poor policy during 
this period. The first two examples illustrate how district political leadership had little 
interest in schemes and centre–state fiscal transfers that could have reduced poverty, 
and how, at crucial junctures, political expediency jeopardised efforts that were 
benefiting the poor. The third shows how the political leadership of the Bihar 
Department of Education showed no interest in providing public sector jobs—a 
potential source of patronage—despite the fact that the Central Government was picking 
up the costs. 
It was 1991. For those who were battling poverty and caste
5
 exploitation, it was a time 
of great promise. Following elections to the state legislative assembly in 1990, against a 
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According to Michael (1999), ‘Caste is a system of ritual hierarchy maintained through 
restrictions on inter-marriage. Its notion of right livelihood in the fulfillment of duty is justified in 
terms of reincarnation and karma; high-caste individuals are thought to have earned status by 
dutiful action in previous lives. It divides rights and responsibilities based on notions of relative 
purity; thus it assigns socially necessary tasks to specific groups. Socially significant, 
endogamous castes (jatis) were divided from ancient times into four caste groups (varnas): 
brahmins, kshatriyas, vaishyas, and shudras. Brahmins were priests, kshatriyas warriors, 
vaishyas farmers or merchants, and shudras servants or commoners. Dalits (formerly called 
untouchables) were a despised group below the shudras and the most impure in the ritual 
hierarchy’ (cited in Clements 2005: 9). 
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population share of 65 per cent
6
, the percentage share of BC, Dalit
7
 and Scheduled Tribe 
(ST)
8
 members in the state legislative assembly
9
 had for the first time risen to 58 per 
cent (Robin 2009: 67 & 100). A new government headed by Yadav had assumed office 
on a platform that promised to empower the poor and end upper caste
10
 dominance, 
particularly in the bureaucracy.  
Yet when it came to pro-poor policy, the election results changed almost nothing. 
Except for strict instructions that communal violence was to be prevented at all costs 
and that officials should be sympathetic to demands from BCs, Muslims, and Scheduled 
Castes (SCs)
 11
, there were no new pro-poor initiatives by the Bihar government. There 
were also no efforts to improve the implementation of the existing anti-poverty 
schemes. If officers in the district wanted to improve the poverty reduction outcomes of 
existing schemes, they had to do so by stealth (i.e., by hoodwinking the local level 
political leadership). Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs, as they are 
commonly called) not only legislate, they also have an important role in local-level 
scheme implementation through their membership of district and block level decision 
making bodies. Most MLAs, whether upper caste or backward, continued the old 
practise of focussing their energies in influencing senior officials (engaging in pairavi, 
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See Annexure 1 for a detailed break down of caste in Bihar. 
7 
The word Dalit comes from the Marathi language, and means ‘suppressed’. Dalits are also 
known as Harijans, a word first coined by Gandhi that translates as ‘children of God’. The official 
term is ‘Scheduled Castes’ following their notification as such in clause 1 of Article 341 of the 
Constitution of India. 
8 
The word Scheduled Tribe (ST) follows the notification of certain communities as suffering 
from extreme social, educational and economic backwardness who need special consideration 
for safeguarding their interests. These communities were notified as STs in clause 1 of Article 
342 of the Constitution of India. 
9 
See Annexure 8 for caste- and community-wise details of members in the Bihar Legislative 
Assembly from 1952 to 2005.  
10 
I use the term ‘upper caste’ to mean all who are not BC, Dalit, ST or Muslim.  
11
 Here and elsewhere Scheduled Castes and Dalits are used interchangeably. 
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meaning ‘to canvass’) so that their cronies were favoured in government contracts or 
avoided prosecution for criminal charges. They operated with an ‘I owe you’ policy 
towards officials, trading favours for more favours. The state government was at best a 
disinterested spectator.  
My experiences, described in the three examples below, led me to this research topic 
and are illustrative of the governance problems at that time. 
1.3.1 Example One 
In 1991, I was the deputy development commissioner
12
 (DDC) in the northern Bihar 
district of Saharsa
13
. My own attempts at re-orienting a dysfunctional microcredit 
program, the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), to benefit 8,000 poor 
women met with resistance from MLAs in the district because they feared that they 
would lose an important source of patronage. The District Rural Development Agency 
(DRDA) finally approved the re-orientation plan only because both the DM and I 
personally requested the MLAs to overcome their reluctance and allow us to use at least 
one program to reduce poverty. The reorientation plan was to develop industry clusters 
dedicated to producing hand spun yarn called khadi across the district. In two years, 
these clusters would have reached a production level greater than the total production of 
yarn in the north and east of India at that time. A pre-condition for the roll out of this 
plan was a commitment from the Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC), the 
designated national authority of the GOI, to do a number of tasks, including: 
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The DCC supervises all development programs in the district and also performs the duties of 
the DM during his or her absence. 
13 
The district of Saharsa was divided into two in 1992, when the northern parts were carved out 
to create a new district called Supaul. 
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 Supplying spinning wheels (charkas, made famous by Mahatma 
Gandhi’s campaign for independence from British rule)  
 Setting up a central sliver14 manufacturing unit 
 Formally committing to arrange for the marketing of khadi 
According to protocol that governs relationships between entities of the state 
government and Central Government departments and organisations, it is the state 
director (of handlooms, in this case) who has to take the lead in negotiating agreements 
with the concerned departments and organisations of the GOI; in this case, KVIC. 
However due to a lack of interest at the state level, we had no choice but to approach 
KVIC directly. Fortunately, KVIC was happy to support our efforts because for two 
years they had been trying to get the support of the state government to locate a central 
sliver plant in the state. Given the economic potential of Saharsa district and the 
resources we were willing to commit, KVIC moved swiftly to facilitate our initiative.  
The state minister in charge of handlooms and village industries in Bihar saw the 
progress we were making and convinced the state government to issue an extraordinary 
order asking me to take additional charge as chief executive officer (CEO) of the Bihar 
State Khadi Board, with jurisdiction over the entire state. This kind of order had never 
been issued before, one in which an officer was in charge of both a district and a 
sector—khadi and village industries in this case—for the entire state. The minister was 
keen to replicate the Saharsa model in other parts of the state. I agreed to take on this 
atypical work arrangement on the condition that some minimal financial resources 
would be available to restructure the Khadi Board. The reform-minded minister and I 
worked hard at making this arrangement work, but when we failed to get the state 
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 Sliver is the principal raw material that goes into a charka to make khadi. 
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finance department to give us the money needed to restructure the Khadi Board, he 
reluctantly agreed to relieve me of my CEO duties.  
After two years in Saharsa and mid-way through efforts to develop the khadi industrial 
clusters, the time had come for my scheduled promotion to district magistrate. The state 
government could have made me DM of any district in Bihar, but the most logical 
choice was to appoint me to Saharsa district because any change in personnel at that 
time would have jeopardised the microcredit project. Senior officials who were aware of 
the project’s potential to reduce poverty tried their best to get me posted  in Saharsa, but 
local politicians who were otherwise appreciative of my efforts saw me as a threat to 
their patronage networks and stood in the way. Instead, I was moved to Palamau district 
and the program in Saharsa suffered. Many years later, I learned that one reason for the 
lack of enthusiasm in Patna (the Bihar state capital) for my work in Saharsa district was 
that production of khadi was traditionally an upper caste occupation in rural Bihar. It 
will become clear later in this thesis why the issue of caste was so important. 
1.3.2 Example Two 
It was 1993, and I was now DM of drought-stricken Palamau, a tribal district in south 
Bihar
15
. Palamau was famous for repeated droughts, and most people assumed that this 
was caused by inadequate rainfall. In reality, however, Palamau district had an average 
annual rainfall of 1280 mm and 38 per cent forest cover (over a total area of 8,000 
square kilometres). Thus, it was the timing and not the total quantity of rainfall that was 
causing repeated crop failure. This timing, combined with the inability to conserve and 
use rain water, led to persistent distress migration and death from malnutrition due to 
                                                 
15 Palamau is now in Jharkhand state. 
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crop failure (S. Gupta 2004). Of the district’s population of 2.4 million, 44 per cent  
were Dalits and STs, and they were the poorest and most deprived. Despite the 
numerical strength of these marginalised groups and the salience of caste issues in 
electoral politics, district politics were dominated by members of the upper castes who 
owned the construction, timber and mining industries.  
The state governor
16
, cabinet ministers and officials in Patna were shocked when I told 
them about the district’s plentiful but ill-timed rainfall, as they had never made this 
connection before. With the help of NGOs, I started a massive rural works program 
aimed at providing employment and drought proofing for villages with substantial Dalit 
and ST populations. We organised water conservation groups called pani panchayats
17
 
and provided them with training, funds and support to construct and maintain traditional 
water harvesting structures and irrigation channels (Peoples Science Institute 2003). 
This angered local politicians for whom chronic droughts
18
 were an opportunity to make 
money. Some won contracts for building large and expensive dams that were never 
completed, while others profited from digging deep tube wells
19
 most of which dried up 
because ground water recharge was poor due to deforestation, hilly terrain and 
inadequate water conservation.  
                                                 
16 The governor of a state in India has similar powers and functions at the state level as that of 
the president of India at the Union level. Governors are appointed by the president on the 
advice of the Union Cabinet.  
17 Pani means ‘water’ in Hindi and panchayat is the term used for the lowest unit of village self-
governance. Pani Panchayats was a movement for equitable distribution of water pioneered by 
Late Vilasrao Salunke in western Maharashtra in 1972-73. 
18
 There are three types of droughts: 1) meteorological, which occur when there is a prolonged 
period with less than average precipitation, 2) agricultural, which occur when crop production is 
affected, and 3) hydrological, which occur when water reserves in sources such as aquifers or 
lakes fall below average levels. 
19 Expensive drilling rigs are required to construct tube wells in hard rock geologies such as 
Palamau. Drilling tube wells was a popular activity amongst the elite in the district because of 
the widespread practice of over stating the depth of each tube well. MLAs got a share of the 
excess billing and, as members of the site selection committee, they could reward supporters 
with contracts.     
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Despite pressure from district leaders of all political parties to abandon the drought 
mitigation strategy I was pursuing, Chief Minister Yadav chose not to interfere. The 
political cost of mismanagement in Palamau was high because the drought situation in 
the district was making headlines in the national media. Finally, in the summer of 1993, 
Prime Minister Narasihma Rao announced that he would travel to Daltonganj, the 
district headquarters, to review steps taken by the Bihar government and district 
administration to tackle the droughts in Palamau and the adjoining district of Garhwa. 
Prime Minister Rao’s visit followed a forceful plea in the Lok Shaba (the lower house 
of Parliament) by the then leader of opposition, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who said: 
... the alarming situation of drought that prevails in many parts of the 
country due to the failure of rain has been the subject of discussion in this 
House several times. 8 districts of Orissa, Palamau and Garhwa districts of 
Bihar and Sarguja district of Mahdya Pradesh are facing severe drought 
conditions. There have also been reports of starvation deaths in those 
areas...This problem cannot be solved by holding talks in Delhi... Mr. 
Speaker, Sir, the situation there is serious. If the Centre and the State 
Governments do not join hands to start joint rescue operations on a large 
scale in order to provide employment and food to the people, the number of 
deaths which is now in hundreds will go in thousands. (Lok Sabha 1993) 
As DM of Palamau, I was in charge of the Bihar government’s efforts to fight the 
drought in the district. I was also in charge of organising the prime ministerial visit. Yet, 
I was asked not to attend the meeting in Daltonganj, in which the prime minister was to 
review steps being taken to combat drought. The State Government was aware that my 
views were at odds with their plan to appease local politicians by using the Prime 
Minister’s visit to ask for more money to build dams and drill tube wells. Mid-way 
through the review meeting, Prime Minister Rao asked to see the head of the local 
district administration: the DM. He wanted to understand the perspective of the local 
officials. As such, I was summoned and asked to brief him on the steps we were taking 
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to deal with the drought. I made my argument about rainfall and the need to generate 
employment by training, funding and empowering local communities to rejuvenate 
traditional water harvesting structures and built new ones. Before I could complete what 
I was saying, Chief Minister Yadav interrupted me to say that my ideas were misplaced. 
There was pin drop silence when I responded that we might have to ‘agree to disagree’.  
The Chief Minister’s intervention and my rebuttal took place in full view of half the 
state cabinet, the governor, the chief secretary and all departmental secretaries who had 
come from Patna. Fortunately, Prime Minister Rao had agreed to visit one of the pani 
panchayat work sites, something that neither Yadav nor officers from the state capital 
had done before then. The site visit was a turning point. Both the Prime Minister and 
Chief Minister were able to see the point I was trying to make regarding the potential of 
water conservation to provide much needed employment and to make water available 
when it was needed for agriculture. And, in spite of my public display of disagreement 
with the chief minister, I was neither disciplined nor moved to a new post. Some years 
later when Atal Bihari Vajpayee became prime minister, he had this to say about our 
work in Palamau:   
I would like to cite the example of Palamau district in Bihar where Pani 
Panchayats have been setup to harvest water and manage watersheds. With 
the help of traditional structures and modern scientific inputs, a drought-
prone area has witnessed remarkable change and is now set on the path of 
sustainable development. (Peoples Science Institute 2003) 
However, prime ministerial and chief ministerial approvals did not amount to much in 
the face of sustained opposition from vested local interests. With elections for the state 
assembly due in early 1995, party leaders from the district pressured the Chief Minister 
to move me out of the district. Yadav’s hand was forced because he could not risk 
14 
angering his party men as state elections drew near. Despite knowing that the water 
conservation work with Dalits and tribes would suffer, by May 1994 (less than a year 
after Prime Minister Rao’s visit and two years after I began in Palamau) I was moved to 
Patna as director of handlooms and sericulture in the Bihar Department of Industries
20
.    
1.3.3 Example Three 
By 2004, I was Bihar state director for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and subsequently 
secretary to government in the department of elementary and adult education. SSA was 
one of the key strategies of the national program for universalising elementary 
education in India. Among other goals, it aimed to increase school enrolment without 
increasing the pupil-teacher ratio. As the number of students attending school increased, 
we needed to recruit additional teachers so that adequate numbers of teachers were 
available to cater to the needs of a growing student population. The combination of 
improvements in student enrolment since 1990 with the failure to recruit new teachers 
meant that the pupil-teacher ratio in the state of Bihar had reached 90:1, much higher 
than the national average of 40:1. Although the GOI was promoting the recruitment of 
additional teachers, the Bihar state government was reluctant. This attitude was 
surprising because the GOI was paying the salaries of the new teachers and so the state 
government could potentially take credit for providing large number of new jobs and 
improving the quality of education at no cost. Like all politicians, those in Bihar were 
constantly on the lookout for opportunities to reward supporters with employment in the 
public sector, which makes their reluctance even more surprising. 
                                                 
20 The DM who followed me in Palamau took interest and supported the campaign, but by 1997 
the contractor-politician lobby had succeeded in ending the program and NGOs who supported 
the work were driven out of the district. 
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Following intense pressure from the central authorities, the Bihar government finally 
gave in and agreed to recruit new teachers, but only after changing the eligibility 
criteria. The power to fix eligibility criteria for primary school teachers lies with the 
National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE)
21
, a statutory body of the Central 
Government. As per NCTE guidelines, state schools can only appoint teachers who 
have the appropriate teacher training qualification. In an effort to make their core 
supporters eligible, the Bihar leadership removed this requirement without the authority 
to do so. As expected, the high court intervened. The ensuing stay order, judgement and 
appeal in the Indian Supreme Court put a stop to all teacher recruitment in Bihar for 
many more years (Sify 2010).  
The example of the Bihar Department of Education was not an isolated case. In 
Chapters 3 and 6, I show how the persistence of a large number of vacancies in almost 
all government departments in Bihar systematically destroyed state administrative 
capacity. In particular, it undermined the ability of the state government to claim and 
spend large amounts of GOI grants.  
Together, these three examples show that, as a civil servant and development 
professional working in Bihar, vast amounts of unspent grants and large number of 
vacancies was not an abstract idea or a distant problem. It was a matter of daily 
significance. The combination of high levels of poverty with the inability to use 
available resources that could have reduced poverty, together with the combination of 
low administrative capacity exacerbated by an inability to fill vacancies, was deeply 
frustrating. The berating we received from GOI officials at national review meetings for 
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 For more information on the NCTE, see http://www.ncte-india.org/index.asp. 
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being poor, incapable and backward did not help. Efforts to overcome procedural 
bottlenecks and increase spending were mostly unsuccessful—and as IAS professionals, 
we had no answers. The best we could do was to attribute this behaviour to a lack of 
political will. The problem was that we knew very little about why there was no 
political will, and even less about how to address it. 
1.4 The Puzzle 
This thesis in many ways is an attempt to answer the question alluded to by the above 
three examples. Why did a democratically elected government that came to power by 
mobilising its poor, marginalised and rural supporters with the promise of using state 
power and resources to their benefit, do very little to pursue pro-poor policies once in 
office?  
To help answer this question, my research explores why the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
party led by Yadav, managed to win three consecutive elections and remain in power 
from 1990 to 2005, while under-claiming and under-spending the vast amounts of 
centre–state fiscal transfers available to it that could have been used to reduce poverty, 
provide employment and benefit core supporters. 
This prolonged incumbency and failure to capitalise on GOI grants happened despite 
India (and Bihar) having: 
… a competitive political system in which the public sector is an 
indispensable source of jobs and services, and where elected officials have 
discretionary power over the distribution of vital resources that directly 
impact the livelihood of communities. (Hislope 2005: 579) 
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In essence, what happened in Bihar between 1990 and 2005 was therefore a puzzle 
because: 
 Bihar has credible elections and a competitive political system 
 The majority of voters in Bihar were poor 
 The RJD came to power in 1990 and remained in office until 2005 by 
promising to use state resources to benefit its supporters (the poor) 
 In Bihar, the public sector is a source of sought-after jobs 
Thus, in the context of credible elections and a majority of poor citizens, it is 
paradoxical that the RJD (and Yadav) presided over large amounts of unclaimed and 
unspent fiscal transfers while maintaining a huge number of public-sector vacancies.  
I have chosen to call this research puzzle ‘the Bihar paradox’. This paradox has five 
elements alluded to above: unclaimed and unspent grants, a large number of vacancies 
in the public sector, repeated electoral success, credible elections and a majority poor 
electorate. Each element will be elaborated in detail in the following chapters. 
1.5 Methodology 
To explore the Bihar paradox, my research methodology draws from existing theory, 
insights from my years in the IAS, and an analysis of primary data sets created during 
my fieldwork.  
1.5.1 Literature Review 
The Bihar paradox relates to a wider debate on why majority-poor democracies 
sometimes fail to implement pro-poor policies. There is burgeoning, but inconclusive, 
literature on this topic, ranging from investigations into why poor people support non-
18 
pro-poor policies, to the ways in which policy arenas are manipulated such that they fail 
to serve the interests of the poor. The focus of the former is the voter, while the latter 
highlights the institutional and/or state perspective. In Chapter 2, I have attempted to 
summarise this range of literature by grouping theories in the following manner:  
i. Plurality of concerns 
ii. Politics of patronage 
iii. Information problems 
iv. Limited democracy 
v. The politician’s dilemma 
These categories are not mutually exclusive; rather, they overlap. Chandra (2004), for 
example, makes the point that ethnicity is one of a plurality of concerns (category i). 
However, ethnicity is also salient because of information problems in the electoral 
market (category iii). In an electoral market beset with inadequate information, voters 
find that ethnicity is a useful predictor of the candidates’ behaviour once elected.   
1.5.1.1 Plurality of Concerns 
As workers, family members and individuals, we all have multiple roles and identities 
that shape our political concerns. Our concerns may be complimentary, overlap or 
conflict, and it is rare that a single role, identity, or concern will drive all of our political 
actions. Thus, it is unlikely that people, both rich and poor, will engage in politics based 
only on their class interests. A plurality of interests, some of which do not relate to 
class, may therefore help to explain why the poor in many cases fail to reap the 
democratic dividend that they could wield due to their large numbers. This makes it 
possible for parties that do not pursue pro-poor policies to win elections in majority-
poor contexts by articulating aspects other than poverty reduction that may be of 
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salience to a electorally significant section of the voters (Acharya et al. 2006; Alesina et 
al. 1999; Banerjee 2004; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007; Chandra 2004; Easterly and 
Levine 1997; M. Gupta and Pushkar 2010; Jaffrelot 2003; Katzenstein et al. 2001; 
Mehta 2003; Roemer 1998; Varshney 2000). 
1.5.1.2 Politics of Patronage 
The poor often get locked into patron–client relationships from which they are unable to 
escape. One reason for this is the uncertainty surrounding alternate sources from which 
the poor can obtain the goods and services they receive within the current patronage 
regime. The other is the intermediate cost of switching from one patron to another. 
Patrons retain their hold by ensuring that clients have access to an adequate supply of 
patronage goods and livelihood options. In poor countries, this supply is valuable to 
voters who do not have the purchasing power needed to buy these from the market 
when they are available. In cases where the market does not supply these goods or 
services, the poor client has no choice—an example being the protection of life and 
property in circumstances where the state does not provide this a public good—and is 
forced to depend on a powerful patron. The poor therefore often vote as directed by 
their patrons (Chubb 1981; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni 2006; Mainwaring 
1999; Medina and Stokes 2007; Scott 1969; Stokes 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Yarahuán 
2009). 
1.5.1.3 Information Problems 
Information problems stem from the difficultly faced by voters (particularly the poor) in 
judging the past performance of their representatives and the validity of promises made 
by new challengers. As policymaking becomes complex, voters also find it difficult to 
interpret the impact that policy has on their welfare. This induces a preference for 
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private goods and makes the provision of otherwise important, but complex, public 
goods unattractive in the electoral market. This lack of information and transparency 
compromises the ability of the poor to benefit from the full range of benefits that a 
modern state could have otherwise provided. The focus of the political leadership under 
these circumstances tends to gravitate towards providing otherwise sub-optimal private 
goods such as price subsidies and jobs in the public sector (Besley and Burgess 2002; 
Chandra 2004; Keefer and Khemani 2004; Keefer 2005; Keefer and Khemani 2005; 
Khemani 2007b). 
1.5.1.4 Limited Democracy 
There are also instances where the reach of democracy is limited, thereby constraining 
the ability of the poor to gain access to services. This includes the overriding influence 
of corruption, elite capture and dysfunctional institutions of oversight (Abed and Gupta 
2002; Alence 2004; Bardhan 1997; Diamond 2005). Corruption reduces efficiency 
through diversion of government expenditure towards less productive and easy to steal 
opportunities (Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). It also creates distortions that 
privilege the rich because they can pay the bribes that are needed to benefit from 
government-provided goods and services (Lui 1985). Corruption is also a highly 
regressive tax and the poor pay proportionally more of their income than the wealthy to 
gain access to basic services (World Bank 2003). 
1.5.1.5 The Politician’s Dilemma 
Governments face a range of pressures on a day-to-day basis. On the one hand, their 
duty is to pursue the public good. On the other hand, they must also cater to voters and 
pressure groups in order to retain power. Consequently, politicians must satisfy a wide 
range of actors—many with competing interests—in order to implement policies while 
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staying in power. Geddes describes this as ‘the wrenching conflict between their own 
need for immediate political survival and longer run collective interests in economic 
performance...’ (1994: 18). Unfortunately, ‘the poor’ are often not a major pressure 
group because they do not have the strategic resources to influence government through 
either carrots or sticks. While pro-poor policy may benefit society as a whole, it may 
also harm the interests of the most powerful groups, to whom politicians often owe their 
terms in office. Thus, the failure to implement pro-poor policies could be the result of 
rational choices made by self-interested officials acting within particular institutional 
contexts (Bates 2008; Geddes 1994).   
The bodies of literature discussed above, and elaborated in Chapter 2, offer alternate 
and overlapping explanations on the Bihar paradox. They do so from two vantage 
points. Firstly, they ask: why do ‘poor voters’ have inadequate influence, or why do 
they support parties that do not pursue pro-poor policies? Secondly, they ask: how and 
why do politicians manage to construct electoral majorities by shaping the electoral 
agenda in ways that do not benefit the majority? Together, both these vantage points 
throw light on possible reasons why majority poor electorates would want to re-elect 
parties that fail to pursue pro-poor policies. However, they lack the ability to explain 
how pro-poor policy failure and re-election coexisted with the paradoxical existence of 
two other aspects of governance in Bihar from 1990 to 2005: the large amounts of 
under-claimed and under-spent fiscal transfers and the large number of public sector 
vacancies. Thus, I have also conducted primary data collection and analysis in order to 
explore additional factors that might contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the 
Bihar paradox.  
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1.5.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
As discussed above, existing theories explain to some degree what happened in Bihar 
between 1990 and 2005. However, with respect to two aspects of the Bihar paradox - 
unclaimed and unspent fiscal transfers and a large number of public sector vacancies - 
this literature not only explains very little, but it actually predicts the opposite. The 
expectation is that governments seeking re-election will use all available resources to 
provide as much as they can to their supporters. Centre–state fiscal transfers and public 
sector jobs are resources commonly used for this purpose.  
I therefore decided to focus my analysis on trends in under-claiming and under-
spending GOI transfers. Not only was this aspect of the Bihar paradox counter-intuitive 
and puzzling, but it also afforded me the opportunity to use hard data to compare Bihar 
with other states, and thereby hopefully gain some insight into Bihar’s particular case.   
The central government passes fiscal transfers to states through three routes. Two of 
these are via Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) and State Plan Allocations (SPA) (see 
Chapter 4 for a discussion on centre–state fiscal transfers in India). The third is via 
finance commission mandated transfers. The award amounts of centre–state transfers 
are substantial. For example, in 2008/9, the GOI transferred a total of £50.86 billion 
(Rs. 3,814,230 million) to states. Of this, £26.5 billion (Rs. 1,986,890 million) was 
through the finance commission (52 per cent), £14.4 billion (Rs. 1,080,310 million) was 
via CSS (28 per cent), and £9.96 billion (Rs. 747,030 million) was through SPA (20 per 
cent) (Saxena 2009). 
There were over 200 CSS active in 2004/5 alone (Verma 2006: 25). Each scheme has a 
pan-Indian footprint, in that they are implemented in most states according to common 
23 
guidelines. Because each state has a different political history within a common federal 
framework, the way in which different states claim and spend CSS and SPA within their 
common guidelines begins to approach a type of natural experiment (Harriss 2000). 
From my work with the IAS in Bihar, I knew that Bihar was under-claiming and under-
spending centre–state fiscal transfers. So, I set out to see if Bihar was unusual compared 
to other states, in the hope that the answer to this question might provide additional 
insight into Bihar’s paradoxical governance during Yadav’s stewardship. However, this 
required comprehensive data sets on CSS and SPA. Unfortunately, I found that very 
little data on CSS was available in the public domain and what was available within 
government was scattered. Data in the public domain on SPA was unfortunately dated 
and thus of little use. I therefore set out to assemble two data sets, one on CSS releases 
from the Central Government and expenditure by states, and the second on SPA 
amounts approved by the Planning Commission of India. 
To this end, I set myself up as an intern in the Planning Commission during my 
fieldwork, and worked with the expert group created to recommend restructuring of the 
CSS by the National Development Council (NDC)
22
. I hoped to use my reach as an IAS 
officer to contribute to scholarship on India by collecting, collating and presenting data 
on centre–state fiscal transfers for a majority of states in India. Unfortunately, even with 
official backing, it was difficult to collect data on the CSS (although SPAs were easier 
because the Planning Commission maintains a compiled database with this 
information). This was not because the data did not exist, but because it lay strewn 
between myriad layers of India’s bureaucracy. The situation was so bad that even a 
                                                 
22 The National Development Council (NDC) is chaired by the Prime Minister of India and has all 
chief ministers, union ministers and all members of the planning commission as its members. 
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formal request by the Planning Commission on behalf of the NDC expert committee to 
different departments that were administering the CSS did not yield the desired results 
(see Annexes 10 and 11). In the end, I had to invoke provisions of India’s Right to 
Information Act (RTI) and the good will of many colleagues to collect the data I was 
able to. Consequently, a substantial portion of the time and effort put into this thesis, 
and the contribution of my work, was actually the creation of these two data sets. 
Chapter 4 has more details. 
1.6 Preliminary Findings and Additional Research Questions 
The collection and analysis of the two panel data sets on CSS and SPA helped me to 
understand how Bihar claimed and spent these transfers in comparison with other states. 
Importantly, it also allowed me to ask two further questions in order to isolate additional 
factors that may help explain the Bihar paradox. The first is: what determines 
differences between Indian states in the extent to which they succeed in claiming and 
spending the fiscal transfers that are in principle available to them?   
Based on a statistical analysis (detailed in Chapter 5), one clear answer to this question 
appears to be that poorer states are less successful both in claiming and in spending 
fiscal transfers. This finding has major implications for public policy in India, and is 
valuable in its own right. It is however, from the perspective of this thesis, largely a by-
product of my research method. I therefore do not explore its implications in any detail, 
except to say that an important objective of fiscal transfers (i.e., to reduce regional 
disparities) was not being met. On the contrary, it was making inequality worse by 
diverting unclaimed resources meant for poor states, which typically had poor spending 
and reporting capacities, to richer states. 
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However, these regression results enabled me to ask the second and more specific 
research question about Bihar: given that poor states generally tend to perform worse in 
claiming and spending fiscal transfers, was Bihar’s poor use of fiscal transfers between 
1997/8 to 2004/5
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 simply a reflection of its poverty?  If that were the case, the poor 
governance practices of Yadav’s regime may not have deprived Bihar of any more 
development resources than one would expect for such a poor state.  
However, through a regression analysis, my research models the extent to which a state 
government at Bihar's level of rural poverty would under-claim SPA and under-spend 
CSS grants. Based on these predictions, I find that in practice, Bihar performed worse 
than its poverty would predict. These statistical results alone would not enable me to 
draw any firm conclusion. However, they are consistent with my field observations 
about the detrimental character of governance in Bihar under Yadav and the extent of 
under-claiming and under-spending during his regime.  
1.7 Explaining the Bihar Paradox 
As detailed above, a statistical analysis indicates that Bihar’s use of fiscal transfers was 
lower than expected for its level of poverty. However, existing literature on the failure 
of governments in majority-poor democracies to pursue pro-poor policy is insufficient 
to explain this anomaly. Thus, it is necessary to look for other factors that may have 
contributed to the Bihar paradox. I therefore turn to the history of Bihar’s governance 
and recent political economy in an attempt to explain the under-claiming and under-
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 I have chosen the period 1997/8 to 2004/5 as a representative sample of my research period 
from 1990 to 2005. It should be mentioned that, the fact that the state of Jharkhand was carved 
out of Bihar in 2000 did not affect the quantitative analysis, because the four dependent 
variables were percentage expenditure, per capita release and per capita spending of CSS and 
per capita SPA. Similarly all independent variables were also normalised using either 
population, Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) or converting the value as a percentage. 
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spending of centre–state fiscal transfers and the abundant public sector vacancies that 
characterised Bihar under the Yadav regime. 
Informed especially by the changes made in Bihar after 2005—when a new government 
under the leadership of Nitish Kumar came to power—I argue that the quality of 
governance under Yadav was worse overall than before and after his reign. However, 
certain aspects of governance did improve for some groups during this period. I 
attribute this to the particular political strategy that the ruling party pursued (details are 
in Chapter 6). This strategy was shaped by caste and electoral arithmetic, and the 
concerns about insecurity that Muslims and BCs faced on a daily basis. This calculation 
led to a set of political circumstances where it became expedient to: 
 Pay little attention to delivering material 'poverty goods' 
 Mobilise particular caste electorates by promising them public sector 
jobs and izzat (a local Urdu word meaning honour or self respect) 
 Deny public sector jobs to others (i.e., castes groups that the ruling party 
did not seek to mobilise) 
 Focus the state apparatus on delivering security24 to Muslims and BCs 
(while maintaining overall background insecurity, especially for upper 
castes) rather than on other public sector tasks 
Intense factionalism among upper caste leaders and their inability to build bridges with 
non-upper caste voters meant that Yadav and the RJD could retain office by securing 
around one third of the votes polled in any election. This was not difficult because his 
core voters (i.e., BCs, Dalits, and Muslims) together accounted for over three quarters 
                                                 
24 This follows from the widespread insecurity and abuse that lower caste members historically 
experienced at the hands of upper castes. See the quotation by Bhatia (2005) on the following 
page for an illustration of the kind of security gains that the under-privileged experienced. 
Chapter 3 also discusses this issue. The fact that the state apparatus focused on delivering 
security and succeeded in doing so is contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy on Bihar.  
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of the entire population
25. Of these, Yadav’s own caste and diehard supporters, the 
Yadavs, were more than 15 per cent (Robin 2009). By preventing communal riots and 
taking an openly hostile stand against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its leader 
L.K. Advani during the Ram Temple agitation
26
, Yadav also earned the support of many 
Muslims. By ensuring that upper caste owners of land (landlords) could no longer 
perpetrate acts of violence against Dalit (SC) landless labourers, he further secured the 
loyalty of Dalits. The following excerpt from Bhatia (2005), though written in the 
context of a violent social movement (the Naxalites
27
) in central Bihar, reflects the 
dramatic security gains made by the poor during the period in question: 
Instances of rape of lower caste women have decreased dramatically. 
Arbitrary beatings are no longer tolerated. Labourers are free to sell their 
labour to whomever they please. Dalit children are able to go to school. 
Labourers are able to wear clean clothes, sit in front of their homes on 
khatias (string cots) welcome their guests without interference from the 
landlords, amongst other gains. All this has come about because the landed 
are no longer in a position to exercise illegitimate power with impunity. 
(Bhatia 2005: 1544) 
These gains were cemented by giving Muslim and Dalit leaders a role in government as 
cabinet ministers, and by ensuring that the largely upper caste police and civil officials 
behaved sympathetically to previously disadvantaged groups:  
                                                 
25 These caste groupings are not homogenous categories. For example within the BC category 
there is a sub category called Most Backward. Furthermore, there are individual castes like 
Yadav, Kurmi etc., within the backward grouping and others like Dhobi and Musahar within the 
SC grouping. In terms of political mobilisation, there is always a lot of mixing and matching in 
terms who supports whom.  
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 In 1984, a movement started under the leadership of L.K. Advani for the construction of a 
Ram Janmabhoomi temple in the birth place of Lord Ram in Ayodhya. The 16th-century 
mosque of Babri Masjid which existed on this site was destroyed on December 6, 1992 by 
Hindu Karsevaks (volunteers) in an attempt to reclaim the land known as Ram Janmabhoomi. 
The demolition led to several months of inter-communal rioting between Hindu and Muslim 
communities, causing the death of over 2,000 people. 
27 Group of far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. 
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Despite Bihar's travails, Mr Yadav keeps getting voted back into power. 
Analysts say this is mainly because Mr Yadav has managed to neatly stitch 
together a hitherto unbeatable Muslim-Yadav vote bank by empowering and 
protecting both. (Tewary 2005)
28
 
As for BCs, particularly those of the Yadav caste, they believed that their time had 
come: 
Yadavs have rallied behind him because he has made them feel that they 
rule Bihar as a caste, with even the weakest Yadav flexing muscle 
physically and metaphorically, Laloo Prasad Yadav[
29
] has played on the 
fears of the Muslims to get their electoral endorsement. (A. N. Das 2000: 
506) 
Those belonging to the Yadav caste emerged as the principal source through which 
citizens and officials could access state resources and benefits. They became the new 
patrons. Their monopoly extended from birth certificates, to government contracts; from 
kidnapping for ransom to protection rackets; from sought after assignments in the public 
sector to protection against punishment for absenteeism. As Bhagat describes 
...if you carry a Yadav surname... People will presume that you have got 
connections and that you can approach political parties. This was the exact 
opposite 15 to 20 years ago when a Brahmin surname guaranteed a certain 
stature to you. (2004) 
This was achieved by centralising authority and ensuring that only officials from the 
‘right castes’ dominated important positions. If a suitable candidate was not available, 
the post would be kept vacant or additional charge given to a ‘trusted one’. Slowly but 
steadily, formal channels of supervision broke down and promotion and recruitment to a 
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 The term ‘vote bank’ was first used by M. N. Srinivas. It refers to a loyal group of voters, 
usually from one community (or a combination) who are expected to consistently support a 
party or a politician.  
29
 The official spelling is Lalu not Laloo (Sahay 2004). In quotes where the author has used a 
spelling other than Lalu, I have been true to the spelling used by that author.  
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large number of positions were stalled. Vacancies proliferated. As a result, the ability of 
the state apparatus to deliver on developmental functions deteriorated; grants remained 
un-used and entitlements went unclaimed.  
Yet, in areas where the political incentive for performance survived, there were ‘pockets 
of productivity’30. An example of this duality was the extraordinary success of the 
police in preventing communal violence, while being hopeless in preventing crime, 
particularly kidnapping for ransom: 
According to former DGP of Bihar D.P. Ojha, the problem is not that there 
are criminals in Bihar.  ‘... The real problem in Bihar is the fact that the 
criminals have connections ... they are often in government.’... The JD(U)'s 
Nitish Kumar says, ‘Once Laloo made up his mind to stop communal riots, 
he succeeded. If he wants to, he can stop the kidnapping too’. (Outlook 
2005)
31
 
 
Thus, two factors that contributed to Bihar’s poor state administrative capacity during 
the period were the large number of public sector vacancies and extreme centralisation 
in decision-making. In Chapter 6, I argue that this was the unintended consequence of 
the nature of mobilisation that brought the Yadav regime to power in 1990, and the 
inability of the regime to change the caste composition of the state bureaucracy. Core 
supporters did not have the requisite qualifications for middle and senior public sector 
                                                 
30
 It is well established that even in regions that have poor governance and weak institutions, 
well-functioning government agencies do exist. Some attribute these pockets of productivity to 
exceptional leadership and good management. Others, believe that these ‘pockets’ are 
generated by their place in the country’s political economy. Studies on why ‘pockets of 
productivity’ emerge in states with poor governance are largely based on case studies. A 
notable exception is a set of hypotheses based on an inventory of cases (Leonard 2008). 
31 Following his election as chief minister in 2005, Nitish Kumar used the same police force to 
reduce crime including kidnapping and murder while replicating Yadav’s success with 
communal riots. See Chapter 6 for details.  
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jobs, and upper caste dominated institutions of oversight such as the judiciary (the other 
two being audit and media) would not allow recruitment rules to be broken.  
1.8 Summary and Organisation of Thesis 
In summary, I focused my thesis on governance in Bihar during the Yadav regime 
because I found it odd that under-claiming and under-spending of fiscal transfers, as 
well as large number of government vacancies, was coupled with credible elections, 
repeated electoral success for the incumbent party, and a majority of poor voters. I 
called this the Bihar paradox. To understand the paradox, I first focused on CSS and 
SPA because I hoped they would provide ‘hard data’ that would be useful to compare 
Bihar with other states. However, complete, compiled ‘hard data’ was not available, so 
it was necessary to construct the CSS and SPA datasets. Using this data for a statistical 
analysis, I was able to confirm that poor states in India claimed and spent less fiscal 
transfers, and notably that Bihar did worse than its level of poverty would have 
otherwise predicted. In order to explain this anomaly, I turned to an examination of 
Bihar’s political economy, and argue that the paradox existed because it was expedient 
for the ruling coalition to focus the state apparatus on delivering security to core 
supporters (while maintaining overall insecurity for others), rather than on other public 
sector tasks. 
The organisation of this thesis is intended to provide the reader with an understanding 
of the Bihar paradox, the methods used to explore it and my research findings. 
Following a detailed discussion about alternate explanations on why governments of 
majority-poor democracies may not pursue pro-poor policies in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
provides the background on Bihar and details of the extent and nature of under-claiming 
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and under-spending of centre–state fiscal transfers. Chapter 4 discusses the fiscal 
transfer regime in India and the difficulties involved with putting together the two 
datasets. Chapter 5 presents the findings from econometric analysis of this data. Chapter 
6 details the core argument of the thesis—the political logic of the Bihar government’s 
under-claiming and under-spending of fiscal transfers and its failure to fill vacancies. 
Chapter 7 revises the main arguments, summarises the findings and concludes with 
implications for policy and theory. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The previous chapter introduced the Bihar paradox: the fact that the state, with a 
majority of poor voters, credible democratic elections and an incumbent party with 
repeated electoral success, maintained a large number of public sector vacancies and 
failed to claim or spend centre–state fiscal transfers which could have benefited the 
poor. A key element of this paradox is that poor voters continued to support a leader and 
party that did not implement key pro-poor policies and development programmes.  
This outcome in Bihar—like many other majority-poor democracies—goes against the 
expectations of the median voter theorem. The median voter theorem predicts that when 
the income of the median voter
32
 is less than the average of all voters (i.e., when the 
majority are poor), governments will be responsive to the needs of the poor in a 
majority-rule society (Rowley et al. 2003). Indeed, pro-poor outcomes are only likely if 
the poor use their votes to elect candidates and parties committed to their needs, and 
parties and elected officials respond by crafting policies that address the concerns of the 
poor. In many cases, however, the poor appear to vote for officials that do not advance 
their interests, and elected officials seem to divert policies away from the concerns of 
the poor. 
Thus, to better explore the Bihar paradox, it is important to review a wide array of 
literature that relates to these trends. There is a range of theories that seek to explain 
why elected officials with dismal pro-poor records remain in power in majority-poor 
contexts, some of which focus on why poor voters do what they do, while others focus 
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 Median is the middle of a distribution. It separates the higher half from the lower half. 
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on the motivations of elected officials who divert policy away from pro-poor agendas. I 
have highlighted five relevant bodies of literature below, beginning with those that deal 
with the actions of voters and ending with theories that purport to explain the actions of 
elected officials. There are certain areas of overlap, to be discussed below:  
 Plurality of concerns: voters have one or more alternate political 
concerns that can trump their preference for poverty reduction measures. 
Religion and race are two examples. 
 Politics of patronage (clientelism): voters may cast votes as their patrons 
direct them. The poor comply because they get locked into patron–client 
relationships in order to secure basic services not provided by the 
government, and the opportunity cost of casting their votes 
independently may be too high to risk.  
 Information problems: voters (particularly the poor and marginalised) 
may have difficulties in judging the pro-poor performance of incumbents 
and the credibility of promises made by challengers. 
 Limited democracy: the overriding influence of corruption, elite capture 
and dysfunctional oversight institutions often undermine democratic 
outcomes. It recognises that voter preferences are only one of many 
influences determining policy. 
 The politician’s dilemma: politicians’ failure to implement pro-poor 
policies can be the result of rational choices made within institutional 
contexts that force them to choose immediate political survival over 
longer run collective interests, including economic development. 
Taken together, these bodies of literature contribute to our understanding of why 
majority-poor democracies may fail to produce governments that focus on issues that 
matter to the poor. However, while these theories help explain parts of the Bihar 
paradox, they do not provide mechanisms to explain why the state government under-
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claimed and under-spent fiscal transfers and maintained a large number of public sector 
vacancies. I discuss each below and explain its significant and limitations for this thesis.  
2.1 Plurality of Concerns 
Oftentimes, the poor do not vote for parties that are committed to poverty reduction and 
therefore despite their numbers, fail to persuade governments to pursue pro-poor 
policies. One explanation for this is the salience of political preferences other than 
poverty reduction that shape voting behaviour. 
A plurality of concerns manifests itself when political mobilisation becomes possible on 
more than one issue. In and of itself, having a variety of political concerns and 
preferences along different dimensions is not a normative issue. However, for the poor, 
voting along non-economic dimensions may have negative consequences for pro-poor 
outcomes. As Varshney describes, the poor, like others,  
... have multiple selves. They are not only members of a class of poor, but 
also of linguistic, religious, tribal, and caste communities. Often, their 
voting, like some others, is identity-based, not class based and so is their 
mobilization. Multidimensionality is true of nearly everyone nearly all of 
the time. We all have multiple roles, identities and concerns. They may both 
overlap and conflict. It is rare that any of us will allow any one 
role/identity/concern to drive our political action, even rarer for all poor 
people to do it. Multiple selves drives a wedge between the poor as a class 
and the poor as a political collectivity, significantly reducing, if not 
eliminating, pressure on the government to act on behalf of the poor. 
(Varshney 2000: 3) 
This multi dimensionality of concerns allows political parties in majority-poor 
electorates to win elections without a credible record on pro-poor policies (Roemer 
1998). To understand how this works, assume that one party represents those below the 
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mean income (the poor) and the other party those above the mean income (the rich). If 
the poor are in a majority and the pro-poor party is running on a platform to increase 
social security provision by raising taxation levels, then the pro-poor party will most 
likely receive the support of the poor and win the election. If however, the pro-rich 
party is running on a platform that includes a religious component salient to various 
poor communities, some of the poor may vote for the pro-rich party and the pro-poor 
party may lose. 
The literature describes many examples of other 'dimensions’ that influence electoral 
outcomes for the poor. In the United States (US), social issues often trump the 
economic dimensions and morally conservative, low-income voters often support the 
Republican Party, although many argue that the Democratic Party has a better record on 
pro-poor policy (Huber and Stanig 2006). Similarly, rightist parties in Latin America 
have in general succeeded in attracting poor voters on issues of security and fiscal 
stability, drawing support away from the leftist parties, which typically have better 
welfare-supporting records (Acharya et al. 2006).  
Another set of examples that demonstrates the inability of poor citizens to pursue their 
interests is rooted in empirical work with national and cross-country data on ethnic 
fragmentation. Alesina et al. (1999) use data from urban areas in the US to show that 
the supply of public goods that benefit the poor, such as education, roads, and sewers, is 
inversely related to ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other socioeconomic 
and demographic determinants. According to the authors, there are two reasons for this 
trend:  
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One is that different ethnic groups have different preferences over which 
type of public goods to produce with tax revenues. The second is that each 
ethnic group's utility level for a given public good is reduced if other groups 
also use it. (Alesina et al. 1999: 1244)  
Where ethnic groups are polarized and politicians have ethnic constituencies, the 
salience of ethnic issues increases and the share of spending on public goods are 
reduced as public resources are diverted to private patronage (Alesina et al. 1999). 
Easterly and Levine (1997) use data from cross-country empirical work in Sub Saharan 
Africa to show that ethnic diversity can explain the extent to which countries take up 
public policies that affect poverty reduction, infrastructure and services. Both these 
studies conclude that increased fragmentation inhibits communities from coming 
together to force political parties and the state to pursue pro-poor policies.  
The evidence from India is similar. Banerjee and Somanathan remind us that ‘Indian 
society is among the most divided anywhere, and the roots of these divisions go back 
thousands of years’ (2007: 312). They show how districts with higher ethnic 
heterogeneity have received lesser public goods. The lower castes have the numbers to 
vote into office  elected officials who will support pro-poor policies, but they have so 
far focussed on challenging upper caste dominance (Jaffrelot 2003). With religion as 
another source for political mobilisation, Indian voters and their leaders have been ‘too 
busy righting all the wrongs of yesterday to focus on what would give them a better 
tomorrow’ (Banerjee 2004: 209). Evidence from urban slums in Delhi also suggests that 
differences based on ethnicity, class and gender ‘weaken the ability of communities to 
unite and demand public goods’ (M. Gupta and Pushkar 2010: 71). 
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Examples from India provided by Chandra (2004) and described below, highlight the 
existence of a number of cleavages institutionalised by the Indian state. Though these 
examples have their origins in demonstrating how cleavages have prevented a breakout 
of ethnic outbidding
33
, they are important to the current argument as instances of 
multidimensionality of issues that compromise the ability of the poor to use their 
numbers to their advantage.  
One example of the institutionalisation of cleavages is how the colonial state in India 
privileged religious identity over other types of identities at the national level, 
particularly by providing separate communal electorates to Hindus and Muslims since 
1909. The post-colonial constitution eliminated these privileges, but institutionalised a 
number of other crosscutting cleavages such as affirmative action for disadvantaged 
caste groups, policies on language and creation of new states within the Indian Union 
(Chandra 2004). The fact that ambiguity over which groups were to be included led to 
relatively easy amendment procedures provides adequate incentive for mobilisation on 
these issues.  
Language policies also continue to have political salience because the list of official 
languages in each Indian state continues to be open for negotiation. Even if attaining 
official language status is not possible for a particular group, recognition as a linguistic 
minority in a particular state is enough to confer privilege. This provides incentives for 
politicians to mobilise the electorate along this issue dimension.  
                                                 
33 According to theories of ethnic outbidding, ethnic divisions inevitably give rise to more ethnic 
parties (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 2009). 
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Similarly, recognition of statehood became an institutionalised issue dimension because 
of the Union Government’s policy of granting statehood based on ethnicity (articulated 
as language, tribe and region). This issue continues to play a role in politics in India. In 
2000, three new states were formed in response to mass mobilisation. Since 2010, the 
demand for a new Telengana State to be carved out of Andhra Pradesh has been 
renewed and continues to draw popular support. As a result ‘... mobilization around 
interest politics is weakly represented within the national electoral arena... in contrast, 
the politics of identity has situated itself pre-eminently within the electoral and party 
political domain’ (Katzenstein et al. 2001: 252). 
Under conditions of multiparty competition and a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral 
system, crosscutting cleavages produce fluidity because losers are able to manufacture a 
majority using other dimensions (Chandra 2004). This has made it easy for political 
entrepreneurs who choose to work with institutionalised cleavages to make credible 
promises to voters within the existing rules of the game.  
The above theories of the plurality of political concerns and empirical findings from 
India and across the world offer an explanation for one part of the Bihar paradox: why, 
despite their dominant numbers, the majority-poor electorate was unable to elect a 
political party that would pursue policies aimed at poverty reduction. However, they do 
not illuminate why officials in Bihar under-claimed and under-spent the centre–state 
fiscal transfers freely available, nor filled the large number of public sector vacancies. 
Furthermore, the fact that, in Bihar, the class interests of BCs, Dalits and Muslims (all 
members of the poorest sections of the electorate) were largely in harmony, adds a twist 
that this literature is unable to explain. 
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2.2 Politics of Patronage (Clientelism) 
Given that the literature related to plurality of political concerns is unable to explain the 
entire Bihar paradox, I turn to the literature on the politics of patronage and clientelism 
for greater insight into the inefficacy of the Bihar state government to use fiscal 
transfers available to it and to fill vacancies in the bureaucracy.  
In order to understand the diversity of democratic experiences in general, it is useful to 
view the interaction between citizens/voters as ‘principals’ and electoral 
candidates/representatives as their ‘agents’. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 1) describe 
this principal-agent interaction in terms of its five features: 
 Voters have policy preferences over a range of salient issues 
 Politicians who seek office bundle issue positions (i.e., create issue 
platforms that combine a number of issues they think are salient) and 
promise to either implement or reject them if voted into office 
 Voters base their votes on the extent to which these programmatic 
bundles relate to their own preferences, as well as the credibility of the 
office seeker  
 Candidates who win elections implement their promises by constantly 
evaluating the evolving preferences of their current supporters as well as 
undecided voters 
 In subsequent elections, voters hold incumbents accountable for the 
extent to which they acted on and/or implemented their platforms as 
office holders or in the opposition 
In many polities however, particularly those in the developing world, the above 
interaction does not reflect the nature of the democratic experience. Instead, the 
emphasis is on using ‘money, jobs and services in direct exchange for votes’ (Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007: iii). Indeed, 
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Economic development is the most commonly confirmed predictor of 
differential modes of democratic accountability. Affluent democracies and 
parties appealing to affluent citizens in a democracy tend to operate more 
through programmatic accountability, while parties in poor democracies and 
parties appealing to the poorest electoral segments tend to practise 
clientelism. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 24) 
India has the largest number of poor people in the world (Sumner 2010) and Bihar has 
the largest number of poor people in India (Himanshu 2007) (see Chapter 3 for details). 
Politics of patronage and clientelism (used interchangeably in this thesis)
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 can therefore 
be expected to thrive in Bihar and may therefore help us understand the paradox in 
question. 
Patronage or clientelism can be defined as the ‘proffering of material goods in return for 
electoral support, where the criterion for distribution that the patron uses is simply: did 
you (will you) support me’ (Stokes 2007: 605). This differs from corruption (or 
‘campaign finance’ depending on the country), which is the flow of money from private 
actors and entities to politicians. In some ways, all politics is an attempt to offer 
material goods and services in exchange for electoral support or votes. A key 
differentiator of patronage is that this relates to the ‘private goods’ end of the spectrum 
as opposed to the ‘collective’ or ‘public’ end. Here the spectrum is typically defined as 
extending from the private, through ‘club’ to the collective or public35.  
                                                 
34 Unlike the position taken in this thesis, some view patronage—‘the proffering of public 
resources (most typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support’—
as a distinct form of the broader category of clientelism (Mainwaring 1999: 177; Stokes 2007: 5-
6).  
35
 Pure public goods are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption. Public goods contrast 
with private goods. Non-rivalry implies that the consumption of a good or service by one does 
not jeopardise its use or consumption by another. Non-excludability ensures that one cannot 
exclude any person from securing the benefits of the public good. Therefore, a consumer may 
‘free ride’ on the provision of the public good, securing the benefits but not paying the costs. A 
lighthouse signal is a classic example of a pure public good, where the provision is both non-
rival and non-excludable. An untelevised sports event is an example of a public good where the 
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Clientelistic exchange is different from general corruption and dysfunctional 
institutions. The latter are dealt with in the section below on limited democracy. The 
lack of a personal element and the absence of continuity often distinguish clientelism 
from general corruption. While particularistic arrangements are not always corrupt, 
corruption cannot be precluded in such an arrangement. For instance, the allocation of a 
public resource to favoured clients may not be illegal unless a bribe has been paid to 
secure this exchange. 
Clientelism is also distinct from ‘pork-barrel politics’, which describes the flow of 
resources and allocations to specific geographies, while the cost is shared by all 
(Aldrich 1995; cited by Stokes 2007). The distinguishing feature that sets clientelism 
apart from other forms of materially oriented political strategies is the distributive 
criteria. For example, in pork-barrel politics, the distributive criterion is, ‘do you live in 
my electoral district or constituency?’, or in the case of other forms of redistributive 
politics, ‘do you belong to a class of beneficiaries?’. As opposed to this, in politics of 
patronage the criteria is ‘did you or will you support me?’. The latter typically excludes 
non-clients from a class of otherwise eligible beneficiaries (Stokes 2007).  
The preceding paragraph focuses on clientelism from the vantage point of the patron, 
but the client’s view is equally important. For the client, the emphasis is on 
‘instrumental friendship’, the protection and benefits that the patron offers (Scott 1972). 
Clients value these for one of two reasons. One, the benefits are not provided by the 
state as public goods—for example, the protection from criminality, particularly 
kidnapping, during Yadav’s domination of politics in Bihar. Two, they cannot be 
                                                                                                                                               
provision is non-rival but excludable. A public good that becomes excludable is a club good 
(e.g. a resident’s association or a public activity that requires a membership fee). Club goods 
can be thought of as being excludable public goods (McNutt 1999). 
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purchased because people are poor or because the markets do not exist (Scott 1972). It 
is largely for this reason that clientelism dominates ‘societies with widespread poverty 
and with a ineffective state apparatus’ (Stokes 2007). 
In addition, there is a distinction in the literature between economic and political 
monopoly as sources of patronage power.  Medina and Stokes (2007) describe 
‘economic monopoly’ as being independent of the outcome of an election while 
‘political monopoly’ is possible only if the patron has access to public office. An 
example of economic monopoly is a patron’s monopoly ownership of land because of 
which landless labourers are dependent on him for employment and often for loans 
during an emergency. Under conditions of political monopoly, voters could face a 
collective action problem (Stokes 2007). The voter who votes against the patron when 
the majority votes for him or her risks retaliation. Therefore, each voter minimises risk 
when s/he votes for the patron. Since all voters face this same incentive, the patron 
remains in power even if unpopular.  
The collective action problem could be one possible reason for Yadav’s continued 
electoral success. This would be the case if people voted for him out of fear of reprisal 
even if he were unpopular. If this were the case, the politics of patronage and the 
collective action problem, like the plurality of concerns discussed above, could offer an 
explanation to the part of the Bihar paradox related to continued electoral success. 
However, it is less useful in explaining the tendency of Bihar politicians to under-use 
state resources and leave public sector vacancies. Patronage theory unanimously 
predicts that patrons’ who hold public office tend to overuse the material resources of 
the state in order to further the patron-client relationship. This was the case in Mexico, 
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for example, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) managed to stay in 
power long after they lost popularity by dolling out state resources (Magaloni 2006). In 
the US, the literature suggests that 
Machines in American cities tended to live beyond their means and the 
evidence suggests that machines in new nations behave similarly. As a form 
of rule machines are particularly subject to what Zolberg terms ‘an 
inflationary process of demand-formation’ and naturally thrive best in a 
buoyant economy that provides them with a continually expanding store of 
material incentives to distribute. (Scott 1969: 1157) 
Citing the example of the Congress party in the Indian state of Orissa, Scott also 
explains that Bailey (1963) 
portrays Congress' local party leaders as machine brokers in a context where 
‘workers and sometimes voters expect some tangible reward, not 
necessarily a bribe, but assistance of exactly the kind which brokers 
provide’ (jobs, licenses, welfare payments, etc.). (1969: 1145) 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson also suggest that client–patron relationships require the flow of 
material resources: 
Under conditions of democratic competition with full enfranchisement, 
local exchange networks will rarely suffice to win national elections. 
Politicians need to organise the flow of material resources across the 
complex pyramidal network of client – broker – patron exchanges. 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 8) 
Though most theorists agree that patrons who hold public office will use the material 
resources the state has to offer, country evidence differs as to whether the patronage 
beneficiaries will be core supporters or swing voters. The latter will inter alia be 
affected by the voting system as well as voter turnout rates. Evidence from the US 
suggests that core supporters will be the favoured recipients; counties that traditionally 
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support the governor’s party receive larger transfers from the state to local governments 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006). In Mexico, the evidence is mixed, as both core and 
swing voters have benefitted. Magaloni (2006) found that the PRI spent little in regions 
controlled by the opposition, and concentrated instead on regions in which voters would 
be most likely to defect. However, Yarahuan (2009) found that the PRI favoured its 
own strongholds. In Peru, anti-poverty program benefits flowed to ‘marginal’ districts 
that President Fujimoro had come close to but failed to win (Schady 2000).  
The evidence from Argentina is also mixed. Between 1999 and 2001, Weitz-Shapiro 
(2006) found that the distribution of unemployment-compensation funds was biased in 
favour of swing districts. Conversely, Stokes (2005) found that Argentine Peronists 
concentrated on giving inducements to indifferent voters as well as core supporters. 
Evidence from the state of Madhya Pradesh in India points to concerted efforts by 
politicians to benefit core supporters and key marginal constituencies. Grants from the 
Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) followed a clear 
electoral cycle with core supporters benefiting soon after elections and swing voters as 
the next elections drew near (V. Singh et al. 2003).  
In sum, though there is ambiguity on who will be the beneficiaries of patronage 
resources at the disposal of the state, there is unanimity that state resources will be used. 
Herein lies the contradiction between the observations from Bihar and what theory 
predicts. Huge amounts of unclaimed and unused centre–state fiscal transfers from the 
central government, particularly CSS grants, remained unused over a fifteen year period 
when the party led by Lalu Prasad Yadav was repeatedly re-elected despite indications 
that the economic development of the state was being jeopardised due to political 
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mismanagement (discussed in Chapter 3). This happened despite various studies 
showing that many of these CSS schemes in other states ‘have been mainly ways of 
securing votes...’ (Wilkinson 2007: 118) 
For example, the beneficiaries of the Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY) program (funded by a 
CSS) to provide subsidised housing were in theory supposed to be selected by the 
village gram sabha (general assembly). In reality, however ‘the lists of IAY 
beneficiaries are often handed to the block level officials by Members of the Legislative 
Assembly’ (R. Nayak et al. 2002: 25). In another example, Wilkinson (2007) studied the 
state budget of Tamil Nadu to determine how much of the rural development 
department’s schemes represented patronage resources that politicians use to benefit 
their clients. He read the program rules of each of the schemes in Tamil Nadu 
government’s rural development budget for 1999-2000, and found that against a total of 
£95 million (@ Rs. 75 to a Pound), MLAs and state representatives to the national 
parliament (MPs) controlled 32 per cent of all rural development spending in the state. 
In addition to this, MLAs also indirectly controlled a further 49 per cent through their 
control of beneficiary selection committees and informal powers to transfer officials 
who refuse to use these schemes to benefit their supporters. 
Describing the distribution of clientelism in India, Wilkinson writes: 
The pressure for reform of clientelism in India will not of course be equal 
all over the country... In some cases, such as Bihar, where levels of 
economic growth are very low or negative and middle-class out-migration is 
high, it is hard to see any real push for reform succeeding except in the very 
long term... (Wilkinson 2007: 138)   
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According to the politics of patronage argument, misuse, waste and siphoning off are 
consistent outcomes in a Bihar-type context, however cheap money lying unspent in the 
governments account is not. The theoretical puzzle that remains is: beyond their failure 
to spur economic development that might help the poor, why did officials in Bihar 
under-claim and under-spend centre–state fiscal transfers that are known to benefit 
powerful interests and serve as valuable patronage resources in other states? 
There is one specific line of theory from the literature on the politics of patronage that 
may still offer an explanation of the continued failure of the regime in Bihar to promote 
economic development. This is the argument that clientelist parties may have an interest 
in preventing the development of a region as part of a strategy to remain in power. 
Chubb (1981) argues that this happened in Italy’s Mezzogiorno region where the 
Christian Democratic Party, in an effort to perpetuate the conditions of poverty and 
socioeconomic fragmentation upon which they thrived, worked to keep its supporters 
poor and dependent. To avoid being undermined by the inevitable processes of social 
and economic development, patrons, through their control over critical resources, may 
impede processes of development that transform traditional patron–client ties into 
modern interest-based parties.  
This type of behaviour is something that I observed both during my fieldwork and my 
civil service career in Bihar. I found that politicians were aware of the benefits of 
ensuring that citizens were unable to access state resources as entitlements (i.e., on their 
own because they had a right to). By doing this, they preserved the value of the 
patronage goods and services they had to offer. There is an often-used word for this in 
Bihar: pairavi (to canvass). Giving a ‘recommendation’ to get the client’s work done is 
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an important service that patrons provide and therefore patrons have an interest in 
ensuring that work cannot get done otherwise. 
With this line of reasoning, it could be argued that CSS grants went unspent to avoid the 
contribution they could have made to economic progress, which might have undermined 
the attraction of the Yadav regime to its core voters. Still, however, this theory does not 
account for the large number of public sector vacancies that were not used either to 
improve state capacity or to provide jobs to supporters or swing voters. 
2.3 Information Problem 
A third body of literature that may add to our understanding of the Bihar paradox are 
theories regarding the impact of imperfect information on democratic outcomes. 
Fundamentally, the ability of a democratic system to ensure that elected officials 
represent the best interests of their constituencies hinges on the ability of citizens to 
adequately judge candidates and make informed decisions before casting their votes. 
Thus, a lack of credible information or the unequal distribution of information on 
candidates’ and officials’ policy platforms and past performance will disrupt the 
translation of voter preferences into government policy (Keefer and Khemani 2005). 
It stands to reason that citizens need information about the performance of their 
representatives if they are to hold them to account for their actions in office or in the 
opposition. Models that treat voters as principals and office holders as agents 
(principal–agent models) demonstrate the validity of this proposition (Barro 1973; 
Ferejohn 1986). One of the main tools through which voters receive information is mass 
media. As such, there is a substantial literature, both from India and around the world 
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on the role of mass media in reducing corruption (Adsera et al. 2003; Brunetti and 
Weder 2003) and shaping more responsive governments (Besley and Burgess 2002; 
Stromberg 2004b). One way in which media coverage influences the behaviour of 
elected officials is the threat that citizens will use the information provided by the media 
to reward or punish candidates and political parties at election time. Both Dreze and Sen 
(1989) and Stromberg (2004a), however, argue that mass media is more likely to be 
interested in sensational events rather than every day (and I would add ‘complex’) 
matters like endemic malnutrition or poor quality of classrooms, which have 
significance particularly for the poor and vulnerable. Still, if mass media were not 
independent from the state or were inaccessible to marginalised groups, this could have 
negative implications for representative democracy.  
Mass media is not the only source of information nor is the performance of elected 
officials the only information that citizens need to have. The business of government is 
a complex one. While it would be unreasonable to expect any lay citizen to be well 
informed about all aspects of public decision-making, voters need to know enough to 
get a sense of how well their money is being used to administer the state on their behalf. 
Evidence from India and the US suggests that voters use daily interactions to decide 
how to cast their ballots. Krishna (2006) has shown that in India, family, neighbours, 
influential people and village assemblies are important sources of information and 
preference formation. Evidence from the US also suggests that voters use very limited 
information, gained from everyday interactions, and simple voting criteria when 
deciding how to cast their ballots (Fiorina 1990).  
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According to Khemani (2007b), the information that citizens in poor and developing 
countries ‘pick up’ as part of their everyday lives, generates undue public attention to 
inefficient, and sometimes ineffective, policies of targeted transfers. This results in 
governments having  
… exaggerated preferences for targeted expenditures. For example, a large 
and disproportionate share of expenditures in health and education typically 
flows to the salaries of teachers and health workers, yet absenteeism and 
shirking are rampant, so that no effective services are provided in many 
cases. (Keefer and Khemani 2005: 3) 
Keefer and Khemani (2005) attribute this to two kinds of market failures. One, citizens 
rarely have access to the comparative, electoral district-level information that is needed 
to judge how well their elected representative has done compared to others. Two, even 
if available, citizens may be  
… apathetic to using actual development outcomes as an indicator of 
politician performance, focusing instead on simple actions they can directly 
observe, such as announcement of a price subsidy or provision of jobs, 
because they do not expect politicians to be able to improve these difficult 
outcomes. (Khemani 2007b: 59) 
This may lead to a ‘vicious cycle of low performance and low expectations’, and a 
scramble for ‘private benefits from public resources ... with opposition politicians 
having trouble mounting a credible challenge on the platform of broad development 
issues’ (Khemani 2007b: 59). 
The information problem discussed above and the ‘low performance, low expectations’ 
hypothesis provide a useful perspective on the Bihar paradox because they give another 
plausible reason for the ruling party’s retention of its core constituents even after under-
claiming and under-spending substantial amounts of centre–state fiscal transfers. 
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However, like the theories regarding the plurality of concerns and the politics of 
patronage, the information problem does very little to improve our understanding of 
reasons for why the Yadav regime did not fill a large number of vacancies in the public 
sector.  Also while it offers an explanation for why people voted for them even though 
they didn’t spend, it does not tell us why they didn’t spend in the first place. 
2.4 Limited Democracy 
A fourth body of theory suggests that there are two other reasons why democracy 
sometimes fails to advance the interests of the poor. The first reason is that a polity may 
be democratic in veneer but function in a limited, shallow or illiberal way. Such 
democracies have been given various names, such as ‘pseudo-democracies’ or ‘electoral 
authoritarian regimes’ (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002). They may have many of the 
formal features of a democracy like elected representation. Their elections may even be 
competitive and allow opposition parties to gain control of seats in the national 
parliament or in provincial governments. However, if the elections are not free and fair, 
the ruling party in these countries may remain continuously in power. This eliminates a 
key pathway through which democracy delivers accountability and responsiveness 
(Diamond 2005). Indeed, limited democracy—characterised by the overriding influence 
of corruption, elite-capture and dysfunctional institutions—may contribute to a context 
where majority-poor voters are unable to elect governments that pursue pro-poor 
policies.  
The second reason this body of literature suggests that democracies may be limited in 
their ability to respond to the needs of the poor is that voters are only one of many 
influences on policy making in any polity. Logically, voters remain ignorant beyond the 
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point where the marginal cost of gaining additional political information exceeds 
marginal benefits. The benefits of additional knowledge are low because an individual 
has only a miniscule impact on policymaking. This opens the field for policymakers to 
deviate from citizen preferences, making it possible for interests groups to influence 
policy instead. Even when politics is competitive, elected officials are therefore willing 
to distort policies in favour of organised interests. This is often because campaign 
contributions from interest groups allow candidates to mount larger campaigns at 
election time and even increase their popularity through side payments to voters funded 
by interest groups. Rational ignorance and group interests are therefore two further 
ways in which voters’ influence, and thus, democracy itself, is limited (Rowley and 
Schneider 2004). 
In a limited or shallow democracy with weak institutions, the negative impact of 
corruption on the poor can be grouped into three broad (but not mutually exclusive) 
categories. The first is economic. Corruption reduces economic efficiency and has a 
detrimental impact on growth and investment (Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995, 
1998), partly through the diversion of government expenditure towards less productive 
and easy-to-steal opportunities (Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), and by 
indirectly raising the cost of business and reducing profits in a way that leads to the 
redirecting of foreign direct investment (Wei 1997).  
The second is distributional. Corruption creates distortions that privilege the rich 
because they can pay the bribes that are needed to benefit from government-provided 
goods and services (Lui 1985). In this way, ‘Corruption is often a highly regressive tax 
and the poor pay more of their incomes proportionately than do the wealthy and the 
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middle class’ (World Bank 2003: ii). Over time, this results in countries with higher 
levels of corruption having higher inequality and poverty (Deininger and Squire 1998; 
Ravallion and Chen 1997).  
The third is political. Corruption, elite-capture and dysfunctional institutions can trump 
the ability of democracy to make democratically elected governments responsive to the 
interests of poor people on whose electoral support they depend (Diamond 2005; Scott 
1969).   
The literature on corruption and limited democracy also marks a shift in agency. While 
the previously discussed theories focus on why poor people may support parties that do 
not advocate or implement pro-poor policies, limited democracy theories discuss the 
ways in which politicians who tend to be non-pro poor manage to construct electoral 
majorities by manipulating the system.  
The literature points to a number of ways in which corruption, elite-capture and 
dysfunctional institutions diminish the potential of democracies to alleviate poverty by 
reducing the vertical accountability of politicians to their constituents’ preferences. One 
is through parties and candidates obtaining the resources to compete through the sale of 
political decisions. This kind of corruption in party and campaign finance has a veneer 
of responsiveness and gives those with the resources a short cut to electoral victory:  
… hints of municipal corruption and graft were winked at, even applauded, 
… as the social banditry of an urban Robin Hood in spite of their long-run 
costs to the city… (Scott 1969: 1144) 
The poor are the most vulnerable to these kinds of inducements: 
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Poverty shortens a man's time horizon and maximizes the effectiveness of 
short-run material inducements. Quite rationally he is willing to accept a 
job, cash, or simply the promise of assistance when he needs it, in return for 
his vote and that of his family. (Scott 1969: 1150)  
This makes it possible to mobilise impoverished constituencies by distributing state jobs 
to loyal followers and a dollop of cheap goods to constituents around election time in 
place of any real policy response to poverty. While these political systems may look 
democratic, they result in largely corrupt and exploitative governments (Diamond 2005: 
410).  
Beyond elections (so called ‘vertical accountability’36), other hallmarks of a democratic 
system are the distribution of power and checks and balances it requires to encourage 
good governance and limit malpractice. This ‘horizontal accountability’ comes through 
oversight by institutions such as the courts, legislature, audit and the media—all 
balancing one other. However, when some or all these institutions become 
dysfunctional, electoral competition alone cannot deliver what democracies should be 
able to—accountability and responsiveness to the electorate (and particularly the 
marginalised). When democracy is hollow and poverty endemic, civil society also tends 
to be weak and insensitive to the needs of the poor. A state apparatus that lacks capacity 
and credibility can be easily co-opted and captured by the elite, thus increasing the 
inability of democracy to protect the weak and the vulnerable (Joseph 2003). In 
countries where rule of law is also weak, the media is compromised and the courts 
subject to elite capture, the state is often unable to discipline its police forces and break 
local power monopolies. In such situations, democratic elections alone cannot enforce 
accountability and make the state responsive. 
                                                 
36
 For a discussion on vertical and horizontal accountability see (Luckham et al. 2003). 
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Parts of the limited democracy literature described above are useful as we consider the 
Bihar paradox. From Chapter 1 we know that state capacity was weak in Bihar, 
corruption was a reality and the ruling party kept coming back to power despite doing 
very little in material terms for the poor. However, in important ways this theory still 
falls short of a complete explanation of the paradox. For example, while the prediction 
is that the majority-poor electorate would be open to exchanging electoral support for 
material inducements, something that centre–state fiscal transfers (particularly CSS) 
offered in plenty, Yadav failed to use them and yet managed to remain in power for an 
unmatched 15 year period. As with other institutions, both the media and the courts 
were aggressively against malfeasance and wrong doing, as a result of which Yadav and 
the chairperson of the Bihar Public Service Commission went to jail for corruption. On 
the point of elite-capture, the position is quite the opposite at least on the surface, as the 
Yadav regime did—if nothing else—represent the success of subaltern capture of the 
state by unseating decades of dominance by a socially and economically powerful elite 
minority (discussed in Chapter 6). On balance, therefore, theories relating to limited 
democracy as characterised by corruption, institutional dysfunction, elite-capture and 
the marginal influence of individual voters leave many questions unanswered.  
2.5 Politician’s Dilemma 
The fifth and final body of literature that may help unravel the Bihar paradox is that 
which explores that politician’s dilemma. The idea from this theory is that political 
leaders in poor and underdeveloped regions often face institutional contexts that require 
them to sacrifice economic development for political gain. The failure to implement 
pro-poor policies according to this theory is the result of rational choices made by 
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politicians and bureaucrats who are driven by their need to maximise success in their 
careers. As Geddes states,  
Whatever additional interests they may have, most political leaders want to 
remain in office. And, generally speaking, their other goals can only be 
accomplished while in office. Political institutions determine which 
strategies for staying in office are likely to work... One can explain much of 
the behaviour of states as the outcome of rational choices by self-interested 
officials acting within particular institutional and circumstantial contexts. 
(1994: 8) 
Geddes (1994) further discusses four types of political actors and their motivations: 1) 
legislators, for whom the principal concern is re-election; 2) presidents or the chief 
executive, who seek to complete their term in office, maximise power within the party 
and improve chances of re-election; 3) party leaders, who seek to maximise the power 
of their party and their own power within the party; and 4) bureaucrats, who do their 
best to hold on to their job and maximise the material advantages that accompany it.  
The above analysis has its roots in the unusual behaviour exhibited by governments 
that, under certain circumstances, affected radical shifts in economic policy without the 
support of powerful interest groups. Standard political theories, both Marxist and 
pluralist, see political outcomes as the result of a clash of interests in which the most 
powerful win. These theories were unable to explain why interests that were considered 
economically and politically dominant were set aside by these governments to pursue 
conflicting policies (Geddes 1994). 
In Latin America, for example, some governments took up industrialisation efforts that 
jeopardised the profits of producers of primary product exports at a time when 
agriculture and mining were economically dominant (Geddes 1994). The interests that 
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benefitted from this shift in policy were often weak and lacked influence. Yet this did 
not stop governments from acting with a certain sense of autonomy to achieve policy 
goals. It is in this context that the notion of state autonomy has assumed significance for 
scholars, although by itself the notion of state autonomy is anomalous because 
government policies in a democracy are expected to reflect societal interests. This is the 
context to the proposition espoused by Geddes, that the state is a collection of self-
interested individuals who seek to maximise career success. Indeed, 
Within modern democratic regimes, particular institutions, such as electoral 
rules and party procedures, determine what kinds of behaviour are most 
likely to contribute to career advancement. By analysing the institutionally 
determined incentives facing political leaders, one can explain state actions 
that might be unexpected from the perspective of more traditional 
approaches. (Geddes 1994: 12)   
Thus, when decision-makers can ensure their career advancement by using funds to 
implement programs or by filling vacancies they will do so. Where politicians’ and 
bureaucrats’ interests are furthered by bartering away resources, not using them, or 
appropriating them selectively for political support, they will do so. The incentives that 
elected and appointed officials both face, therefore, depend on the political, 
administrative and social circumstances of a particular environment.    
This is a useful vantage point from which to analyse the Bihar paradox because it opens 
up the possibility of using political incentives as a key to deciphering political action 
and its administrative consequences. Therefore, the policies that a party will pursue 
when in office—particularly its stance on the nature and extent of public expenditure 
and with respect to bureaucratic capacity—will depend on the extent to which such 
policies further the career interests of the decision-makers. Thus, an alternative path to 
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understand the two parts of the Bihar Paradox that the review of literature so far has not 
been able to adequately explain—the failure to use centre-state fiscal transfers and the 
large number of public sector vacancies—may be to examine the political incentives 
that could have motivated such behaviour. 
This is not to say that social and economic development will always pose a dilemma to 
elected officials, or that they will have to sacrifice pro-poor policies so as to remain in 
office. Governments in Latin America have affected radical shifts in economic policy 
without the support of powerful interest groups (Geddes 1994). The poor and the not so 
poor ‘middle strata’, may have shared interests that open up the possibility of shared 
alliances (Nelson 2005). The latter is likely to happen when the gap between incomes 
and lifestyles of the poor and the middle strata is modest; they are intermingled 
geographically; they have complementary patterns of income generation and their 
ethnic, religious and other identities coincide (Nelson 2005). Political leaders are also 
able to some degree mould the context, through coalition building, managing 
expectations, good timing, bargaining and even stealth (Ascher 1984; Melo et al. 2011 
expected). 
It is also not the case that India’s democracy and capitalism invariably imposes 
constraints on elected officials, forcing them to choose between pro-poor policies and 
political survival. Kohli (1989) shows how within India in the 1970’s, state 
governments such as the communist government in West Bengal successfully adopted 
redistributive pro-poor policies that improved the conditions of sharecroppers. They 
circumvented issues of state capacity and bureaucratic ineffectiveness by empowering 
panchayats and getting rid of landlord bias. They did so by getting party sympathisers 
58 
elected to panchayats and formally subjecting local and district level bureaucrats to their 
supervision. 
2.6 Summary 
The above theories have provided us with ample rationale for why a majority-poor 
electorate might have continued to support the RJD, despite the fact that Yadav’s 
regime did not pursue widespread economic development that could have benefitted the 
poor. It may have been that poor voters were mobilised on issues unrelated to poverty 
(plurality of concerns), in clientelistic relationships that dictated their votes (patronage), 
or lacked sufficient information to judge the performance of the regime (information 
problems). Furthermore, the Yadav government could have remained in power due to 
corruption, weak institutions, thin accountability or the existence of powerful interest 
groups (limited democracy).  
As discussed, however, few of these theories provide explanations for why the 
government in Bihar during this time failed to claim and spend large amounts of fiscal 
transfers while maintaining a bevy of public sector vacancies. Patronage theory suggests 
that under-use of transfers could have been a means to stall economic development, but 
does not provide an explanation for the unfilled vacancies. In the end, the concept of the 
politicians’ dilemma provides the most useful vantage point from which to explore the 
Bihar paradox, including the under-use of centre–state fiscal transfers and the large 
numbers of public sector vacancies.   
Therefore it is from this vantage point that the analysis of this thesis has proceeded to 
examine the political motivations that may have helped shape the Bihar paradox. For 
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this examination, it is important to first understand Bihar’s deep history as well as the 
political landscape immediately before, during and after the Yadav regime. These issues 
will be discussed in brief in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 – A Brief History of Politics and Development 
in Bihar 
There are five characteristics of Bihar before and during Lalu Prasad Yadav’s period of 
dominance that are important to highlight for the argument of this thesis. The first is 
that Bihar was relatively cursed by history, and was not an example of good governance 
or social harmony long before Yadav assumed office in 1990. The second is the salience 
of caste and caste conflict in everyday life in the State. The third is the emergence of 
BCs as dominant players in politics. The fourth is that BCs and Muslims (the core 
supporters of the Yadav regime) were poor and socially deprived, and that during the 
fifteen-year period from 1990 to 2005 when Yadav and the RJD
37
 were at the helm, 
Bihar failed to catch up with the rest of India with respect to a number of social 
indicators. The fifth and final point is that, during Yadav’s leadership, the Bihar 
Government under-claimed and under-spent substantial amounts of fiscal transfers 
(mostly CSS grants) from the Central Government that were otherwise available to it. 
Yadav and his party therefore failed to make a difference to Bihar’s backwardness and 
poverty during their tenure. 
3.1 Bihar’s History of Troubled Governance and Poor State Capacity 
In this section, I discuss first the history and consequences of Bihar’s development and 
governance during British colonial rule. This is followed by an assessment of the period 
prior to Yadav becoming chief minister in 1990. 
                                                 
37
 When Yadav became chief minister of Bihar in 1990, he was leading the Janata Dal party in 
the state legislature. In 1997, after he became an accused in the fodder scam, he broke away 
from the Janata Dal and created a new party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal. At the time of 
submission of this thesis he continues to be its national president. 
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3.1.1 Permanent Settlement and its Consequences 
Following the battle of Buxar in Bihar, the British East India Company secured the 
diwani (overlordship) of Bengal in 1764, which at the time included the present day 
states of Bihar and Orissa. At that time the term zamindar (Zamīn is Persian for earth 
and dār is holder) was a generic title given by the Mughals to people with a range of 
rights and responsibilities, from autonomous or semi-independent chieftains to peasant-
proprietors (Habib 1963). 
Under the Mughals, zamindars were required to perform certain revenue, police, judicial 
and military duties. Although zamindar titles were allowed to be held hereditarily, the 
holders were not considered to be the proprietors of their estates. It was the duty of the 
diwan (the representative of the Mughal empire in Bengal) to ensure that zamindars 
were neither lax nor overly stringent. However because the Mughal empire was in 
decline by 1764, the writ of the Mughal state did not extend to many parts of Bihar and 
supervision was lax. The British found this a difficult and complex system to 
administer. By 1793, the then governor general Lord Cornwallis introduced the 
‘permanent settlement’, under which the rent to be paid by a zamindar to the East India 
Company was fixed in perpetuity. However, no restriction was placed on the amount of 
taxes a zamindar could collect. As McPherson describes, 
… it was one of the most difficult tasks of early British administrators to 
reduce the system to order. Ultimately, after numerous temporary 
adjustments and prolonged discussion, it was decided that it would be in the 
best interests of the country to place the land revenue demand of Bengal and 
Bihâr on a fixed basis, and the permanent settlement was accordingly made 
by Lord Cornwallis in 1793. … all collecting agents of whatever degree or 
origin were recognised as landed proprietors… [in the] past 150 years, 
rental assets have increased at least tenfold… had the permanently settled 
area of Bihâr been left on the same temporary basis as is established in other 
parts of India, it would now be producing a revenue of £2 million instead of 
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the existing £800,000. The difference would have gone far to place the 
province on its feet financially… (1931: 67) 
In addition to reducing uncertainty in the Company’s budget, the permanent settlement 
was intended to draw investments into agriculture. By fixing in perpetuity the land 
revenue payable by zamindars and allowing them to retain any excess revenue, the 
expectation was that zamindars would invest surpluses in land or lease out land to other 
farmers. Instead, most zamindars extracted exorbitant rents from the tenants by 
delegating the right of rent collection to amlas (subordinate agents) who imposed their 
own arbitrary assessments. Tenants whose rents were low, and therefore could have 
invested surplus, faced eviction because zamindars were always on the lookout for ways 
to increase rent. This left only basic subsistence for most tenant farmers, and there was 
little to spare for effecting improvements in land and living conditions. A large 
proportion of tenant cultivators barely managed to make ends meet even in good crop 
years. In bad ones, they had to borrow for subsistence. Once peasants fell into debt, the 
exorbitant interest rates ensured that they could never get out of it (Sharma 2005). As 
explained by Das, 
... the fact that the system of lease to a burgeoning class of rich peasants did 
not evolve in Bihar, the pressure of population on the land was much higher 
in Bihar and there was an ‘admittedly lower level of awareness on the part 
of the Bihar peasantry of their rights’ did much to make the system even 
worse, the tenants even more oppressed, the landlords even stronger and 
land even a more valuable asset in Bihar than in Bengal. (A. N. Das 1983: 
25) 
  
To make matters worse, the zamindars and their amlas extracted agricultural surplus in 
other forms, such as abwabs (various extra-legal demands). Zulum (physical 
maltreatment and oppression) of agricultural workers while extracting labour rent 
63 
through beggar (unpaid forced labour) was common. Customarily, the zamindar had 
first claim on the tenants’ labour and this was extracted ruthlessly (Hauser 1961; cited 
in Sharma 2005). The permanent settlement therefore produced an extremely 
exploitative agrarian structure in the countryside of Bihar, and zamindars had complete 
political and economic control over a pauperised peasantry. 
Permanent settlement therefore failed to create agrarian surplus that could go on to 
become the basis for primary accumulation and subsequent diversification of the 
economy. Consequently, Bihar, in spite of its rich mineral endowments and agricultural 
potential, remained a source of raw material and labour for capital accumulation and 
diversification of production in other parts of India and the British Empire. 
Permanent settlement and the delegation of revenue administration to zamindars had 
another ramification that was important from the perspective of state capacity. It meant 
that the colonial system of revenue administration did not penetrate this region. The fact 
that land revenue was fixed also implied that the revenue generation capacity of the 
provincial government was limited. This resulted in lower government expenditure. The 
accumulated effect of this low expenditure and the absence of a properly laid out system 
of land records and revenue administration led to vastly poor state capacity that had 
serious and long term implications for Bihar’s post-independence development:  
Low expenditure on creation of administrative capacity during the colonial 
period was thus a direct fallout of the minimalist presence of institutions of 
the State at the district and lower levels. The Memorandum for the Indian 
Statutory Commission (1930) on the ‘Working of the Reforms in Bihar and 
Orissa’ noted that the standard expenditure of Bihar and Orissa, worked out 
on the basis of actual expenditure prior to 1912, came to just Rs 8 lakh per 
million of the population against Rs 13 lakh per million of the population in 
Bengal. It must be noted that the expenditure on administration in Bengal 
itself was the lowest in British India as compared to the Bombay or the 
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Madras Presidencies; and within this low expenditure, Bihar was accorded 
the lowest priority. This led to a relative deficit of institutional capacity for 
governance in Bihar as compared to the other states of India during the 
colonial period. (Bihar Government 2008: 2) 
The impact of land tenure systems and the production relations it created have had a 
lasting influence on the level of development not only in Bihar. Other areas in India in 
which proprietary rights in land remained with zamindars during British rule have also 
been found to have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity as late 
as 1991. These areas have significantly lower investments in health and education:  
We compare the present-day economic performance of different districts of 
India, which were placed under different land revenue systems by British 
colonial rulers as a result of certain historical accidents. We show that 
districts in India where the collection of land revenue from the cultivators 
was assigned to a class of landlords systematically underperform the 
districts where this type of intermediation was avoided, after controlling for 
a wide range of geographical differences. The differences show up in 
agricultural investment and yields, in various measures of public investment 
in education and health, as well as in health and educational outcomes. For 
example, the average yield of wheat is 23 per cent higher and infant 
mortality is 40 per cent lower in non-landlord districts. (Banerjee and Iyer 
2005: 1190) 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) attribute this lower spending to the political environment, 
particularly differences in the nature of collective action caused by a climate of conflict. 
This is also correlated with levels of crime; districts that were subject to zamindari rule 
have significantly higher levels of violent crime such as murder, rape and kidnapping 
(Banerjee and Iyer 2005).  
After independence, attempts at land and tenure reform in Bihar remained a partially 
fulfilled promise due to impediments raised by the political elite who had vested 
interests in land and the patron-client relationships that sustained their politics. This 
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perpetuated the social relations inherited from the colonial legacy. The exercise of 
arbitrary power by upper-caste landlords (see section on salience of caste later in this 
chapter) gave rise to caste-based resentment which proved to be fertile ground for the 
growth of peasant movements (Brass 1994). This also formed the background against 
which political entrepreneurs like Yadav mobilised public opinion around the idea of 
izzat. 
3.1.2 Bihar Post-Independence  
For the 14 years following Indian independence in 1947, before the death of its first 
chief minister in 1961, Bihar experienced political stability and stable governance. 
However, the state’s long standing problem of a lack of investible surplus and under-
investment continued due to the Freight Equalization Policy established in 1948 by the 
new government in Delhi. Under this policy (which lasted until 1991), for the 
consumption of every unit of a key input like steel, the responsible industry in Bihar had 
to subsidize its competitors in more developed states by paying a freight element
38
 in 
the price of steel which would otherwise have been paid by the industries in more 
distant locations. Thus, the barriers to growth and development that Bihar experienced 
during the colonial period continued to adversely affect the State even in the post-
independence period. This policy accentuated the existing regional inequality in 
industrial production by distorting the comparative cost of location for industries that 
used the freight-equalized commodities as inputs. Thus, there was no incentive for 
industrial capital to come to places like Bihar which had a rich mineral resource base 
but poor infrastructure. A bizarre consequence of this policy was that cost-disabilities of 
                                                 
38
 This was the indirect effect of the landed price being the same all over India. According to this 
arrangement, whether you had steel delivered to your premises outside the steel factory gate, 
or to a place 2000 kms away, you paid the same price. 
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industrial production centres located in developed states were subsidized by resource 
rich and backward states like Bihar (Bihar Government 2008). 
Long before Yadav assumed power as the chief minister of Bihar in 1990, the state 
administration had been plagued by political instability. No chief minister since 1961 
had lasted a full five-year term. In fact, only two had even completed three years in 
office. Writing about the deterioration in the administration of Bihar, P.S. Appu, a 
widely respected chief secretary (head of the civil service
39
) wrote: 
Group rivalry rooted in caste conflict was a significant feature of the 
Congress party in Bihar before and after independence. The implacable 
antagonism between the two dominant upper castes of Bhumihars and 
Rajputs was at the core of the infighting in the Party... I witnessed the 
gradual decline ... during the period 1962-1970 when I worked as Secretary 
to Government ... In August 1975 I returned to Bihar. The Administration 
had degenerated further ... Despite my best efforts I did not succeed in 
making much improvement during my tenure as Chief Secretary... During 
the next two decades Bihar acquired the reputation of being one of the worst 
administered in the country… (Appu 2002) 
In 1967/8, Bihar faced the spectre of widespread drought and famine. On 20 April 1967, 
the State Government declared famine in two districts of Palamau and Hazaribagh. By 
25 May, 36 per cent of Bihar state was declared to be undergoing famine and 30 per 
cent to be suffering from scarcity. Thirty four million people were affected, of whom 
13.4 million were in the famine area (Brass 1986).  
Reporting on the state administration during that period, the Economic and Political 
Weekly wrote: 
                                                 
39 P.S. Appu belonged to the 1951 batch of the Bihar cadre of the IAS. He became chief 
secretary of Bihar in 1977. 
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State Government had been without a Chief Secretary for months. But the 
degree of amenability of the candidate officers, their civil service seniorities 
and their caste were all in the wrong order. The caste-cum-power factions in 
the Bihar cabinet became active over the issue and the choice hung in the 
balance for 4 months… Union Secretaries[40] confirmed the total failure of 
leadership both in the Government and in the administration in Bihar. 
President's rule reared its ugly head but no one wanted to face it. 
(Anonymous 1966: 657) 
In a subsequent analysis of the same period, Brass wrote that 
The central actor in the drama of the Bihar Famine was the state 
government and administration, whose responsibility it was to assess the 
developing situation, to take the preventive measures that were possible, to 
organize relief measures to minimize the suffering of the people of the 
state…The quality of the Bihar administration, which once had had a 
reputation for being among the most efficient in the country[
41
], had also 
deteriorated, especially since the death of Sri Krishna Sinha. The state 
administration lacked the confidence of the state government and was the 
butt of criticism in the local press. The central government also had little 
confidence in the ability of the Bihar administration to cope efficiently and 
impartially with a major crisis such as a drought (Brass 1986: 247). 
In many other spheres as well, government’s performance left much to be desired:  
The failure of governmental rural development efforts in Bihar is another 
example. It is well known that at the local level programmes mounted in 
Patna (or in New Delhi) have been taken over by local elites and perverted 
by them to their own ends … big farmer elites have been afraid that if the 
rural economy did expand, they would lose their control over it. By taking 
over and milking community development, co-operatives, panchayati raj, 
minor irrigation and all the other programmes, they assured that very little 
                                                 
40
 These are positions equivalent to that of a permanent secretary in Britain. 
41
 This is the popular perception about public administration in Bihar. Many including the Prime 
Minister of India cite Appleby (1953, 1956) to say ‘...Bihar, in 1950 was described as the 
second-best governed state in the very famous Paul Appleby Report ... This is worthy of 
exploration, why a state like Bihar has not been able to catch up with the rest of the world’ 
(Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 2006). However, despite the fact that Appleby myth has been 
around for so long that it had become part of ‘routinised common sense’, the Appleby source 
was verified in 2006 and found to be baseless. The following is what was written in response: ‘... 
where in his two reports did Appleby rank Bihar as the second-best governed state? I have read 
both reports and can't find it... in the 1950s, this business of cross-country or inter-state 
rankings wasn't that fashionable... I can find no rankings in the first report, nor anything that is 
specific to Bihar... I have also gone through three papers Appleby published in the Indian 
Journal of Public Administration and can find no such references there either’ (Debroy 2006). 
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development ever occurred and that their own control endured…With the 
main power groups at the state level and in the countryside both wanting 
above all to maintain their control, and both being composed primarily of 
the same caste groups, it is not surprising that a tacit arrangement developed 
between them, whereby each assisted the other. The big farmers kept order 
in the mofussil through their sharecropping, money-lending, patron-client 
relationships and enforcers. They also mobilised their retainers, followers 
and dependents in electoral support of the dominant groups in Patna (Blair 
1980). 
My own experience in the IAS in the mid-1980s was not different. Public 
administration was deeply influenced by competing caste interests and factional leaders 
within the ruling congress party. The caste of the officer was the most important criteria 
in civil service postings. Oftentimes, political expediency required posting someone 
who was not seen as being beholden to local caste interests, and personnel managers 
would turn to an officer from outside the state, typically a south Indian. My own 
postings invariably followed this pattern. As a south-Indian Christian, I was the most 
suitable person for tackling riots, floods, droughts and when officers from locally 
important castes were found to be quarrelling over the spoils of office!  
3.2 Salience of Caste in Everyday Life and Politics 
In this section I discuss the meaning of caste and its impact on everyday life and politics 
in Bihar. In particular, it is important to explain how the long history of social, 
economic and political domination by an upper-caste minority provided a fertile ground 
for mobilisation based on grievance by a political entrepreneur such as Lalu Prasad 
Yadav. 
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3.2.1 A Brief Introduction to Caste 
Caste as a word was first used by the Portuguese to label the complex social situations 
they encountered during their early trips to India. Today it is a popular term that is used 
to indicate social status rather than the classical varna
42
 (classification based on 
occupation) (A. N. Das 1984). Caste therefore works as an identity. And, like all 
identities, it can be a very simple conception and yet complex, variable and contested in 
practise. As Blair writes:  
In the North American and Western European democracies, the articulating 
groups in the modern period have been mainly secondary associations. 
Primary groups, particularly those based on religion and ethnicity, are of 
great importance in some spheres of Western political life, to be sure; but it 
is the secondary groupings that form the greater and more influential portion 
of the articulation and aggregation structure in the West. In developing 
nations, on the other hand, secondary associations are notoriously 
underdeveloped... the political system must fall back upon primary groups if 
the articulation process is to take place at all. Religion, language, culture, 
and race are all important cleavages producing primary groups at the 
national level in India, and in some measure at the state level as well. But at 
the local level, where these other divisions do not exist for the most part, the 
caste system produces the most significant cleavage. Indeed, there are few if 
any aspects of social existence that are not bound up in some way with the 
caste system. Religion, economic activity, social intercourse, political 
power-all are intimately connected with it. (Blair 1972: 108) 
Church (1984) advocates a grouping of castes that is different from the traditional varna 
to make the point that there is a ‘crisis of participation’ amongst lower castes. 
According to him the ‘upper castes’ - Brahmans, Kshatriyas and Banias dominated 
society and politics as landlords, businessmen and professionals. The ‘middle castes’ 
are the farming castes (Jats, Yadhavs and Kurmis in the north and Marathas in 
Maharashtra). According to the varna tradition these groups are classified as Sudras—
                                                 
42
 The terms varna (general classification based on occupation) and jati (caste) are two distinct 
concepts. Varna (from Sanskrit, literally "arrangement") is usually a unification of all the castes 
or jatis into four groups: Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra. 
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those below the twice-born and above the untouchables. They are politically important 
because of their numbers and proximity to land. At the bottom of the traditional status 
hierarchy are the SCs, the former untouchables. The SCs are agricultural labourers and 
have special constitutional protection and privileges in post independent India. 
According to Church there is another category, what he calls ‘lower castes’. They form 
an economic and social stratum which is sandwiched between the ‘middle castes’ above 
them and the SCs below. They are typically marginal farmers, share-croppers and 
landless labourers from low status agricultural castes together with traditional service 
and artisan castes (barbers, boatmen, blacksmiths, carpenters, cobblers, oil-pressers, and 
so on). 
Because these individual ‘lower castes’ are usually small and widely dispersed, as well 
as poor, they have not developed a common sense of identity or been able to assert 
political power. Church argues that a useful way to classify states in India is to look at 
the extent to which each of these groups have attained political power that is 
commensurate with their numbers. He also predicts that the groups that will be the last 
to experience political empowerment will be these ‘lower castes’, rather than the lower 
SCs.  
This is a useful vantage point from which to approach the study of politics in Bihar 
because we will see later in this chapter that there were three distinct phases in the 
ascendency of BCs in Bihar’s politics and how these correspond to Church’s 
conception. 
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3.2.2 Caste and Politics in India 
Caste identity has been an important feature of Indian politics. In political mobilisation, 
caste interests combine and recombine with interests of other identities and issues, 
giving Indian politics its centripetal ability to stay away from extremist positions. As 
Manor puts it: 
Indians tend not to fix on any one of these identities fiercely and 
permanently, as groups in places like Sri Lanka have done. They tend 
instead to shift their preoccupations, readily and often, from one identity to 
another, and then another, in response to changing circumstances. As a 
result, tensions do not become concentrated along a single fault-line in 
society, and do not produce prolonged and intractable conflict-'ethnic' or 
otherwise-that might tear democratic institutions apart. (1996: 463)  
Caste became politicised when both the colonial and post-independent governments in 
India used it in public policy at various times along with other forms of identity such as 
religion, language and region (recall the discussion in Chapter 2 on plurality of 
concerns). But in Bihar it took on a particularly virulent form: 
In Bihar, one cannot but come across the phenomenon of caste in its most 
virulent form: it attacks the senses in an almost physical manner like an 
odour emanating from the putrefying mess that the state has converted itself 
into. (A. N. Das 1984: 1616) 
Thanks to a history of inequality and dominance, Bihar has been the site of intense caste 
conflict. Stray incidents of upper-caste oppression of others exist even today, after 
twenty years of BC-domination of politics (discussed later in this chapter). The 
following example is indicative of how bad the situation was when upper castes 
dominated politics prior to 1990: 
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... Ramnagar[
43
] in Lakhisarai district, where higher-caste men of the village 
allegedly raped six Dalit women at gunpoint. The apparent provocation: the 
Dalit women voted for a candidate other than the one recommended by 
members of the higher castes... caste imbalances, discrimination and power 
play remain central to Bihar society in spite of the significant gains made by 
the politics of social justice in the past few decades. (Ramakrishnan 2006) 
The following excerpt shows the extent to which low castes have been socially 
discriminated: 
Such was the stranglehold of the feudal order in the village that upper caste 
landlords were supposed to have an undisputed right over Dalits and 
Backward Caste women. The right had been institutionalised by the 
landlords through the system of dola by which every newly married Dalit 
woman had to pass her first night after marriage with the village landlord. 
Thus those escaped being raped by the landlords had to undergo the trauma 
after getting married. These were the extra-economic methods devised by 
the landlords to continuously remind those lower in the caste and class 
hierarchy of their aukat[
44
]. (Bharti 1990: 980) 
To understand why this was so, we must understand the relationship between caste and 
class in Bihar and the consequences of British rule. There is a rich discussion on this for 
example in (Chakravarti 2001), however, I provide only a simplified summary because 
my purpose is limited to explaining the rationale behind the support enjoyed by a party 
and leadership that did so little for poverty, literacy and incomes. 
Some scholars have argued that British rule undermined the economic significance of 
caste by bringing in industrialisation, western education, monetisation of the economy 
and the growth of occupations based on impersonal qualifications that eroded this 
relationship to a small degree (Beteille 1975; Bose 1975; Habib 1995; Srinivas 1966). 
However, because economic development was slow and opportunity for education 
                                                 
43 The Ramnagar incident happened on the night of 6 August 2006. 
44
 Socio-economic status as a person of low standing. 
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limited, the range of occupational opportunities available in Bihar was restricted, and 
caste continued to be a dominating factor in determining whether a person or group had 
access to productive resources or was at the receiving end of a relationship based on 
exploitation (Chakravarti 2001).   
Analysts make two broad and contradictory arguments about caste in Bihar:  
 Caste is a mode of expression of class interests. 
 Caste is one of many identities in Indian politics. It interacts with other 
kinds of identity interests such as religion, ethnic, racial, agrarian, class 
to define the Indian social and political experience.  
Each perspective is discussed below. 
3.2.2.1 Caste as Class:  
Because caste is a convenient concept for social reporting, analysts often overlook 
evidence that indicates that caste-based mobilisation is oftentimes simply the 
articulation of the collective interest of a group or a collection of groups. Marxists 
scholars however, do not. They believe that the only real and enduring interests are class 
interests. Accordingly, they view caste-based mobilisation as merely the articulation of 
class interests:  
... when scholars throw their finely meshed sociological nets into the 
stagnant waters of Bihar's society, they draw out not class but the familiar 
fishes of 'caste' and 'tribe’... (A. N. Das 1984: 1616) 
Those who subscribe to the caste-as-class view use the example of the Kurmis caste to 
show how different groups came together to further their economic/class interests. The 
Kurmis until late 19
th
 century were considered to be a ‘criminal tribe’ in the official 
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records, and were not allowed to join the police or army. In 1894, the Awadhias of 
Patna, the Dhanuks of North Bihar and the Mahtos of Chotanagpur came together to 
form the All-India Kurmi Mahasabha (A. N. Das 1984). Until then, they were separate 
groups with inter-dining and inter-marriage customarily prohibited between them. 
Subsequently, they even tried to widen their group by including Marathas from as far as 
Maharashtra. With no common taboos, rituals, religious observances or ethnic 
identities, they came together because they were peasant farmers who worked their own 
land. As such, ‘… the grouping was more akin to the concept of class-in-the-making 
than that of a ready-made caste’ (A. N. Das 1984: 1618).  
Another trend that Marxist scholars identify is exemplified by the spate of killings that 
erupted in the 1970’s, when discontent among the rural poor had increased dramatically. 
Although this was described by many as atrocities against Harijans, they were in fact 
‘bloody testimonies of class war going on in Bihar’ (A. N. Das 1984: 1619). Killers 
included Kurmis, Rajputs and Brahmins and victims were Harijan, Yadav and Sonar 
sharecroppers and agriculture labourers. Das articulates the caste-as-class point of view 
across very succinctly when he wrote ‘Thus, it is only when we see the Harijans as 
landless peasants or sharecroppers that we can begin to understand the real character of 
the so-called “atrocities against Harijans” for what they really are — symptoms of class 
war’ (A. N. Das 1984: 1619).  
The above is a reductionist view of what is otherwise a complex relationship. It misses 
the point that both class and caste are social constructions. Both are concepts that we 
can either accept or ignore, yet nothing will change on the ground!  
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3.2.2.2 Caste as a Vehicle for Articulation of Common Interests:  
The notion of caste as one of many identities regards caste as the expression of secular 
interests, a tool for political mobilisation rather than a matter of ritual distance 
(Crossette 1996). Hauser (1997) argues that caste is neither as unique nor as static and 
unchangeable as is often assumed. Caste is also not the only identity that has mattered 
in Indian politics. It interacts with many different kinds of identity interests such as 
religious, sectarian, ethnic, racial, agrarian and class. In doing so, caste distinguishes 
itself from the idea of caste as class where caste is seen as simply an expression of class 
interests.  
Hauser (1997) also argues that there is nothing new about the use of caste for political 
mobilisation in India. Even as early as 1929, after the Lahore session of the Indian 
National Congress, both Rajendra Prasad and Swami Sahajanand Saraswati had held the 
view that caste was being employed in new and complex ways, as instruments of cross 
cutting political mobilization. The emphasis on caste as a tool for political mobilisation 
that we see in Bihar today therefore has a long history dating back to the politics of 
India’s independence movement. 
3.3 Backward Caste ascendancy in politics 
The issue of discrimination against Dalits and BCs was a pan-Indian problem. Given 
their connection with land and their large numbers, the BCs were successful in asserting 
themselves. Dalits had constitutional protection and benefitted from affirmative action 
from the State. However, the pace at which BCs experienced political empowerment 
varied from state to state. For example, the situation in the State of Kerala, one of earlier 
adopters of increased rights for lower castes, was at one time as bad if not worse than 
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Bihar. When in 1800 the British political resident assumed office in the princely state of 
Travancore (now part of Kerala) he saw that:  
Men polluted their caste superiors not merely on touch but on sight. In the 
extreme case, a Pulaya was said to pollute a Nambudiri Brahmin from 95 
paces. When the Nairs walk along a street or road, … they shout to the low 
caste folk to get out of their way; this they do, and if one will not, the Nayre 
may kill him without punishment … Ezhavas, though regarded as polluting 
by caste- Hindus, enjoyed superior status… An Ezhava was said to pollute a 
Nambudiri Brahmin from 32 feet and a Nair from 12, and considered 
himself polluted by the approach of one of the ex-slave castes. (Jeffrey 
1976: 5-6) 
However with the spread of education and increasing affluence due to growing trade in 
spices and other industries, the situation began to change. By 1918, the League for 
Equal Civic Rights was formed in Kerala to agitate for the opening of all branches of 
government service to Christians, Muslims and non-upper caste Hindus, and the ending 
of untouchability. By 1922, the league succeeded and by 1925, the first Christian 
district officer was appointed. The fight against untouchability, however, took longer. 
On 30 March 1924, the famous ‘Vaikom Satyagraha’45 that demanded access to roads 
around temples for non-upper castes began. Though it lasted for 20 months, it was only 
by 1936 that a proclamation was issued to open all government temples in the state to 
all Hindus irrespective of their caste (Jeffrey 1976). 
Bihar, in contrast, was a late reformer. Even as late as 1952, with only 14 per cent share 
in population, upper castes had 46 per cent share of seats in the Bihar state legislative 
assembly (Robin 2009). The first signs of challenge to the upper-caste hegemony were 
                                                 
45
 Satyagraha is a form of non-violent protest made popular by Gandhi during the struggle for 
Indian independence. In the town of Vaikom, low caste and upper caste Hindus jointly offered to 
be arrested as they symbolically attempted to enter the roads adjoining the Shiva temple. They 
were protesting against untouchability and the law that prevented low caste Hindus from using 
roads near temples and worshiping in them. 
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visible only in 1977, when the first non-Congress Party, non-upper caste chief minister 
assumed office. However, with an economy that had no particular stimulus for growth 
and very little investment in infrastructure or social development, both politics and 
society in Bihar continued to be dominated by upper caste interests. Given the large 
number of factions in the Congress party (which was in power for most of the period 
until 1990), contending upper caste factional leaders began to co-opt lower caste leaders 
to make up for the lack of numerical strength of upper caste voters. Drawing strength 
from their numbers within the electorate, BC leaders slowly began to assert themselves 
as political leaders in their own right. This led to political polarization in Bihar on a 
backward vs. forward (upper caste) basis, because the resentment and grievance of 
backward caste voters was a low hanging fruit waiting to be used for political 
mobilisation.  
Bihar was also the cradle of the socialist movement in India with leaders such as 
Jayaprakash Narayan
46
 and Karpoori Thakur
47
. Their efforts led to the political 
mobilization of an anti-upper caste voter block led largely by BCs. Before long, the 
number of non-upper caste MLAs began to rise and those from the upper castes began 
to fall. The ascendency of BCs in Bihar can be divided into three phases. Phase one was 
from 1977 to 1990. In 1977, Karpoori Thakur became chief minister for the second time 
and the number of BC MLAs had begun to go up.  Reservations for BCs in government 
employment were announced. Phase two began in 1990, when, for the first time, the 
                                                 
46
 Jayaprakash Narayan widely known as JP or Loknayak (leader of the masses), was an Indian 
independence activist, remembered for leading the opposition to Indira Gandhi the then Prime 
Minister of India in the 1970s when she declared an internal emergency. In 1998, he was 
posthumously awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. 
47
 Karpoori Thakur became the first non-congress chief minister of Bihar in 1970. He became 
chief minister for a second time in 1977 when he introduced reservations for BCs in 
Government jobs, in 1978. 
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percentage of upper caste members in the Bihar’s legislative assembly fell to 35 per 
cent, equalling the rising share of BC members (not including SC, ST and Muslim 
members). In keeping with this trend, after the 1995 elections the share of upper caste 
MLAs went down to 22 per cent and in 2000 to 23 per cent
48
(Robin 2009). Phase three 
began in 2005. By then, a new political settlement had emerged in Bihar in which upper 
castes were able to increase the number of MLAs to 30 per cent by entering into an 
alliance with the group that Church (1984) called ‘lower castes’—those below the 
agricultural middle castes and above the SCs. They adopted an agenda for inclusive 
growth and good governance under the leadership of a much applauded chief minister, 
Nitish Kumar. In this new dispensation, ‘middle castes’ minus the Yadavs, Mahadalits 
(SCs minus the Paswans) and ‘lower castes’ (as described by Church) came together to 
break the 15 year (1990-2005) Muslim-Yadav domination of Bihar’s politics. 
3.4 Bihar: Poor and Backward  
In the previous three sections, I described how, before Lalu Prasad Yadav came to 
power in 1990, Bihar was relatively cursed by a history of poor governance, that caste 
and caste conflict were an everyday reality and that BCs had begun to emerge as a 
political force in Bihar beginning in the mid- to late-20
th
 century. In this section, I turn 
more specifically to trends in poverty levels, economic development and state capacity 
during the 1990-2005 period to show that: 
 BCs and Muslims, the core supporters of Lalu Prasad Yadav were 
economically under privileged 
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 It increased to 25 per cent with bifurcation of the state in November 2000. Caste and 
community wise details of Bihar MLA’s from 1952 can be seen in Annexure 8. 
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 At the time that Lalu Prasad Yadav became chief minister, Bihar had a 
poor record with respect to poverty, illiteracy, per capita income and 
government capacity compared with other Indian states 
 Under Lalu Prasad Yadav’s stewardship, Bihar’s situation with respect to 
poverty, illiteracy, per capita income and government capacity either 
showed very little improvement or declined 
3.4.1 Who Are the Poor? 
According to the 1931 census
49
, BCs, SCs and STs accounted for 64 per cent of Bihar’s 
population. Muslims, who were also largely under privileged, were another 14 per 
cent
50
. The percentage of upper castes were only 14 per cent (Robin 2009). More recent 
estimates put the number of BCs at 52 per cent and Muslims at 16 per cent (Deshingkar 
et al. 2006). In Bihar, caste and socio-economic status tend to overlap. According to the 
55
th
 round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) undertaken in 2000, only 11 per cent 
of BCs and only 9 per cent of SCs in urban Bihar had a monthly per capita consumer 
expenditure of Rs. 775 or more, whereas 32 per cent of upper castes had this same level 
of consumption. The situation in rural areas was similar. Against 8 per cent of upper 
castes who had a monthly per capita consumer expenditure of Rs. 775 or more, only 4 
per cent of BCs and 3 per cent of SCs had reached this level (National Sample Survey 
Organisation 2001b: 53-60). In the case of Muslims, it is estimated that 50 per cent of 
rural and 45 per cent of urban households live below the official poverty line 
(Deshingkar et al. 2006). All of this meant that in Bihar, the majority in electoral terms 
were poor, and most of the poor were non-upper caste. The significance of this in terms 
                                                 
49 The Indian census is held every 10 years. However, 1931 was the last year in which caste 
details of the entire population was collected. 1931 is therefore the closest we can get to know 
the population shares of each caste with a degree of certainty. For these numbers to be valid at 
any later date we need to make the assumption that migration and population growth rates were 
the same across different caste groups between 1931 and the date for which we intend to use 
this data. 
50 For caste and community wise-details see Annexure 1. 
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of the argument of this thesis is that BCs and Muslims, the core supporters of Lalu 
Prasad Yadav, were economically under-privileged. 
3.4.2 Bihar’s Situation when Yadav Took Power 
As measured by poverty levels, per capita income, illiteracy and government capacity, 
Bihar’s situation during the early years of Yadav’s first term in office beginning in 1990 
was dismal (Guruswamy and Kaul 2002; Kumar 2005; Sharma 2005; N. K. Singh 2005; 
World Bank 2005). Each of these statistics is discussed below.  
3.4.2.1 Poverty 
In 1993/4, the combined state of Bihar
51
 had the largest proportion of rural poor in the 
country (M. S. Ahluwalia 2000; Deaton and Dreze 2002; Himanshu 2007). Table 3.1 
below has data on rural poverty over a 21-year period. In 1993/4, with 57 per cent of 
Bihar’s and 62 per cent of Jharkhand’s rural population living in poverty, the combined 
state of Bihar was the only state where the majority of the rural population was poor. 
This was also substantially higher than the all-India average, of 37 per cent at the time.  
Table 3.1 Per cent of rural population below the official poverty line 
States 1983 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 
Bihar 65 54 57 42 
Jharkhand 66 53 62 43 
Madhya Pradesh 49 40 39 36 
Chhattisgarh 51 47 44 42 
                                                 
51 In 2000, the states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal were carved out of Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively. To calculate parent state totals prior to 2000, 
figures from the new states will have to be added. For most of the data used in this thesis, the 
division of the state has not been a problem because percentage numbers have been used. 
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Assam 45 39 45 22 
Rajasthan 35 33 26 19 
Orissa 68 59 50 47 
Uttar Pradesh 48 43 43 34 
Uttaranchal 25 13 25 15 
Gujarat 29 28 22 19 
Haryana 22 15 28 14 
Himachal Pradesh 17 17 30 11 
Karnataka 36 33 30 20 
Kerala 40 29 25 13 
Andhra Pradesh 27 21 16 11 
Maharashtra 46 41 38 30 
Punjab 14 13 12 10 
Tamil Nadu 55 46 33 23 
West Bengal 64 49 41 29 
ALL INDIA 47 39 37 29 
Adapted from Himanshu (2007: 498) 
3.4.2.2 Economic Stagnation  
The situation with respect to per capita income was worse than that of poverty. In 1990, 
Bihar’s per capita income at Rs. 1197 was only 22 per cent of Delhi, which had the 
highest per capita income. After five years of Yadav’s rule, in 1995 Bihar was the only 
Indian state that suffered a fall in per capita income—it had fallen to Rs. 915. See Table 
3.2 below for a ranking of states along with their respective per capita net state domestic 
product (per capita income) for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004. Over 
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a twenty-five year period beginning in 1980, Bihar failed to improve its position as the 
state with the lowest per capita income in the country. 
Table 3.2 Per capita Net state Domestic Product (NSDP) at constant 1980 prices
52 
 
State 1980 State 1985 State 1990 State 1995 State 2000 State 2004 
(Del) 4030 (Del) 4665 (Del) 5447 (Del) 6580 (Del) 9108 (Del) 10764 
(Go) 3145 (Punj) 3249 (Go) 4883 (Go) 5952 (Go) 8535 (Go) 8232 
(Punj) 2674 (Go) 3091 (Punj) 3730 (Mah) 4533 (Mah) 4880 (Mah) 6125 
(Mah) 2435 (Har) 2893 (Har) 3509 (Punj) 4120 (Punj) 4774 (Har) 5327 
(Har) 2370 (Mah) 2705 (Mah) 3483 (Har) 3645 (Har) 4372 (Punj) 5308 
(Guj) 1940 (Guj) 2186 (Arun) 2709 (Arun) 3607 (Guj) 3753 (Guj) 5072 
(JK) 1775 (Arun) 2119 (Guj) 2641 (Guj) 3501 (TN) 3691 (WB) 4394 
(WB) 1773 (WB) 1929 (HP) 2241 (TN) 2883 (Kar) 3645 (Kar) 4249 
(HP) 1704 (JK) 1832 (TN) 2237 (WB) 2683 (Arun) 3530 (Arun) 3991 
(Arun) 1571 (TN) 1798 (WB) 2145 (HP) 2589 (WB) 3507 (TN) 3977 
(Kar) 1520 (HP) 1781 (AP) 2060 (Kar) 2573 (HP) 3261 (HP) 3963 
(Ker)  1508 (Nag) 1653 (Kar) 2039 (AP) 2429 (Trip) 3070 (AP) 3718 
(TN) 1498 (Kar) 1644 (Nag) 1976 (Ker) 2336 (AP) 3068 (Tri) 3638 
(Man) 1419 (Mani) 1598 (Raj) 1942 (Nag) 2293 (Ker) 2822 (Ker) 3509 
(AP) 1380 (AP) 1573 (Ker) 1815 (Raj) 2073 (Nag) 2727 (Nag) 2922 
(Meg) 1361 (Ass) 1510 (JK) 1784 (JK) 1915 (Raj) 2349 (Raj) 2831 
(Nag) 1361 (Ker) 1507 (Mani) 1739 (Tri) 1865 (Meg) 2311 (Meg) 2750 
                                                 
52
 In this table, for each year, states are arranged in descending order of per capita NSDP. For 
example, in the year 1980, Delhi with a per capita income of Rs. 4,030 had the highest per 
capita income in the country. It was followed by Goa with a per capita income of Rs. 3,145. In 
1985 while Delhi continued to have the highest per capita income at Rs. 4,665, Punjab with Rs. 
3,249 exchanged places with Goa whose per capita income was Rs. 3,091. Because Punjab in 
1985 had the second highest per capita income, its name is placed after Delhi instead of Goa 
for that year. 
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(MP) 1358 (Orr) 1442 (Meg) 1733 (Meg) 1838 (Mani) 2204 (Mani) 2579 
(Orr) 1314 (Meg) 1412 (MP) 1696 (MP) 1809 (JK) 2100 (JK) 2297 
(Tri) 1307 (MP) 1409 (UP) 1652 (Mani) 1807 (MP) 1917 (Orr) 2262 
(Ass) 1284 (UP) 1375 (Tri) 1642 (UP) 1687 (UP) 1789 (MP) 2195 
(UP) 1278 (Raj) 1338 (Ass) 1544 (Orr) 1640 (Orr) 1749 (UP) 1970 
(Raj) 1222 (Tri) 1240 (Orr) 1383 (Ass) 1595 (Ass) 1646 (Ass) 1862 
 
(Bih) 
917 (Bih) 1074 (Bih) 1197 (Bih) 915 (Bih) 1285 (Bih) 1266 
Average 
24 
States 
1756  1959  2384  2786  3421  3697 
State abbreviations: Bihar (Bih); Rajasthan (Raj); Uttar Pradesh (UP); Assam (Ass); Tripura 
(Tri); Orissa (Orr); Madhya Pradesh (MP); Nagaland (Nag); Meghalaya (Meg); Andhra Pradesh 
(AP); Manipur (Man); Tamil Nadu (TN); Kerala (Ker); Karnataka (Kar); Arunachal Pradesh 
(Arun); Himachal Pradesh (HP); West Bengal (WB); Jammu & Kashmir (JK); Gujarat (Guj); 
Haryana (Har); Maharashtra (Mah); Punjab (Punj); Goa (Go); Delhi (Del). 
Source: Alessandrin et al. (2008: 24) 
3.4.2.3 Illiteracy 
Bihar’s literacy levels were similarly poor (see Table 3.3). In 1991, with literacy levels 
as low as 38 per cent, Bihar and Rajasthan were the only two states that had illiteracy 
levels greater than 60 per cent. 
Table 3.3 Total Literacy Rate (%) 
States 
1981 1991 1997 2001 2005 
Bihar 32 38 49 48 56 
Jharkhand - -  - 54 61 
Madhya Pradesh 37 44 56 64 65 
Chhattisgarh - -  - 65 58 
Assam - 53  - 64 84 
Rajasthan 30 39 55 61 57 
Orissa 41 49 51 64 64 
Uttar Pradesh 33 42 56 57 62 
Uttaranchal - - -  72 81 
Gujarat 52 61 68 66 73 
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Haryana 44 56 65 69 71 
Himachal Pradesh  51 64  - 76 80 
Karnataka 46 56 58 67 68 
Kerala 82 90 93 91 92 
Andhra Pradesh 36 44 54 61 59 
Maharashtra 56 65 74 77 79 
Punjab 48 59 67 70 74 
Tamil Nadu 54 63 70 73 76 
West Bengal 49 58 72 69 72 
All India 44  52 52 65 68 
Sources: Indiastat, Ahluwalia (2000) and National Sample Survey(2008)  
 
3.4.2.4 Government Capacity 
There is abundant anecdotal evidence indicating the poor quality of governance in Bihar 
in the 1990s. The following extract from an article in The Economist is illuminating: 
Bihar... has become a byword for the worst of India: of widespread and 
inescapable poverty; of corrupt politicians indistinguishable from the mafia 
dons they patronise; of a caste-ridden social order that has retained the 
worst feudal cruelties; of terrorist attacks by groups of Naxalite Maoists; of 
chronic misrule that has allowed infrastructure to crumble, the education 
and health systems to collapse, and law and order to evaporate... much of 
the blame for Bihar's poor performance is laid at the door of Laloo Prasad 
Yadav, who was the state's chief minister from 1990 to 1997. Jailed for his 
alleged involvement in a huge corruption scandal, he... rules through his 
wife, Rabri Devi. (Long 2004) 
Beyond such anecdotes, empirical evidence also supports the claim that government 
capacity in Bihar was poor during this period, at least in relation to other Indian states. 
One measure of government capacity is the amount of revenue that a government 
actually raises relative to the revenue it is expected to raise, given key features of the 
structure of the economy of the state like share of agriculture in GSDP.  Public finance 
economists routinely take data relating to a set of comparable governments, and, using 
regression analysis, classify them according to how good they are at raising revenue, 
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relative to one another. In standard jargon, those who raise more revenue are said to be 
making a ‘high tax effort’.  Economists at the Reserve Bank of India conducted this 
exercise for India’s 15 largest states and found that Bihar was ranked near the middle: 9 
out of 15, in 1993/4.  (Reserve Bank of India 2005: 18-19).   
Given all of the above, it would appear that compared to other Indian states, Bihar had a 
poor record with respect to poverty, illiteracy, per capita income, human development 
and government capacity around the time that Yadav came to power in 1990. 
3.4.3 Bihar’s Pro-Poor Performance during Yadav’s Stewardship 
In the preceding section we saw that, around the time when Yadav became chief 
minister in 1990, Bihar’s situation with respect to a number of indicators (i.e., poverty, 
per capita income, literacy, human development and government capacity) left much to 
be desired. In this section I will show that, by 2005 when Yadav and the RJD lost to the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by Nitish Kumar, Bihar’s situation had not 
only failed to improve, it had markedly worsened.  
3.4.3.1 Poverty 
Poverty reduction is one of the areas in which Bihar did relatively well compared to 
others like literacy or per capita income (see Table 3.1). For example, between 1993/4 
and 2004/5 (data is not available for 1990) Bihar managed to reduce rural poverty from 
57 per cent to 42 per cent. Despite this at 42 per cent, Bihar was still the second poorest 
state in India. Another way to look at Bihar’s performance is to compare it with another 
state that had similar levels of poverty in the past. This is possible with respect to West 
Bengal between 1983 and 2004/5 because in 1983, Bihar’s level of poverty at 65 per 
cent was comparable to West Bengal’s 64 per cent. Although the year 1983 was a full 
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seven years before Yadav became chief minister of Bihar, it is a reasonable comparison 
because 15 of the 22 years from 1983–2005 correspond with the Yadav regime’s tenure 
in Bihar. During this period, West Bengal was able to reduce the per cent of rural poor 
to 29 from 64 per cent, while Bihar only reduced the number of rural poor to 42 per 
cent—a full 13 per cent less.   
3.4.3.2 Per Capita Income 
When Yadav took over as chief minister of Bihar in 1990, Bihar’s per capita income or 
NSDP at constant prices (see Table 3.2) was Rs. 1,197 per year (half that of the national 
per capita income of the time of Rs. 2,384). By the time his party lost elections and 
handed over power in 2005, Bihar’s per capita income at Rs. 1,266 was only a third of 
the national average of Rs. 3,697.  
3.4.3.3 Literacy 
In 1990, Bihar’s literacy rate at 38 per cent was the lowest in India. When the RJD left 
office 15 years later, the State’s literacy rate was still the lowest. Seven years into 
Yadav’s tenure in 1997 and four years after in 2001, Bihar was the only state in India 
where the majority of the population (over 50%) continued to be illiterate (see Table 
3.3). When, in 2001, there was an absolute decline in the number of illiterates in all of 
India for the first time since independence, the number of illiterates in Bihar had 
increased from 32 million in 1991 to 35 million in 2001 (National Literacy Mission). 
Although by 2005 the percentage of illiteracy in Bihar had fallen to 44 per cent, it was 
still 24 per cent points more than the all-India average of 68 per cent. 
3.4.3.4 Government Capacity 
As discussed previously, it is possible to use the fact that Indian states have some 
autonomy to raise part of their own revenues to set up a measure for government 
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capacity (tax effort). In 1993/4 Bihar was ranked 9 out of 15 in tax effort.  By 2002-3, 
when Yadav had been in power for over a decade, Bihar’s rank had declined to number 
15 (Reserve Bank of India 2005: 18-19).    
From the evidence discussed above, it seems reasonable to conclude that, compared 
with 1990 when Yadav assumed office, Bihar’s situation with respect to poverty, 
illiteracy, per capita income and government capacity showed very little improvement 
or declined dramatically by the time he and his party finally left office 15 years later. 
3.5 Under-Claimed and Under-Spent Fiscal Transfers in Bihar 
In the preceding sections, we saw that Yadav’s core BC and Muslim supporters were 
poor. Yet, he managed to remain electorally viable for fifteen long years without 
reducing poverty, improving incomes, reducing illiteracy or increasing government 
capacity. In this section, I will show how Bihar’s poor performance during this period 
occurred alongside substantial under-claiming and under-spending of centre–state fiscal 
transfers. From a World Bank study, we know that from 1997 to 2000, 
... Bihar has the country’s lowest utilisation rate for centrally funded 
programs, and it is estimated that the state forfeited one-fifth of central plan 
assistance during 1997-2000. (World Bank 2005) 
Thus, it becomes evident that Yadav failed to improve the economic condition of his 
core supporters despite having access to financial resources that could have helped him 
do so. This seeming contradiction is the core of the Bihar paradox that this thesis seeks 
to examine. 
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3.5.1 Brief Overview of Fiscal Transfers in India 
States in India have access to a range of financial resources (fiscal transfers) from the 
central government, fully discussed in Chapter 4. There are three main three types of 
fiscal transfers, one of which is CSS. For many states, these fiscal transfers from the 
central government are the principal source of development funds. For example, of the 
Rs. 34,760 million spent in Bihar on development in 2004, Rs. 28,310 million came as 
central fiscal transfers, and the remaining Rs. 6,450 million was in the form of a Central 
Government loan (Government of Bihar 2006). 
CSS grants are made available to states in two or more instalments during the year. The 
release of the second and subsequent instalment is dependent on the spending of at least 
60% of the money made available in the previous instalment. Bihar has struggled to 
meet this criterion because of its low spending capacity. As a result, Bihar has been 
forfeiting large amounts of money each year that have been earmarked for it by the 
Central Government.  
Another source of Bihar’s failure to claim CSS resources has to do with that class of 
CSS schemes for which there is no earmarked allocation for a state. The inter-state 
allocations for such schemes are determined on the basis of proposals submitted by 
states and approved by the sanctioning authority in the concerned GOI ministry. 
Allocations for these schemes are therefore ‘demand-led’. Considerable work needs to 
be put in before a state can submit a proposal that will get approved. Bihar has been a 
looser with respect to these types of schemes because of its lack of capacity to prepare 
project reports that are able to stand up to the scrutiny of experts in Delhi.   
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3.5.2 Examples of Bihar’s Under-Claiming and Under-Spending 
There have been a large number of instances where Bihar government has been unable 
to claim and spend centre-state fiscal transfers that were otherwise available to it. The 
aim of this section is not to list all of these. The purpose here is to showcase a few 
examples that help to establish the claim that under-claiming and under-spending was 
widespread in Bihar during the period when Yadav and the RJD were in power.  
During the five-year period from 1992 to 1997, the state plan outlay (SPA) approved by 
the Planning Commission of India for Bihar had to be scaled down to less than half of 
what was approved at the beginning of the year (see Table 3.4). Between 1997 and 
2006, of the Rs. 96.45 billion allocated to Bihar by the Central Ministry of Rural 
Development, over Rs. 22 billion could not be claimed and, of the money claimed, only 
64 per cent was spent (Government of Bihar 2006) (see Table 3.5). In Chapter 1, one of 
the three examples I discussed while explaining my motivation for this research related 
to the unwillingness of the state department of education to hire schoolteachers despite 
the Central Government paying for it under the SSA scheme. In the case of SSA, of the 
Rs. 52 billion earmarked for Bihar during the period 2001 to 2007, only Rs. 26 billion 
was spent (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.4 Scaling-down of the state plan (Rs. millions) 
Serial 
Number 
Year Approved Plan Revised Plan % Reduction 
1 1992-93 22027 11000 
50 
2 1993-94 23000 7500 
67 
3 1994-95 24000 9000 
63 
90 
4 1995-96 25227 9720 
62 
5 1996-97 21439 16490 
23 
 
Total for 
8
th
 Plan 
11569 5371 
54 
6 1997-98 22684 17961 
21 
7 1998-99 37687 18500 
51 
8 1999-00 36300 24720 
32 
9 2000-01 31550 17367 
45 
10 2001-02 26440 16554 
37 
 
Total for 
9
th
 Plan 
154662 95103 39 
11 2002-03 29644 23140 
22 
12 2003-04 33200 26420 
20 
13 2004-05 40000 30592 
24 
Source: Government of Bihar (2006) 
 
Table 3.5 Inability of Bihar to claim and spend CSS grants (Rs. Million) 
Year 
Central 
Allocation 
Central 
Release 
Loss of Resources 
Total 
Funds 
Available 
Expenditure 
   Amount 
% of 
Allocation 
 Amount 
% of 
Funds 
Available 
1997-98 8300 7299 1000 12 23124 13979 61 
1998-99 10848 8563 2285 21 23011 15975 69 
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1999-00 12321 9532 2789 23 25522 15776 62 
2000-01 6766 4480 2287 34 12815 9009 70 
2001-02 7874 6122 1752 22 14056 9418 67 
2002-03 7642 5223 2418 32 12959 8979 69 
2003-04 8906 6279 2627 30 14036 10471 75 
2004-05 13726 13742 -15 -0.1 21789 15349 70 
2005-06 20077 13212 6865 34 28303 13823 49 
Total 96459 74451 22008 23 175613 112778 64 
Source: Bihar State Rural Development Department; Government of Bihar  (2006) 
 
Table 3.6 Inability of Bihar to claim and spend SSA grants (Rs. Million) 
Year 
Approved   
Annual 
Work Plan & 
Budget 
Fund Releases 
Total 
Expd. 
% 
Govt. of 
India 
Govt. of 
Bihar 
Total 
2001-2002 671 285 285 570 90 13 
2002-2003 3514 792 285 1077 129 4 
2003-2004 7648 1945 648 2593 2469 32 
2004-2005 8358 3020 800 3820 3765 45 
2005-2006 8427 3020 1213 4233 4443 53 
2006-2007 23402 10263 5385 15648 15496 66 
Total 52019 19324 8617 27941 26392 51 
Source: (Bihar Education Program Parishad – private communication)  
 
There were a number of other CSS grants for which money was available from the 
central government that met with a similar fate. They were a programme for the 
development of ‘backward’ regions known as Rashtriya Sam Vikash Yojana (RSVY), a 
program for rural roads called Prime Ministers Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), a 
scheme that sought to deal with child malnutrition known as Integrated Child 
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Development Scheme (ICDS), and a scheme for disadvantaged groups called Special 
Component Plan (SCP) also met a similar fate. Against an allocation of Rs. 40 billion 
for RSVY from 2002 to 2006, Bihar was able to secure only Rs. 10 billion and of the 
amount received only 62 per cent was spent. In the case of PMGSY, between 2000 and 
2006 the allocation was Rs. 14.2 billion and spending Rs. 3.59 billion, and for the 
ICDS, between 1990 and 2005 the release and use figures were Rs. 4 billion and Rs. 1.9 
billion respectively (Government of Bihar 2006). The under-spending of ICDS funds 
was not surprising given that 50 per cent of the approved 394 ICDS projects in the state 
had not even started (N. Nayak and Saxena 2006).  
The use of SCP grants meant exclusively for the development of SCs, a core 
constituency of Yadav, was no different. Bihar used only Rs. 1.4 billion between 1990 
and 2005 against an availability of Rs. 4.2 billion (Government of Bihar 2006). 
Ministers at the time were well aware of these failures, as evident from the fact that in 
2002, Bihar’s finance department prepared an estimate of unused centre-state fiscal 
transfers between 1997 and 2001, which showed that Rs. 15,700 million from a total of 
Rs. 77,000 million remained unspent (World Bank 2005). Bihar’s inability to claim and 
to use centre-state fiscal transfers was therefore substantial and systematic.  
Before closing this section, it is worth highlighting one point on central plan assistance 
to states
53
. Figure 3.1 below has the time trend of plan assistance provided by the 
Central Government to the three states of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka from 
1980 to 2007. It is illuminating to note that, through the 1980s—i.e., during the sixth 
and seventh plan periods and up until the eighth plan period when Yadav became chief 
                                                 
53
 Central plan assistance is a sub set of SPA used in the statistical analysis of this thesis. Plan 
assistance is one of three sources of funding for SPA. Market borrowing, states own revenues 
being the other two. 
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minister—Bihar received central plan assistance at a level that was higher than 
Karnataka and equal to Andhra Pradesh (two states that have done well). Bihar’s 
position began to weaken when Yadav took over in the eighth plan period, and by the 
tenth plan when his party demitted office, Bihar had fallen behind both Andhra Pradesh 
and Karnataka. 
Figure 3.1 Plan Assistance through the 6th–10th five-year plans (Rs. crores) 
 
Source: World Bank (2005: 44) 
 
By itself, this data is not conclusive, because the down turn could have happened for a 
number of reasons. Yadav becoming chief minister was only one of many things that 
changed in Bihar at this time. The only point I wish to make is that the numbers, pattern 
and timing are striking. If nothing else, it does not disprove the argument of this 
chapter.  
3.6 Summary 
By itself, Bihar’s failure to use centre-state fiscal transfers is not conclusive proof that it 
is a case of a democracy that failed to implement pro-poor policies. For example, it 
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could well be that Bihar had plenty of its own resources and did not need the funds 
available to it from Delhi. However, the fact that under-claiming and under-spending 
occurred as they did alongside Bihar’s dismal development record and its known 
dependence on centre-state fiscal transfers, leads to the conclusion that Bihar failed to 
improve the economic condition of its people despite having the resources to do so. This 
is the Bihar paradox. In the following chapters, I seek to explain this paradox using both 
statistical analysis and the theories described in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 – Centre-State Fiscal Transfers in India 
As explained in Chapter 3, contrary to almost all expectations, an apparently ‘populist’ 
government in Bihar was the opposite of profligate with public money: it often failed to 
spend funds available to it from the Central Government, including money specifically 
intended for anti-poverty activities. A major part of this thesis is therefore devoted to a 
statistical exploration of this pattern of under-claiming and under-spending with regard 
to fiscal transfers available from Delhi to fund development programmes. 
In this chapter, I first explain in Section 1 why it is possible in India to approach the 
conditions of a natural experiment by comparing the extent to which different state 
governments claim and spend these transfers. In Section 2, I outline the complex 
organisational and administrative dimensions of centre–state fiscal transfers in India, 
including why securing these transfers from the Central Government requires a lot of 
organisational effort. I also discuss in some detail the CSS and SPA transfer sub-
categories, which are the foci of this thesis. I move in Section 3 to a summary of 
existing research on inter-state differences in fiscal transfers in India. One important 
point is that there is no data in the public domain on CSS money claimed and spent by 
different states, and what we know about SPA is dated. Therefore, a substantial portion 
of my research for this thesis was actually creating data sets on CSS and SPA, as 
explained in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes this chapter. 
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4.1 India and CSS: A Natural Experiment 
The first challenge in empirically testing the question of why Bihar in particular failed 
to implement pro-poor policies is to narrow the boundaries of this study. One way to do 
this is to identify a set of schemes and/or programs, which if implemented could result 
in improvements to the lives of the poor. In the case of India, CSS transfers fit this bill 
quite nicely, because they are a bouquet of schemes, almost all of which have the 
potential to influence the lives of poor people living in states that choose to implement 
them. Though there is some element of co-financing by state governments, CSS 
financing largely comes from grants made available by the Central Government. This 
means that CSS also provides an opportunity to study the impact of factors other than 
the availability of financial resources, such as poverty levels, elections etc.   
Though public spending is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving the 
lives of the poor, it is widely acknowledged that development expenditure by the public 
sector is also an important driver for poverty reduction in India (Harriss 2000; Sen 
1996). I therefore chose the extent to which states claimed SPA and CSS funds 
available to them and spent CSS—using annual data from 1997/8 to 2004/5 for 16 
states, as the dependent variable in this quantitative analysis and as the marker for the 
case study on Bihar. 
The second challenge is to find comparable entities to contrast with Bihar in order to 
study the impact of various factors on the uptake of such schemes—and by extension, 
pro-poor policies. Fortunately, India’s states fulfil these criteria quite nicely, because of 
their social, economic, political and administrative diversity combined with the fact that 
they operate within a common legal and constitutional framework. With credible 
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elections and substantial variations in levels of poverty and human development, India 
is akin to a laboratory in which to test a range of hypotheses about democracy (Harriss 
2000). Because CSS represent a collection of schemes applicable to all Indian states, it 
is then possible to compare Bihar’s performance with other states in a way that is 
analytically significant.  
4.2 Centre-State Fiscal Transfers: An Outline 
There is a clear separation of powers and functions between the centre and the states in 
India, detailed in the seventh schedule of the Indian Constitution. The exclusive powers 
of the Central Government are in the union list, those of the state governments are in the 
state list, those under joint jurisdiction are in the concurrent list; and all residuary 
powers are with the Central Government.  
There is no overlap in the power to tax. Most broad-based taxes are the responsibility of 
the Central Government, including taxes on income and wealth from non-agricultural 
sources, corporation tax, taxes on production (excluding those on alcoholic beverages) 
and customs duty. Though states have a long list of items on which they have the power 
to impose taxes, the only state taxes of significant value are those on the sale and 
purchase of goods (M. G. Rao and Singh 2001). This has led to a situation in which 
states, despite having substantial developmental responsibilities, end up with very few 
resources from which they can finance development expenditure: 
The result of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, and 
their implementation in practice has been a substantial vertical fiscal 
imbalance. In 1997-98, the states on average raised about 31 per cent of 
total revenues, but incurred about 57 per cent of total expenditures. 
Transfers made up the balance from the Centre. In fact, the ability of the 
states to finance their current expenditures from their own sources of 
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revenues has tended to decline over time, from 69 per cent in 1955-56 to 
around 55 per cent in the 1990s. (M. G. Rao and Singh 2001) 
This imbalance has given rise to a large and growing array of instruments through 
which states receive fiscal transfers from the Central Government in order to finance 
development programmes. This opens up an opportunity to use such schemes to map 
the diversity in adoption of pro-poor policies and programmes by democratically elected 
state governments. 
The GOI has a fiscal transfer system with three principal financing routes: 
1) Transfers mandated by the Central Finance Commission 
2) Plan assistance that partly funds the annual SPAs approved by the 
Planning Commission of India 
3) CSS approved by the Planning Commission but administered by various 
central ministries and implemented by state governments 
Out of a total transfer of £50.86 billion (Rs. 3,814,230 million) made available by the 
Central Government to states in 2008-09, £26.5 billion (Rs. 1,986,890 million) was 
through the Central Finance Commission (52 per cent), £9.96 billion (Rs. 747,030 
million) was through plan assistance (20 per cent) and £14.4 billion (Rs. 1,080,310 
million) was via CSS (28 per cent) (Saxena 2009). Transfers made on the 
recommendations of the Central Finance Commission are mandatory. The remaining are 
not: state governments can apply to central ministries for funding under a wide range of 
CSS or approach the Planning Commission for approval and co-financing of state plans.  
Historically, as development planning gained popularity in India and the revenues of the 
Central Government grew, the Planning Commission and central ministries became a 
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major dispenser of funds to state governments. For example, while the share of transfers 
mandated by the Finance Commission hovered around 50 per cent, CSS transfers grew 
from 0.9 per cent in 1980-85 to 28 per cent in 2008-09. As there is no specific provision 
in the Constitution for SPA or CSS, the Central Government used the miscellaneous 
provisions of Article 282 of the Constitution to give legal sanction for these transfers.  
In what follows I explain the main features of each of the three types of centre-state 
fiscal transfer system. 
4.2.1 Finance Commission 
Article 280 of the Constitution of India
54
 provides for the establishment of a Finance 
Commission once every five years
55
. It lays down the rules for sharing of the proceeds 
from certain centrally levied taxes with the states, and for grants to the states from the 
Consolidated Fund
56
 of India. Sharing revenue from non-corporate income tax (Article 
270) is compulsory, while sharing proceeds from Union excise duty (Article 272) is 
optional. The Finance Commission also recommends grants to the states under Article 
275. It is therefore a key institution responsible for ensuring balance in the assignment 
of revenues between the centre and states and between states. In recent years, the 
                                                 
54 The powers and procedures of the Commission are regulated by the Finance Commission 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1951. 
55 The latest was the thirteenth Finance Commission. It was constituted on 13 November 2007 
and it submitted its report on 30 December 2009. 
56
 The accounts of Government of India have three parts. They are the Consolidated Fund of 
India, Contingency Fund of India and the Public Account. The Consolidated Fund of India 
contains all revenues received by the Government by way of taxes and other receipts. All loans 
raised by the Government are also credited into this fund. All expenditure of the Government is 
incurred from this fund and no amount can be withdrawn from the Fund without authorisation 
from Parliament. The Contingency Fund of India is used to meet unforeseen expenditure. All 
expenditures are recouped as soon as Parliament authorises additional expenditure. Receipts 
under the Public Account mainly flow from the sale of savings certificates, contributions into 
General Provident Fund and Public Provident Fund, security deposits and earnest money 
deposits received by the Central Government. With respect to such receipts, the Central 
Government is acting as a banker or trustee and refunds the money after completion of the 
contract/event. The receipts into and disbursements out of the Fund are not subject to vote by 
the Parliament (The Controller General of Accounts 1991). 
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Commission has also been given the additional responsibility of making 
recommendations on aspects of fund transfers to the third tier of government (i.e., 
panchayat raj institutions). Finance Commissions thus far have followed a formulaic 
transfer system, one that seeks to correct the resource imbalance between states. To that 
extent, its recommendations have been progressive in the sense that poor states have 
received more in per capita terms (M. G. Rao and Singh 2001).  
4.2.2 Plan Assistance (PA) 
The Planning Commission of India approves the annual development plans of states 
following an exercise that involves the submission of an itemised proposal including 
details of how the state governments proposed to finance their plans. This is a 
complicated exercise and involves a lot of work on the part of each state government to 
put together a plan that will stand up to scrutiny by the mandarins of the Planning 
Commission in Delhi. One source of financing for SPAs is the Plan Assistance (PA) 
that the Planning Commission agrees to make available. The rest comes from market 
borrowing, which requires the permission of the Planning Commission, and the states’ 
own local revenues. As principal secretary to the Bihar State Government, I have 
observed and participated in this process. Though the Planning Commission has some 
discretion, almost the entire amount of PA that a state will receive is decided using the 
Gadgil formula
57
 as approved by the National Development Council (NDC) from time 
to time. All international aid that goes to states as Additional Central Assistance (ACA) 
is also part of the plan. The Gadgil formula does not apply to this. In addition, some 
central government non-CSS schemes like the National Old Age Pension Scheme 
(NOAPS) are also routed via the ACA route.     
                                                 
57 The details of how the Gadgil formula has evolved over the years can be seen in Annexure 2. 
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4.2.3 Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) 
CSS transfers seek to provide additional resources to states for investing in sectors that 
are in the states’ domain as per the Constitution of India, but according to the Central 
Government are of national importance. They form part of the central plan and central 
budget, and are distinct from plan assistance given to states as block grants. CSS 
transfers are designed, financed and supervised by different departments in the Central 
Government. Each has its own rules and operating procedures. Individual departments 
in the GOI in consultation with the Planning Commission, determine the outlay and 
nature of individual schemes based on the guidelines they set. These cannot be altered 
by individual states. Though they came to be known as CSS around the late 1960s, 
specific purpose grants and loans
58
 for specific schemes were in existence following 
World War II and have historically been an area of discord between the centre and the 
states (Garg 2006). The states, or at least their finance departments, prefer unlinked, 
untied or block assistance. However, individual departments in the states have a 
preference for specific purpose grants especially when they bypass the state budget (and 
therefore the state’s finance department) and reach bank accounts of state agencies set 
up for the purpose. The GOI also prefers specific purpose grants because it is easier to 
take political credit for specific programs.  
Beginning in 1968, several committees set up by the NDC
59
 have grappled with ways to 
limit the number and scope of CSS transfers, the last of which was in 2005
60
. Though 
                                                 
58 Under Article 293 of the Constitution of India, states can borrow from the market. However, 
the Constitution also stipulates that when a state is indebted to the centre, it can borrow from 
the market only with the prior permission of the Central Government. As all state governments 
are indebted to the centre, in practice states can do so only with the prior permission of the 
Central Government. The extent to which a state government can raise market loans is agreed 
to at the time of approval of the state’s annual plan. 
59 The Prime Minister heads the NDC. Its members are the deputy chairman of the Planning 
Commission of India, senior members of the central cabinet and state chief ministers. 
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this leads to a reduction in the number of CSS available each time, their numbers soon 
grow again and the cycle continues. 
There were an estimated 196 different CSS in 2006-7 when I was collecting data, 
although other sources suggest slightly different totals. The uncertainty derives from the 
fact that some CSS are not formally labelled as such in the Central Government’s 
budget. Those not so-labelled appear as ‘minor’ or ‘sub-minor’ items within the 
operational programmes of central ministries. Originally, state governments were 
required to co-fund CSS, typically at a 50 per cent level. By the 1990s, and in response 
to high fiscal deficits being run by many state governments, the average state 
contribution requirement had decreased to around 25 per cent. Many schemes initiated 
after 2000 require no financial contribution at all from the state governments (Reserve 
Bank of India 2008).  Leaving aside question of levels of co-funding, one can identify 
four different types of CSS based on two categories of difference.   
The first major difference is between schemes that are routed from the Central 
Government through the budgets of state governments to the operating/spending 
agencies; and those that are routed directly from the Central Government to operational 
agencies within the states, bypassing the budgets of the state governments (Garg 2006). 
In 2006/7, for example, there were 154 CCS that were financed through the state budget 
                                                                                                                                               
60 In 1968, the central government accepted the recommendation of a committee of the NDC 
that the total value of CSS should be limited to 1/6
th
 of the quantum of central plan assistance to 
states. However this was soon exceeded. During the fifth five-year plan period (1974-79), 72 
CSS were transferred to the state sector and the resultant savings of about Rs. 20,000 million 
were given to the states as additional block assistance. In July 1984, this issue was raised 
again by states and after six years of deliberations in 1991, 113 of the 262 CSS (as of 1 April 
1985) were transferred to states along with the corresponding share of funds. This cycle of 
expansion and contraction continues. The latest being an expert committee set up in 2005 
(Verma 2006). I had the opportunity to work with this expert group during my fieldwork in India 
2006-07. 
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and 42 that bypassed it. The former collectively accounted for 248,020 million rupees of 
expenditures and the latter for 365,160 million rupees. The CSS that bypassed the state 
budget were therefore on average four times as costly as CCS that went through the 
state budget (C. B. Rao et al. 2007).The second distinction is between schemes for 
which the distribution among states is specified at the start of the year and those for 
which it is not. The latter allocation is ‘demand-led’: states have to submit a formal 
demand according to a standard blueprint drawn up in Delhi.  
This two-by-two variation generates four different types of CSS, however, these are, 
only a part of the story. Even where there are formal inter-state allocations declared at 
the start of the financial year, normal public sector budgetary processes begin to take 
effect in the second half of the year, and money is in practice re-routed to those states 
that can make the most effective claims. In the Indian public service as elsewhere, 
spending officers tend to be evaluated according to their success in spending their 
budgets; they have an incentive to make the system flexible so that they can shift all 
their money
61
. State governments can expect to be rewarded financially for putting 
organisational resources into managing the ways in which they relate to ministries in 
Delhi in respect of CSS transfers. Conversely, those state governments that do not pay 
attention to this issue can expect to be out-competed by those that do, and to end up 
with smaller fiscal transfers than the CSS system formally offers them.   
The flow chart in Figure 4.1 has details of the different sources from which Government 
of India finances its development assistance programs to states and the multiple routes 
its takes. Numbers in brackets are in rupees crores (1 crore = 10 million). 
                                                 
61 Special category states located in the northeast of India are treated differently. Funds 
allocated to them do not lapse at the end of the year, but are carried over into the next financial 
year. 
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Figure 4.1 Devolution of funds to states in 2001-2002 (revised estimates)
62
 
 
Source: (Saxena 2004) 
4.3 Existing Research on Centre-State Fiscal Transfers in India 
Current insights into fiscal transfers in India that are pertinent for this thesis can be 
grouped in the following manner: 
                                                 
62
 The Central Government’s annual budget reports three figures: budget estimates, revised 
estimates and accounts. The first two refer to the current year, while the accounts typically refer 
to the previous year. 
105 
1) Political economy of fiscal transfers 
2) Fiscal transfers as regressive vs. progressive 
3) Impact on regional inequality 
4) Explaining non-use of transfers 
This section summarises the existing knowledge in each of these areas.  
4.3.1 Political Economy of Fiscal Transfers 
There is a general consensus in the literature that politics plays a role in determining the 
size of fiscal transfers or grants that states receive (Arulampalam et al. 2007; Dasgupta 
et al. 2001; Khemani 2007a; M. G. Rao and Singh 2000; V. Singh et al. 2003). These 
studies focus on the short and direct route, i.e. by the party in power in the Central 
Government favouring states in which their party is in power, and/or states with a large 
number of Members of Parliament successfully pressurising the Central Government to 
give their state more money. This thesis makes a contribution by identifying an 
additional route; what I have chosen to call - the long and indirect route. This acts 
through the impact of politics on one or more mediating factors. One such is via the 
impact of politics on state administrative capacity and through it, its ability to spend 
fiscal transfers. The other is via the impact of politics on the ability of states to spend 
(via state administrative capacity) and this in turn impacting the ability of states to claim 
fiscal transfers from the Central Government. The latter effect is relevant because fiscal 
transfers are paid in instalments, each instalment being conditional on use of the 
previous. When states, as in the case of Bihar, do not spend what it has claimed, they 
fail to meet the eligibility conditions for the subsequent instalment.  
Much ink has been spilled on discussing the importance of state administrative capacity 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1989; Haggard 1990; Stepan 1978), yet we know very little 
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about the politics of achieving high capacity. Much of the treatment has been in regards 
to providing technical solutions: more training, better motivation, appropriate rewards 
and punishment. However, an examination of the history of administrative competence 
shows that political constraints rather than money or knowledge have been the decisive 
factor (Geddes 1994). The Bihar case study contributes to this literature by identifying 
certain pathways through which political incentives shape state administrative capacity.  
4.3.2 Fiscal Transfers as Regressive vs. Progressive 
Opinion is divided on the impact of fiscal transfers on poor states. Some find no 
systematic relationship between per capita transfers and per capita GSDP (Arulampalam 
et al. 2007; M. G. Rao and Singh 2000). Others find that fiscal transfer outlays are 
regressive; states with low per capita income receive lower
63
 outlays compared to states 
with higher per capita income (Chakraborty 2003: 45; World Bank 1995: 46). Others 
still find that fiscal transfer outlays are progressive (R. Das 2008; Gadgil 2008; Ghosh 
et al. 1998). However, this literature does not address 
 Fiscal transfers routed to state government agencies like the DRDA, 
which bypasses state government budgets (e.g., CSS that bypass the state 
budgets as discussed above) 
 Patterns of spending and their impact on poor states; rather the focus has 
been on allocation and claims
64
 
Understanding the impact of patterns of spending is important because determining 
outlays is only one of many stages in an intricate system of centre–state financial 
management. At the very least, outlays need to be claimed and what is claimed needs to 
                                                 
63 Annexure 3 has details of per capita plan outlays for 16 major states in 2001/2. Annexure 4 
has spearman’s rank correlations for transfers relative to the per capita ranking of major states. 
64 In reports to Parliament, moneys disbursed to states are reported as spent without taking into 
account the CAG’s certification of expenditure by state governments. 
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be spent before benefits can accrue. In this thesis, I analyse data relating to CSS 
claiming and spending by states through two channels; the first via the state budget and 
the second disbursed directly to autonomous state agencies bypassing the state budget
65
. 
4.3.3 Impact on Regional Inequality 
The theoretical literature on comparative regional development predicts the impact of 
economic growth and development on regional disparity. Its predictions can be grouped 
into three broad strands. The first prediction contends that regional inequality will 
increase in the early stages of development and decline later (the inverted U curve) 
(Williamson 1965). The second predicts that regional inequality will decrease as less 
developed regions attract more investment due to comparatively lower wages, 
unfulfilled demand and higher rates of return, calculated or forecast by the Solow 
growth model (Sala-i-Martin 1996; Solow 1956). The third uses theories of 
agglomeration economies to predict that regional inequality will increase because of the 
benefits that firms accrue when they are located near each other (economies of scale and 
network effects) encourage firms to cluster due to greater competition among suppliers, 
greater specialization and the division of labour (Duranton and Puga 2004).  
Indian evidence on these predictions is conclusive in that there was an increase in 
regional inequality. We know that, following economic liberalisation in the 1980s and 
the increase in momentum after 1991, the Indian economy grew rapidly but so too did 
inequality (M. S. Ahluwalia 2002; Alessandrin et al. 2008; Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 
2004; Nagaraj et al. 1998; M. G. Rao et al. 1999; Shetty 2003). Studies recognise the 
following factors as contributors to increased regional inequality in India: 
                                                 
65 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that CSS grants routed directly to 
autonomous agencies of the state governments in India, bypassing the state budget, have been 
captured in a data set. 
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 Competition between states for private investment66 (I. Ahluwalia 2006; 
Alessandrin et al. 2008; M. G. Rao et al. 1999) 
 The inability of fiscal transfers to adequately offset the fiscal disabilities 
of poor states (M. G. Rao et al. 1999) 
 The regressive nature of invisible interstate transfers (M. G. Rao et al. 
1999)  
 Banks’ unwillingness to lend to entities located in states with poor 
economic and social infrastructure
67
 (Guruswamy and Kaul 2004)   
This thesis adds to the above body of work by putting forward evidence to show that 
poor states spend less of the fiscal transfers (CSS) they claim and that this could be a 
hitherto unacknowledged reason for poor states claiming less in the long term, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Inability to spend transfers, therefore, has the potential 
to render the Government of India’s only strategy to reduce regional inequality (i.e., to 
allocate additional resources to poor areas) ineffective.  
4.3.4 Explaining Under Spending  
Two explanations have dominated the literature on why some states in India spend more 
central grants while others spend less: state administrative capacity and the ability to co-
finance
68
 (R. Nayak et al. 2002; Reserve Bank of India 2008; World Bank 1995). The 
state administrative capacity hypothesis simply argued that some states spent less 
                                                 
66 The two states of Gujarat and Maharashtra received close to 40 per cent of all investments in 
the first seven years after 1991 (Kurian). 
67 For example, while banks raised Rs. 264,466 million as bank deposits from Bihar, lending in 
the state was only Rs. 56,358 million (21.3  per cent against a national average of 58.5  per 
cent). In per capita terms, this worked out to Rs. 551.60 against a national average of Rs. 
4,828.80. When Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar are taken together, the credit deposit (CD) ratio 
is less than 30 per cent, which means that more than 70 per cent of deposits raised in UP and 
Bihar were invested elsewhere (Guruswamy and Kaul 2004). 
68 An inability to co-finance can prevent state governments from using fiscal transfers when 
states are required to bear a portion of the program cost. For example, the rural housing 
program for people below the poverty line (the IAY) is a CSS in which the Central Government 
meets 75 per cent of the cost and the state government 25 per cent. The Central Government 
releases funds for this program only if 60 per cent of available funds have been used and the 
state government has released its share. 
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because they had poor capacity, but offered little evidence on this trend or its correlation 
with poverty levels. The co-financing hypothesis displayed the same limitations. Until 
now, these have remained hypotheses that have not been possible to test empirically 
because reliable, disaggregated data on allocation, claiming and spending of different 
components of the fiscal transfer system was not available (M. S. Ahluwalia 2000: 8; 
Shariff et al. 2002). This thesis makes a contribution by creating a panel dataset and 
testing the co-financing hypotheses. 
A key finding from the analysis of SPA and CSS data (as we will see in Chapter 5) was 
that poor states, besides spending less, also claimed less to begin with. One of the 
conditions associated with CSS grants is that further grants cannot be given unless the 
money made available has been spent. Poor states, due to their inability to spend, 
therefore receive less. The analysis of SPAs shows that poor states claim less per capita 
allocations. Literature on SPAs in India already acknowledges this for an earlier 
period
69
 (World Bank 1995), and the subsequent analysis shows that this trend 
continued into the period 1997-98 to 2004-05.  
4.4 Constructing the Data Sets 
This section describes the two data sets on centre-state fiscal transfers that I assembled 
for this research. The first set, on CSS transfers, is unique, and based on locating and 
collating details of state-wise release/claims and use/spending buried within separate 
divisions of many departments across Central Government ministries. The second data 
set on SPAs entailed assembling data available from the Planning Commission of India. 
Before describing these two data sets, I first begin with a brief section on the need for 
                                                 
69 See Annexure 3 and Annexure 4. 
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the data sets and another on the background processes at work within government that 
have shaped the data and its collection.  
4.4.1 The Need for New Data Sets 
Fiscal transfers from the Central Government to Indian states are an important source of 
state spending on poverty reduction and development in developing countries with 
multitier governments. Yet, they have not been subject to the kind of statistical enquiry 
witnessed for international aid programmes. This is largely because of the poor 
availability of reliable and suitably-disaggregated data. Though India has done better 
than other developing countries in statistical scrutiny, the analysis of interstate 
differentials in the spending of transfers from the Central Government has not been 
possible so far due to a lack of data: 
... very little attention has been paid to the utilisation of the ‘allocated 
funds’. There is scant information on what is really happening to the 
budgetary allocations made year after year to implement several 
development schemes. Are they being fully utilised or not? If not, why? 
(Shariff et al. 2002) 
Therefore, the creation of this dataset is an important contribution of this thesis. 
4.4.2 Issues with Data Collection 
During my fieldwork, I encountered various obstacles in collecting both the CSS and 
SPA datasets. These issues are described below.  
4.4.2.1 CSS 
Currently, the GOI operates close to 200 CSS schemes through a number of central 
ministries. In theory, data on CSS financial flows should be readily available. India has 
a parliamentary democracy, all allocations are authorised by Parliament and Parliament 
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receives reports of all expenditures authorised by it. The CAG has the duty to exercise 
oversight over the spending process and reports to parliament each year. So, it is curious 
why data on spending of CSS grants by states has thus far not been available.  
There are potentially five sources of data on CSS: 
1) The Planning Commission, which collects information on CSS as part of 
its annual plan review and approval process 
2) The office of the CAG, which monitors the submission of audit 
certificates by the state accountant generals (to the central Finance 
Ministry and other concerned departments in the GOI) 
3) The Department of Expenditure in the Ministry of Finance, which is 
supposed to receive expenditure certification reports from the state 
accountant generals 
4) The ministries in the GOI that administer each CSS, collect expenditure 
reports and utilisation certificates directly from state governments and 
receive audit certificates from the state accountant generals 
5) Individual departments in state governments that have received CSS 
transfers 
 
In reality, however, this reporting system is problematic. I discuss problems in obtaining 
data from each source below. 
4.4.2.1.1 Planning Commission 
Each September, the Planning Commission asks states to send proposals for the annual 
state plan for the forthcoming year by the middle of October. As part of this, states are 
required to report the approved outlay and estimated expenditure in the current year for 
each CSS. The letter dated 20 September 2005 from the Planning Commission (copy 
attached as Annexure 5) is illustrative. It was therefore with some enthusiasm that I 
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enrolled as an intern in the Planning Commission during my fieldwork in 2005-06. 
Officially, the archives of these documents are in the library of the Planning 
Commission. Unfortunately, however, some of them are not catalogued, some are not 
identifiable, and some are not actually in the library as they should be. Despite my best 
efforts, which involved delving into the depths of the dustiest parts of the Commission’s 
library stores and filing formal RTI applications, I was unable to put together a full set 
for the years between 1997/8 and 2004/5. Furthermore, what I was able to salvage was 
not usable since elementary precautions like ensuring that states used a standard naming 
protocol while filing reports for each CSS was not followed.  
4.4.2.1.2 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India  
Sections 3.23.16 to 3.23.27 of the CAG’s Manual of Standing Orders (Audit) second 
edition, 2002 (copy attached as Annexure 6) contain detailed instructions on how, at the 
end of each year, the Accountant General (audit) of each state should check and issue 
expenditure certificates for all money transferred to states each year for CSS schemes. 
According to section 3.23.18 of the standing orders, certified copies of the audited 
expenditure certificates are to be sent to the Ministry of Finance, the administrative 
department in charge of each CSS, and the concerned state department. The office of the 
CAG does not collect and collate these in a manner that makes it possible to know the 
amount of money that has been certified as spent by each state’s Accountant General 
(Audit) against money claimed for each CSS. As per section 3.23.26 of the standing 
orders, the CAG keeps track only of the quarterly progress of the number of schemes 
for which expenditure statement was issued, not the amount of money that remains to be 
accounted for. This is a simplification made possible because of the practise in India of 
treating money released to states as expenditure for purposes of reporting to parliament. 
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For example, when the finance minister of India reports the previous year’s expenditure 
to parliament, s/he does so on the basis of the audit certificate provided by the CAG of 
India. This is called ‘accounts’ in the budget documents and where it refers to money 
given to state governments; the figure is not the amount actually spent by the state 
government, but the amount successfully claimed by it.  
The subsequent step—collecting, collating and tracking pending expenditure certificates 
from each state for each CSS—is not subject to systematic scrutiny by Parliament. This 
gap in parliamentary oversight has a negative effect on pendency, quality of record 
keeping and supervision. For example, according to the quarterly report of the 
Accountant General of Kerala (copy attached as Annexure 7) as of 30 September 2007, 
audited expenditure certificates for a total of 242 CSS were pending for expenditure 
certification, the earliest being from the year 1999/2000. 
4.4.2.1.3 Ministry of Finance 
One of the intended recipients of certified copies of audited expenditure certificates 
prepared by the accountant generals in each state is the Department of Expenditure in 
the central Ministry of Finance. This is therefore a third possible source from which to 
obtain expenditure data on CSS. Due to delays is preparing and transmitting expenditure 
certificates by the state accountant generals, it is only to be expected that the availability 
of these certificates with the Department of Expenditure is compromised. On meeting 
the concerned officials in the Department of Expenditure, I found that there has been no 
serious effort to compile even the few reports they do receive. More importantly, no one 
compiles the numbers arising from these reports and no effort is made to get in touch 
with the CAG to instruct the defaulting state accountant generals to send the pending 
reports. This is not surprising given the large and challenging portfolio of the Ministry 
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of Finance, but I found that this was also a low priority because the finance minister is 
not required to inform Parliament of the amount of money that remains to be certified as 
spent from the total money transferred to states each year.  
4.4.2.1.4 Central Ministries 
The fourth source from which one could get data was departments of the central 
ministries that are responsible for administering each CSS. Unfortunately, as the 
following abstract from the report of a Parliamentary Standing Committee on the 
Ministry of Human Resource Development shows, ministries do not always maintain 
information on expenditure: 
… a disturbing trend gradually taking roots along with the increase in 
allocation and utilisation of funds.  The Committee observes that as on 
1.4.2004, there were as many as 4652 pending Utilisation Certificates for an 
amount of Rs.5510.85 crore. While appreciating the persistent efforts made 
by the Department in getting reduced the pending UCs to 2903 amounting 
to Rs.535.62 crore, the very fact that there are pending UCs highlights the 
inadequacies of the accounting procedure as well as incapacity of the 
implementing agencies… there were unspent balances of Rs. 505.53 crore 
as on 1.4.2005 which reached the figure of Rs. 928.86 crore within a short 
span of 6 months. (Parliament Standing Committee on Human Resource 
Department 2007) 
Central Government departments were therefore not an easy source for data on spending 
by states of grants claimed by them. Having spent many years in the civil service, I 
knew that the problem was not that expenditure data was not collected. Ministry of 
Finance regulations require individual ministries to collect utilisation certificates from 
state government departments (not the state accountant generals) before they can release 
money. The following extract from the orders issued by the finance ministry in this 
regard makes this amply clear: 
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No amount will be released to any entity (including State Governments), 
which has defaulted in furnishing utilization certificates for grants-in-aid 
released by Central Government in the past without clearance from the 
Ministry of Finance. In respect of all grants released prior to April 1, 2004, 
two months’ notice may be given to the concerned entities to furnish the 
required utilization certificates, failing which the amount will be deducted 
from future releases and credited to government revenue as “refund of 
unused grants”... The State Governments will, henceforth, furnish monthly 
return of Plan expenditure – Central, Centrally Sponsored or State Plan – to 
respective Ministries/Departments along with a report on amounts 
outstanding in their Public Account in respect of Central and Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes. (Kishore 2005) 
Therefore, the problem had more to do with inadequate attention to collating the data 
and keeping it in a form that was easily accessible. Without a non-negotiable and 
annually occurring deadline from Parliament, the minister in charge and his 
departmental secretary felt no need to prioritise this task. 
4.4.2.1.5 State Governments 
I therefore faced a choice. Either I could travel to each state capital and put together the 
dataset by sourcing data from each of the state departments that implemented each CSS, 
or I could try to do the same with Central Government ministries. Given the logistical 
challenge involved in travelling to so many state capitals, I decided on the latter and 
focused my efforts on ministries in Delhi.  
4.4.2.2 State Plan Allocations 
The SPA dataset, fortunately was much easier to assemble. Thanks to my internship 
with the Planning Commission during my fieldwork, I was able to locate the person 
who had steadfastly kept track of this data. Plan data was also much easier to collect 
because it is headline news each year when at an annual event a team led by the chief 
minister of each state comes to the Planning Commission to discuss the plan 
expenditure of the previous year and agree to the plan allocation for the forthcoming 
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one. Plan allocation and expenditure data therefore receives attention from the highest 
echelons in the planning commission. Though CSS data is also collected as part of the 
same exercise, no one in the Planning Commission pays any real attention to it because 
it is seen as an activity for which the concerned central ministry is in charge. Even so, 
obtaining the SPA data required me to file an RTI application with the public 
information officer of the Planning Commission, who then directed the holder of the 
information in the Commission to make it available to me. 
4.4.2.3 Data Reliability 
The two datasets on CSS and SPA are therefore the product of a year and a half of 
concerted effort. My CSS data set was assembled from information obtained from a 
variety of divisions in several departments in different central ministries. The data 
comes from the spending reports they collect from individual states, on the basis of 
which they have been releasing grants. These are not audited statements and I am aware 
that state governments have an incentive to overstate spending so as to become eligible 
for the next transfer instalment. I looked into this, and given the awareness within the 
system that these numbers will at a later stage be subject to audit, I am reasonably 
confident that the data is not influenced by any systematic bias in either direction so as 
to make it spurious. As for the SPA data, this danger is not present as the source of 
information is the planning commission, which is the body that gives the final approval 
for the SPA for each state for each year.  
4.4.3 The CSS Dataset 
CSS allocation for a central ministry is approved when the Indian Parliament approves 
the central budget. Because CSS funds are released to state governments and spent by 
agencies of the state government, there is a delay between Central Government release 
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and their actual use. In some cases, this money is never spent and lies in the bank 
accounts of autonomous agencies (like the DRDA) that have proliferated in the last two 
decades. In others, all or part of this money is not released by state finance departments 
to the state agency responsible for spending. When either of these situations occurs, 
subsequent release of funds by the central ministry gets delayed.  During informal 
discussions, senior CAG officials indicated to me that the unaccounted-for money 
already transferred to state governments and its autonomous agencies could total 
billions of pounds. Financial rules require that where grants have been given for a 
specific purpose, utilisation certificates are to be sent to the state accountant general by 
the concerned state department within 15 months. In 2001/2 in Bihar for example, out 
of a total grant of £189 million, the state accountant general had received utilisation 
certificates for only £13 million before 30 June 2003, leaving £176 million (93 per cent) 
unaccounted for (Accountant General Bihar 2003).  
It is this inter-state variation in use of CSS grants that I seek to exploit in order to 
empirically test the statistical significance of certain independent variables in explaining 
the variation in percentage use of CSS grants (the dependent variable). By using amount 
spent as a percentage of amount claimed (of CSS) as a proxy for the degree to which 
governments pursue pro-poor policies, I hope to throw fresh light on why Bihar, with its 
preponderance of poor people, failed to implement policies directed at the needs of the 
poor.  
The data set on claimed and spent CSS grants covers 62 schemes implemented by 16 
states, over an 8-year period from 1997 to 2005
70
. In statistical parlance, this is called a 
                                                 
70
 During this period, the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh were bifurcated. 
This does not materially affect the analysis because the dependent variables are per capita 
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‘panel data set’, because it has both time series (years) and cross section (states) 
elements. This data covers 91 per cent of India’s population, 80 per cent of its area and 
65 per cent
71
 of the value of CSS releases during this period. It relates to schemes 
operated by the ministries of Rural Development, Agriculture, Health, and Human 
Resource Development.  
Availability of data has dictated the choice of schemes for inclusion in the data set. 
Changes in names of schemes have been dealt with by integrating data from the 
successor scheme with the original. This has been possible in cases where the name of 
the scheme has changed, but its main features have not. In the case of CSS that were 
terminated during the time period covered by the data set and a logical successor was 
not available, the truncated data for the original scheme was used. This was not 
problematic because the impact of this truncation would have been felt by all states, and 
because absolute numbers were not used in the regression analysis. All of the data were 
normalised values, either percentage or per capita.  
4.4.4 The SPA Dataset 
Like CSS, the SPA data has also been put together as a panel data set. It captures the 
size of annual development plans for the same 16 states over the same eight-year period 
from 1997/8 to 2004/5. As explained earlier, the Planning Commission of India invites 
state governments each year to submit details of development activities they propose to 
undertake along with arrangements for financing the plan. The Commission, after 
discussions and suitable modifications, approves these and indicates the extent of 
                                                                                                                                               
CSS claimed, per capita SPA claimed, percentage CSS spent, per capita CSS spent and not its 
absolute values. Per capita and percentage numbers are not affected by state division because 
these are normalised numbers—i.e. as the state divides, both the numerators and the 
denominators used to derive the percentage and per capita numbers change simultaneously.  
71 Based on outlay and expenditure for 2004/5. 
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central assistance it will provide. After ascertaining the states own resource position, the 
gap (if any) is met from market borrowings. State governments in India require the 
permission of the Central Government before they can borrow from the market. The 
annual limit for this borrowing is confirmed while approving a state’s annual plan. In 
addition to its own resources, central assistance and market borrowing, two other 
components in a state’s plan are CSS and ACA. In recent years, the size of CSS and 
ACA has increased.  
Unlike the CSS data set, the SPA data was much easier to collect because the Planning 
Commission keeps a good record of annual state wise allocations that they approve. 
There was also no issue with truncation because state plans have had an unbroken run 
since the 1950s.  
Our current understanding on state plans is that poor states have lower per capita 
allocations. However, this is based on data prior to 1997 (World Bank 1995). The 
dataset on SPA helps us understand if this trend has persisted for the period 1997/8 to 
2004/5. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter provided a discussion of why it was appropriate to use inter-state variations 
in centre–state fiscal transfers, claimed and spent by states, to identify trends that will 
help to explore the reasons why Bihar, failed to implement policies directed at the needs 
of the poor. It further outlined the centre–state fiscal transfer arrangements in India, 
summarised existing literature on the subject and explained why I needed to invest 
substantial time and effort in assembling the two data sets. 
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In the following chapter, an analysis of the panel datasets shows how poor states 
claimed and spent less, both in per capita and percentage terms, than better off states 
during the 1997/8 to 2004/5 period. This finding illustrates that the failure to use centre–
state fiscal transfers to pursue pro-poor policies was a nation-wide problem, rather than 
a feature unique to Bihar. Bihar was, however, special in the sense that it did worse 
during this period than its level of poverty would have predicted.  
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Chapter 5 – Bihar in Context: A Statistical Analysis of 
CSS and SPA Data 
In this chapter, I analyse the two panel data sets on CSS and SPA explained in the last 
chapter. To begin, I use a statistical analysis to answer two broad questions. Firstly, 
what determines differences among Indian states in the extent to which they succeed in 
claiming fiscal transfers that are in principle available to them? To answer this question, 
I estimate two regression equations, first with per capita release of CSS and then with 
per capita SPA as the dependent variables. The second question is similar: what 
determines differences among states in the extent to which they spend the fiscal 
transfers they succeeded in claiming? As with the first, I explore this question by 
estimating two regression equations. The first using the percentage of CSS spent and the 
second using the amount of CSS spent per capita. 
In all four regressions
72
, I use Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE)
73
 estimators in 
STATA. One result stands out very clearly: poorer states are less successful in claiming 
and spending fiscal transfers. There are also some consistent correlations with the 
performance of state governments in raising taxes (what I have called ‘tax take’), but 
there are difficulties in interpreting this unambiguously. This main finding about the 
effect of rural poverty has major implications for public policy in India, and is valuable 
in its own right. It is however, from the perspective of this thesis, largely a by-product 
of my research method. I therefore do not explore its implications in any detail, except 
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 For the statistical analysis in this chapter, I used methods learned during my time completing 
an MSc in Research Methods at the University of Sussex, auditing the econometrics course of 
the MA Economics at Sussex and attending the University of Essex summer school on panel 
data analysis of small ‘n’ data sets. 
73 The PCSE method was popularised by (Beck and Katz 1995) when they pointed out the 
pitfalls in using the generalized least squares (GLS) method first described by (Parks 1967). 
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to report that an important purpose of fiscal transfers, namely to reduce disparity 
between rich and poor states was not being met. On the contrary, the combined effect of 
poor states claiming and spending less money had the effect of making an already bad 
situation worse. It did so by reinforcing the regressive impact of economic liberalisation 
in India, where rich states attracted almost all of the new investments (Kurian 2008). 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am interested in these regression results mainly because 
they enable me then to ask a third, more specific question about Bihar. The question is 
this: given that poor states generally tend to perform worse in accessing and using 
central government fiscal transfers, was the poor performance of the Bihar government 
in this respect over the period 1997/8 to 2004/5 no more than a reflection of its poverty? 
If that were the case, then I could conclude that, however damaging the governance 
practices of Lalu Prasad Yadav seemed to be, this data provides no evidence that Yadav 
deprived Bihar of resources more than one would expect for such a poor state. 
The regression equations described above allow me to 'predict' the extent to which a 
state government at Bihar's level of rural poverty would under-perform in claiming and 
spending central transfers. I find that Bihar performed worse than its poverty levels 
would have predicted. I have already explained the character of governance under 
Yadav and the concept of under-claiming and under-spending in Chapters 2 and 3, and I 
go on to explain the underlying political motivations in the next chapter.   
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5.1 The Regressions 
Following Beck and Katz (1995), I use PCSE estimators for analysing both panel
74
 
datasets. With data on 16 states over eight years, there are 128 data points in each 
dataset. Economists rarely work with such ‘small n’ datasets (those with so few data 
points) because large datasets are normally available for both firms and individuals. 
Students of comparative political economy, however, have to deal with case numbers 
that are both too large and too small
75
: ‘too large for reasonable qualitative analysis 
and... too small for reasonable quantitative analysis’ (Kittel 1999). PCSE estimators, 
first suggested by Beck and Katz (1995), solves the technical problems associated with 
panel estimations of small ‘n’ data sets, provided it is acknowledged that the results are 
not general relationships that hold as a rule
76
 (Kittel 1999).  
The general specification used in the four models in this thesis is: 
                                
 
Statistical estimation enables testing the relationship between the independent variables 
on the right hand side of the equation and the dependent variable on the left hand side. 
For example in Model A, the dependent variable is the per capita release of CSS funds 
and in Model B the dependent variable is per capita SPA. A variable is anything that 
takes on different values. For example, per capita income is a variable because it takes 
                                                 
74 Datasets that have both time series and cross section elements are also known as panel, 
pooled or time series–cross section datasets. 
75 For example, Friedland and Sanders (1985) used a dataset with 12 cross sectional elements 
and six time series elements to estimate the political determinants of economic growth in 
advanced industrial societies. Another is Pampel and Williamson (1988) who used a dataset 
with 18 cross sectional elements and seven time series elements to estimate the political 
determinants of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies. 
76 One reason for this is that the small n data set cannot be interpreted as being a 
representative sample of a population. It is the population itself. Therefore, the relationships that 
emerge will be valid for the concerned dataset only. 
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on different values in different years in different states. A variable is called a dependent 
variable when it is used to test whether a change in an independent variable results in a 
proportional change in the dependent variable. Statistical estimation tells us if the 
dependent and independent variables co-vary (i.e., vary together) in a statistically 
significant way. Only theory can tell us whether the observed covariance has causal 
significance, and which variable should be the dependent variable.  
Listed below are the specifications of the four models. First two estimate differences in 
claiming fiscal transfers, while the later two estimate differences in spending what has 
been successfully claimed. These are explained in subsequent sections where I also 
report the results.  
5.1.1 Question 1: What determines differences among Indian states in the 
extent to which they succeed in claiming fiscal transfers? 
 
Model A: PCSE model with state dummies where per capita release of CSS funds is the 
dependent variable.  
                                                               
                                       
 
Model B: PCSE model with state dummies where per capita SPA is the dependent 
variable 
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5.1.2 Question 2: What determines differences among Indian states in the 
extent to which they succeed in spending fiscal transfers? 
 
Model C: PCSE model with state dummies where % spent of CSS funds is the 
dependent variable.  
                                                            
                                       
 
Model D: PCSE model with state dummies where per capita spending of CSS funds is 
the dependent variable. 
                                                             
                                       
 
With these equations in mind, I will now turn to a description of the variables used in 
these regressions.  
5.2 The Variables 
The full list of variables used in the regression analysis and their sources are described 
below, along with a brief discussion on what each variable helps us test. These have 
been chosen in order to answer the two research questions mentioned above, and also to 
test the two claims in the literature described in Chapter 4 regarding why states under-
claim and under-spend fiscal transfers available to them: lack of state administrative 
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capacity and the inability to co-finance centre-state schemes. The variables used are 
described below. 
5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
‘CSS Release’: the total money claimed by a state government in a financial year for all 
CSS schemes for which data is available, divided by the estimated population of the 
state in that year. There are three stages in the flow of fiscal transfers from the central 
government to states: allocation, release/claim and use/spend. As explained in Chapter 
4, not all schemes have preannounced allocations. They instead use what some call a 
‘demand led’ policy for fund release. This work is therefore limited to the analysis of 
funds claimed by the state governments and their use. CSS Release is the dependent 
variable in Model A. It approximates the amount available per person or per capita for 
spending on development programs.  
‘Plan Outlay’: the per capita SPA. It is calculated by dividing the revised annual plan 
outlay/allocation for each state by its population. The data for this has been sourced 
from the Planning Commission. It is the dependent variable in Model B. 
‘% Expend’: the percentage expenditure of all CSS funds with a state. It is calculated by 
aggregating the annual expenditures incurred for each CSS operational within a state, 
and dividing this aggregate by the total funds available with state for all CSS in a year. 
For example if IAY, SGSY and NREP are the names of three CSS operational in the 
state of Kerala in 2003/4, % Expend for Kerala for this year is calculated by totalling the 
expenditure incurred by Kerala in 2003/4 in implementing IAY, SGSY and NREP and 
dividing this amount by the total funds received/claimed by Kerala for IAY, SGSY and 
NREP in the year 2003/4. % Expend is the dependent variable in Model C. It tells us the 
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extent to which a state has spent the funds available to it. The data for this variable has 
been sourced from individual divisions in various departments in the GOI as described 
in Chapter 4. 
‘CSS Spend’: the total amount of money spent by a state government in a financial year 
for all CSS schemes, divided by the estimated population of the state for that year. CSS 
Spend is the dependent variable in Model D. It gives the amount spent per person or per 
capita on development programs. 
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
These variables are common in all the four Models: A, B, C and D. 
‘Tax Take’: the total taxes collected by a state government in a given financial year, 
normalised for its level of GSDP. It is calculated by dividing total taxes collected by a 
state by the state’s GSDP in that year. It does not include non-tax income like user fees 
or dividends from government companies or taxes collected by the central government 
and shared with states. This ratio captures the extent to which a state is willing and able 
to extract revenue from its citizens. Some, like Arbetman and Kugler (1997), have 
argued that governments with a greater ability to extract revenue also have greater 
political capacity and vice versa. Publications from the Reserve Bank of India are the 
source for this data. 
‘% Rural Poor’: the proportion of poor (as per the official poverty line) in the rural 
population in the state
77
. This variable reveals whether there is a statistically significant 
                                                 
77
 I chose to work with data on rural poverty rather than urban or total poverty because 90% of 
the population of Bihar is rural with very little change over the three census periods that this 
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relationship between poverty and the dependent variable. For example, if in Model A 
the estimated coefficient for poverty is negative and statistically significant, it signals 
that as poverty levels rise, per capita claiming of CSS grants falls. Data on poverty has 
been sourced from Himanshu (2007). He has data only for the years 1993 and 2004, and 
so I have assumed that poverty grew/fell at a fixed rate between 1993 and 2004 while 
calculating data for the intervening years
78
. 
‘Deficit’: the amount of gross fiscal deficit is a proportion of GSDP. It enables us to test 
the validity of the hypothesis that the inability to co-finance is a reason for inability to 
claim and spend CSS grants. The appropriateness of this test is dependent on the 
validity of the assumption that states that do not face fiscal crises will be able to source 
the funds to fulfil co-financing commitments. I have closely observed the functioning of 
finance departments in a number of Indian states and served as secretary of the 
department of finance in one. I have found that because CSS funds come as grants, 
finance officers and ministers prioritise the fulfilment of co-financing commitments as 
long as salary and debt commitments enable them to do so. Thus, my experiences 
suggest that this assumption is valid. Publications from the Reserve Bank of India are 
the source for this data.  
                                                                                                                                               
data set covers. For example the percentage of urbanization in Bihar in 1991, 2001 and 2011 
was 10.4, 10.4 and 11.3 respectively (Office of the registrar general of census of India). 
78
 Sen and Himanshu (2004b, 2004a) and Himanshu (2007) show that the 55
th
 round (1999-
2000) of the NSS uses a different methodology from all previous thick quinquennial rounds of 
the NSS. Its results are therefore not comparable with the earlier and later thick quinquennial 
(61
st
 i.e. 2004-05) NSS rounds. The 61
st
  round and earlier rounds except the 55
th
 (1999-2000) 
canvassed information on consumption expenditure based on a 30-day uniform recall period for 
all items and also by the 365-day recall period for five less frequently consumed items – 
education, institutional medical care, durables, clothing and footwear. The 55
th
 round 
consumption expenditure survey schedules are not comparable to the others for two reasons. 
First, it collected information for food items based on seven-day recall and, second, it asked 
only 365-day questions for the five infrequently purchased items. Following this experts no 
longer use the 1999-2000 NSS 61
st
 round for comparisons and most including Deaton and 
Drèze (2009) use Himanshu (2007) as the authoritative source for comparable data on poverty 
data for different Indian states. 
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‘Agri Share’: the share of agriculture in GSDP. This variable is necessary to control for 
the effect of poverty (or per capita income) and share of agriculture in GSDP so that the 
tax-GSDP ratio (what I have called tax take) will be comparable across states. This 
follows from Wagner’s law, identified as early as 1877, which states that countries with 
higher per capita incomes and lower shares of agriculture in GDP tend to have higher 
tax-GDP ratios.  National income tables published by the Central Statistical 
Organisation in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation are the source 
for this data. 
‘Election Dum’: an election dummy variable. It takes a value = 1 in years when there 
was an election to the state assembly or national parliament. In other years it is given a 
value = 0. The dummy variable has been introduced to control for the effect of 
increased availability and spending during election time. The Election Commission of 
India is the source for this data. 
‘S (individual names of states’): a dummy for each state. These dummies help control 
for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. 
As detailed in Chapter 4, the little that has been written on fiscal transfers in India 
speculates that low state administrative capacity and inability to co-finance account for 
states’ inability to use fiscal transfers they receive. Thanks to these variables, 
particularly the fiscal deficit variable and the new CSS dataset, I am able to test the co-
finance hypothesis.  
The state administrative capacity hypothesis however could not be fully tested due to 
ambiguity with interpreting the tax take variable. In the description of the tax take 
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variable above, I referred to Arbetman and Kugler (1997) and their argument that states 
that extract more revenue as tax from its citizens can be said to have greater political 
capacity. While this relationship may be valid in the long run and one could consider 
using it as a proxy for state administrative capacity, I am sceptical about using this for 
two reasons. One reason is practical: eight years (the time period of my data set) is too 
short a period for changes in tax take to be due to changes in state administrative 
capacity. The second is theoretical: difference in tax take could be due to difference in 
scope rather than capacity (Fortin 2008; Fukuyama 2004). As Fortin states,  
The differentiation between scope and capacity becomes even more 
important in the case of post-communist countries since the scope of the 
Soviet state was extended to its maximum, while its administrative capacity 
was more limited… communist states, even with extensive surveillance and 
coercion apparatuses, were not necessarily capable and efficacious states… 
distinction between infrastructural and despotic power is particularly 
salient… while the Soviet Union may have been exceptionally repressive, it 
was administratively weak… (Fortin 2008: 3) 
Therefore the statistical significance and sign (+ or -) of the tax take variable in each of 
the four models do not give us an unambiguous measure for state administrative 
capacity. 
5.3 Determinants of Fiscal Transfers (Claimed) 
In this section, I use the CSS and SPA datasets to examine whether poor states are less 
successful in claiming fiscal transfers from the central government.  
5.3.1 Model A: PCSE Model with State Dummies (Per Capita Release) 
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The dependent variable (               captures variation in per capita CSS release in 
relation to increases or decreases in poverty levels (               , ability to co-
finance (           and tax take (           . The three independent variables are the 
percentage rural population who are poor (               , fiscal deficit (           
and tax take (           . 
The other independent variables in the regression equation are: the share of agriculture 
in GSDP (              to account for the influence of agriculture on the tax-GSDP 
ratio; an election year dummy (               to account for spikes in CSS spending 
due to elections; and state dummies (    to control for omitted variables that differ 
between cases but are constant over time. These variables are treated as controls in this 
regression.  
The results from estimating the above model are detailed in Table 5.1. Rows with a grey 
band denote statistical significance at 90 or 95 per cent level. 
Table 5.1 Determinants of per capita CSS release 
--------------------------------------------- 
               CSS Release |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z     
-------------+------------------------------- 
% Rural poor |   -.000146   .0000469    -3.11**    
     Deficit |   -.000012   .0000251    -0.48    
  Agri Share |   .0001421   .0002959     0.48    
Election Dum |   .0001856   .0001279     1.45    
    Tax Take |    .000107   .0000795     1.35    
      Andhra |  -.0033498   .0008311    -4.03    
       Assam |   .0008899    .000331     2.69    
       Bihar |   .0024002   .0008201     2.93    
     Gujarat |  -.0024164    .000558    -4.33    
     Haryana |  -.0026482     .00069    -3.84    
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    Himachal |   .0002569   .0008169     0.31    
   Karnataka |  -.0019086   .0005388    -3.54    
      Kerala |  -.0031974   .0006598    -4.85    
          MP |   .0008413   .0005211     1.61    
 Maharashtra |  -.0004345   .0004942    -0.88    
      Orissa |   .0037534   .0009194     4.08    
      Punjab |  -.0044249   .0009426    -4.69    
   Rajasthan |  -.0016546   .0005323    -3.11    
  Tamil Nadu |  -.0014388   .0004793    -3.00    
          UP |    .000247   .0005946     0.42    
       _cons |   .0062494   .0017879     3.50    
             R
2
 = 0.7991 
     * - 90% level of significance 
    ** - 95% level of significance 
 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors for 16 major states from 1997 to 2005. 
 
 
The results from this regression confirm that, as levels of poverty (                
rose, states systematically received less per capita CSS grants (              . There is 
a statistically significant negative relationship between rural poverty 
(                and per capita CSS release (              . The other two 
independent variables, tax take (            and deficit (          , are not 
statistically significant.  
What are the causal pathways that drive this result? Officials in central ministries have a 
mandate to move vast amounts of money. Their performance appraisal depends on how 
much they are able to report as spent, as does the ability of the departmental minister to 
stand up to parliamentary scrutiny. Given that grant rules require that previous 
instalments have to be spent before a fresh claim can be entertained, officials have two 
choices. One is to look for reasons why poor states are unable to spend and then try to 
address it (the harder option). The second is to pass on unclaimed money to those who 
are able to spend (the easier option). As the results from estimating Models C and D 
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show, the states that received this ‘passed on’ money are states with low levels of 
poverty. Unfortunately, in a political climate in which states compete against each other 
and in an administrative culture in which it is easy to shift the blame for failure from the 
Central Government to states, there is very little motivation to pursue the harder of the 
two options
79
. 
Having examined claim patterns with respect to CSS and finding that states with high 
levels of poverty appear to claim less, I now turn to examine SPA claiming patterns 
using the second of the two datasets. 
5.3.2 Model B: PCSE Model with State Dummies (Per Capita SPA) 
 
                                                              
                                       
 
The dependent variable captures variation in per capita SPA (              as poverty 
levels (               , ability to co-finance (           and tax take (            
increase or decrease. The three independent variables are the percentage rural 
population who are poor (               , fiscal deficit (           and tax take 
(           . The controls remain the same
80
 as in the earlier model. The estimation 
procedures, period and independent variables are identical to the ones used in the 
analysis of CSS release (              . The results are presented below in Table 5.2. 
As before, rows marked in grey highlight variables that are statistically significant at 90 
or 95 per cent.  
                                                 
79 Lack of data and statistical enquiry has also helped perpetuate this situation. 
80 The controls are share of agriculture in GSDP to account for influence of agriculture (with its 
low taxability) on ratio of Tax to GSDP; the election year dummy to account for spikes in outlay 
due to elections; and state dummies to control for omitted variables that differ between cases 
but are constant over time. 
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Table 5.2 Determinants of per capita plan outlay 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 Plan Outlay |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z     
-------------+------------------------------------ 
% Rural Poor |  -31.79119   9.703304    -3.28**    
     Deficit |    2.97543   10.35556     0.29    
  Agri Share |  -8.893057   131.1648    -0.07    
Election Dum |   -5.48742   37.36078    -0.15    
    Tax Take |   39.53012   20.97387     1.88*    
      Andhra |  -351.5254   260.2924    -1.35    
       Assam |  -143.1904   94.01246    -1.52    
       Bihar |   77.15677    156.856     0.49    
     Gujarat |   242.1531   159.2098     1.52    
     Haryana |  -241.7585   178.3886    -1.36    
    Himachal |     1158.7   180.6008     6.42    
   Karnataka |   350.8438   204.5634     1.72    
      Kerala |  -174.7122   195.4956    -0.89    
           MP|   58.40294   134.5924     0.43    
 Maharashtra |   386.8431   93.37255     4.14    
      Orissa |   612.6313   162.1125     3.78    
      Punjab |  -298.4172   230.1946    -1.30    
   Rajasthan |  -229.2553     126.22    -1.82    
  Tamil Nadu |   -89.9907   141.3355    -0.64    
          UP |   -27.4775   75.59896    -0.36    
       _cons |   1467.545   335.5254     4.37    
                 R
2
 = 0.8560 
          * - 90% level of significance 
         ** - 95% level of significance 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors for 16 major states from 1997 to 2005. 
 
The results from this regression on per capita plan outlays (              are similar 
to that from the regression on CSS release (              . They confirm that as 
poverty levels rise, states systematically receive lower levels of per capita SPA. This is 
because there was a statistically significant negative relationship between rural poverty 
(                and per capita SPA (             . Tax take (            also has 
a statistically significant, but positive, relationship. As tax take (            went up 
during the period, per capita SPA (              also went up. It is tempting to 
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conclude that the statistical significance and positive sign of the coefficient of tax take 
implies that state administrative capacity has a positive impact on the ability of states to 
claim SPA, and in all likelihood this would be a correct statement to make. However, I 
hesitate to do so for the theoretical reasons stated earlier and because the data set covers 
only an eight-year period. Finding a proxy measure for state administrative capacity that 
can be used in quantitative analysis, is sensitive to short run changes, and for which data 
is available, is a challenge I have not been able to meet. 
5.4 Determinants of Fiscal Transfers (Spent) 
In this section, I use the CSS dataset to examine the relationship between poverty levels 
and states’ ability to spend the fiscal transfers they have successfully claimed from the 
Central Government. From the earlier two regressions (Models A and B), we know that 
there is a negative relationship between poverty and ability of states to claim centre-
state fiscal transfers. If the following two regressions also show a similar negative 
relationship, these findings have serious implications for the ability of poor states to 
pursue pro-poor policies and for India’s efforts to reduce disparities between poor and 
rich states.  
5.4.1 Model C: PCSE Model with State Dummies (% Expenditure) 
 
                                                            
                                       
 
The dependent variable in this model (            captures impact on CSS spend as 
poverty levels (               , ability to co-finance (           and tax take 
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(            increases or decreases. The three independent variables are tax take 
(           , fiscal deficit (           and percentage rural population who are poor 
(               . As in the previous two models the controls are, Share of Agriculture 
in GSDP (             , to account for the influence of agriculture on the ratio of tax 
to GSDP (           ; an election year dummy (              , to account for 
spikes in spending due to elections; and state dummies (   , to control for omitted 
variables that differ between cases but are constant over time.  
The results from estimating the above model are detailed in Table 5.3. As before, the 
rows in grey denote statistical significance at the 90 or 95 per cent level. 
 
Table 5.3 Determinants of percentage CSS spent 
------------------------------------------------ 
   % Expend |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z                                            
------------------------------------------------ 
% Rural Poor |  -1.050135    .560535    -1.87*    
     Deficit |   .1090443   .5181121     0.21    
  Agri Share |  -3.597874   5.730872    -0.63    
Election Dum |  -.2175154   2.333672    -0.09    
    Tax Take |   4.304921   1.311941     3.28**   
      Andhra |  -12.53329   13.55596    -0.92    
       Assam |   4.033478   5.290948     0.76    
       Bihar |   6.748021   8.692922     0.78    
     Gujarat |  -15.92569     10.261    -1.55    
     Haryana |   -14.4802   11.12884    -1.30    
    Himachal |  -6.098623   10.81566    -0.56    
   Karnataka |  -7.088844   9.923502    -0.71    
      Kerala |  -20.93087     11.906    -1.76    
          MP |   15.66551   6.047627     2.59    
 Maharashtra |   13.75129   6.577652     2.09    
      Orissa |   27.93209   10.13014     2.76    
      Punjab |  -27.03202   14.61275    -1.85    
   Rajasthan |  -2.085812   8.252837    -0.25    
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  Tamil Nadu |   4.115337   9.226784     0.45    
          UP |   10.58638   6.674089     1.59    
       _cons |   77.11196   18.25842     4.22    
R
2  
= 0.5619 
* - 90% level of significance 
** - 95% level of significance 
 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors for 16 major states from 1997/8 to 2004/5. 
 
The results of this regression indicate that tax take and rural poverty both significantly 
influence the spending of CSS grants. As the ability of states to collect taxes increases, 
so too does their ability to spend CSS funds. As the extent of poverty increases, the 
spending of CSS resources decreases. Contrary to claims in the literature, ability to co-
finance does not seem to affect states’ expense of CSS funds81. If ability to co-finance 
was a valid factor, the variable (           would have been statistically significant. 
5.4.2 Model D: PCSE Model with State Dummies (Per Capita CSS 
Expenditure) 
 
                                                             
                                       
 
The dependent variable (             captures the impact on per capita CSS spent as 
poverty levels (               , ability to co-finance (           and tax take 
(            increase or decrease. The three independent variables are tax take 
(           , fiscal deficit (           and the percentage of the rural population who 
are poor (               . The controls are the same as in the earlier three models. 
                                                 
81
 This does not mean that individual states at some point or the other during this period were 
not constrained by the availability of money to co-finance. This result only indicates that this was 
not a statistically significant trend. In some ways, this is the difference between anecdotal 
findings and systematic analysis of evidence. 
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The results are given below in Table 5.4: As in Models A, B and C, rows in grey denote 
statistical significance at the 90 or 95 per cent level. 
Table 5.4 Determinants of per capita CSS spent 
------------------------------------------------- 
        CSS Spend |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z     
-------------+----------------------------------- 
% Rural poor |  -.0001391   .0000285    -4.89** 
     Deficit |   3.87e-06   .0000226     0.17    
  Agri Share |  -.0001312   .0003089    -0.42    
Election Dum |   .0001274   .0000826     1.54    
    Tax Take |   .0001857   .0000469     3.96**    
      Andhra |  -.0028987   .0005197    -5.58    
       Assam |   .0008071   .0002377     3.40    
       Bihar |   .0019874    .000473     4.20    
     Gujarat |   -.002209   .0003307    -6.68    
     Haryana |  -.0023547   .0004178    -5.64    
    Himachal |   .0000951   .0005262     0.18    
   Karnataka |  -.0016434   .0003132    -5.25    
      Kerala |   -.002979   .0004065    -7.33    
          MP |   .0010609   .0002773     3.83    
 Maharashtra |   -.000046   .0002392    -0.19    
      Orissa |   .0036297   .0005425     6.69    
      Punjab |  -.0039263   .0005799    -6.77    
   Rajasthan |  -.0013283   .0003049    -4.36    
  Tamil Nadu |  -.0010435   .0002645    -3.95    
          UP |   .0004271   .0002521     1.69    
       _cons |   .0048344   .0010336     4.68    
R
2
 = 0.8427 
* - 90% level of significance 
** - 95% level of significance 
 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors for 16 major states from 1997/8 to 2004/5. 
 
Per capita spent of CSS (             is the net effect of CSS grants claimed by a state 
government and its rate of spending. In the previous regression (Model C), we saw that 
as levels of poverty went up, ability of states to spend CSS grants went down. One way 
that the Central Government could have encouraged poor regions to spend more in per 
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capita terms might have been to ensure that poor states claimed more in per capita terms 
to begin with. Even if poorer states still spent a smaller percentage of fiscal transfers 
than richer states, this could have been a workable, if inefficient, strategy for getting 
more resources to underdeveloped regions. However from Models A and B, we know 
that this did not occur, as poverty levels rise the ability of states to claim both per capita 
CSS and per capita SPA goes down. 
Overall, the results from this estimation are similar to those from Model C. States’ 
ability to collect taxes (            and the extent of rural poverty (                
significantly influences per capita CSS (             spending. As taxes collected 
rose, so too did per capita CSS spending. As poverty levels rose, per capita CSS 
resources reaching citizens/voters decreased.  
Taken together, the four regressions indicate that poorer a state, lesser its success in 
claiming and spending centre–state fiscal transfers. This finding has major implications 
for public policy in India, and is valuable in its own right. However, I do not pursue this 
insight except to say that private investment in India tends to flow to better-endowed 
states (M. S. Ahluwalia 2000). Because of this, the only way to slow the growth of 
regional disparity (as opposed to reducing it) was by ensuring that poor states claim and 
spend more fiscal transfers. The results from estimating Models A, B, C and D taken 
together seem to indicate that this did not happen. The CSS and SPA systems, like 
private investment, were in fact worsening regional inequality during the 1997/8 to 
2004/5 period.   
To return to the main line of enquiry that this thesis is pursuing, I will now address to 
the third question articulated at the beginning of this chapter: was the poor performance 
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of the Bihar government in claiming and spending transfers a result of its poverty 
alone?  
5.5 Was Bihar’s Poor Performance Merely a Consequence of its Poverty? 
The statistical results discussed above indicate that Bihar with its high levels of poverty 
tended to have high levels of under-claiming and under-spending. However, are they in 
practice higher or lower than one would expect given Bihar’s level of poverty in 
comparison with other states?  
5.5.1 Estimating the Predicted or Trend Line for CSS Spent 
In the graph below
82
 (Figure 5.1) derived from regression Model C, the fitted line for 
percentage of CSS spent shows how much under-spending can be expected given the 
proportion of each state’s rural households that are below the poverty line. The distance 
between the fitted line and the actual annual observation points indicates the direction 
and degree of under- or over-spending.  
The results for four states are especially significant. Tamil Nadu is strikingly successful 
in spending its CSS allocations. This is consistent with its general reputation for 
relatively effective and enthusiastic anti-poverty programmes, which seems in turn to be 
based in large part on a pattern of consistent and close electoral competition between 
two main political parties, both bidding for the support of the average poor voter (Harris 
2005). The opposite pattern is found in the Punjab, where the State Government under-
spends its CSS allocations to a marked degree. This too is predictable. Incomes are high 
                                                 
82 In these graphs, Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Punjab have their names written in full. The others 
have short codes which are As (Assam), AP (Andhra Pradesh), Gu (Gujarat), Ha  (Haryana), 
HP (Himachal Pradesh), Ker (Kerala), Kar (Karnataka), Mah (Maharashtra), MP (Madhya 
Pradesh), Or (Orissa), R (Rajasthan), UP (Uttar Pradesh), and WB (West Bengal). 
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in Punjab, and the opportunities to exercise political patronage that arise from CSS are 
of little use to politicians there. The agenda for electoral politics in that state is shaped 
more by issues around opportunities for investment, profit and international migration 
of skilled labour. Like Punjab, we can see that Bihar also consistently under-spends 
relative to its poverty level. Bihar contrasts strongly with Orissa, which is equally poor, 
but tends to achieve relatively high expenditure levels on CSS schemes.   
Figure 5.1 Trend line for per cent CSS spent 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Estimating the Predicted or Trend Line for SPA Claimed  
In the following graph (Figure 5.2) derived from regression Model B, the fitted line for 
per capita SPA claimed shows how much under-claiming can be expected given the 
proportion of each state’s rural households that are below the poverty line.  As in the 
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case of the preceding graph on CSS spent, the distance between the fitted line and the 
actual annual observation points indicates the direction and degree of under- or over- 
claiming SPA. 
The data on SPA captures the size of annual development plans for the same 16 states 
over the eight year period from 1997/8 to 2004/5, the same as the CSS data set. In the 
following graph, all the cross-sectional (16 states) and time series (eight years) elements 
in the dataset have been pooled like in the graph on CSS spending.  
Figure 5.2 Trend line for per capita SPA claimed 
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As in the case of CSS spent, Bihar’s SPA data points are consistently below the trend 
line, indicating that Bihar claimed less SPA than predicted by its level of poverty.  
5.6 Summary 
Taken together, the above-described regression results and graphs indicate that the 
Bihar Government performed worse in practice than predicted by its level of poverty. 
While this suggests that there must be additional factors at play, these statistical results 
alone do not enable me to draw any firm conclusion as to the cause of the State’s 
performance. Bihar could have under-performed for reasons that had nothing to do with 
its governance during the Yadav regime. However, the findings from the graphs matter 
to this thesis because they are consistent with my field observations about the character 
of governance in Bihar under Yadav and his party and their underlying political 
incentives. I will turn to these factors in the next chapter when I present the political 
logic driving ‘state incapacity by design’—the core arguments of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 – The Core Argument: State Incapacity by 
Design 
The previous chapter discussed how governments of poor states in India tend to under-
claim and under-spend centre–state fiscal transfers. Of these, Bihar performed worse 
than one would expect for a state with its level of poverty during the leadership of Lalu 
Prasad Yadav. 
This chapter attempts to explain this occurrence by discussing two questions. The first 
is, what were the proximate reasons for Bihar under-claiming and under-spending 
centre–state fiscal transfers as described in Chapters 3 and 5? Secondly, how did these 
proximate reasons coexist with repeated electoral success, credible elections and a 
majority of poor voters?  
In Section 1, I begin by discussing four proximate reasons for Bihar’s particularly bad 
record in claiming and spending centre–state fiscal transfers. Then, in Section 2, I 
elaborate two of these reasons: the high number of vacancies and the centralisation of 
decision making, which were the direct result of a specific political strategy to solidify 
core electoral support by maintaining a mood of continuous rhetoric and mobilisation 
against the upper-caste minority. Yadav gave credibility to his rhetoric by refusing to 
recruit members of those upper castes into the public service, and by maintaining very 
close political control over the decisions of officers already in service. The costs, 
knowingly incurred, were loss of administrative capacity and, indirectly, sacrifice of 
fiscal transfers from Delhi, discussed in Section 3. However, as we will see in Section 4, 
in instances when it was necessary to deliver important selective benefits to the core 
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components of his electoral base, Yadav ensured that administrative capacity was 
preserved. He strove to alleviate the tension inherent in his political strategy by making 
only very sparing promises about the material benefits that he would bring to his 
supporters. The tension, described in Section 5, was that, by consistently undermining 
the capacity of the state apparatus under his control, he limited his ability to deliver 
normal developmental goods.  
However, Yadav’s ability to direct the attention of his supporters away from 
development outcomes and from the numerous corruption cases lodged against him in 
the courts was limited. His competitors, notably Nitish Kumar, saw the potential to 
mobilise votes from two under-represented groups: the non-Yadav BCs and the 
numerous Extremely Backward Castes. Church (1984) preferred to call the Extremely 
Backward Castes ‘lower castes’ (see Chapter 3)—a group sandwiched between the 
‘middle castes’ above them and the ‘scheduled castes’ below. They were marginal 
farmers, share-croppers, landless labourers, barbers, boatmen, blacksmiths, carpenters, 
cobblers, oil-pressers, and so on. Kumar also rallied the upper caste vote and sections of 
the Dalit community (Robin 2009: 88-96) to become chief minister after the 2005 state 
elections. He quickly gained a reputation for effectiveness and for making gains in 
development. Most importantly from the perspective of this thesis, Bihar began to 
benefit from a large increase in fiscal transfers from Delhi—despite the fact that 
Kumar’s party, the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))83, was not a part of the ruling coalition 
in New Delhi, while the RJD was. This is discussed in Section 6.  
                                                 
83
 The JD(U) and the RJD both have their origins in Janata Dal and Jayaprakash Narayan's call 
for Total Revolution in 1974. The Samata Party was formed as an offshoot of the Janata Dal in 
1994 by Nitish Kumar and George Fernandes. In October 2003, it merged with the Janata Dal 
(United). 
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Yadav later served as railways minister in the Central Government from 2004 to 2009. 
In this position, he gained a reputation of being a very successful reformer, and for 
bringing about a marked improvement in the performance of India’s poorly performing 
national railway. It became clear that Yadav could be an effective manager of a large, 
complex organisation, in large part because he knew how to pick and delegate power to 
the right kind of people. Therefore, as we see in Section 7, he did not govern Bihar 
poorly due to incompetence, but rather because he chose to use his talents in other ways. 
Finally, Section 8 summarises and concludes this chapter. 
6.1 Proximate Reasons for Bihar’s Record of Fiscal Transfers 
My own experience in working for the governments of Bihar and India since 1985, 
supplemented by a series of interviews with IAS officers and others in Bihar in 2005–6, 
suggests that four sets of organisational practices within the Government of Bihar 
contributed to its demonstrated low capacity to claim and spend centre–state fiscal 
transfers. These were neither the norm in public administration elsewhere in India nor in 
Bihar before 1990 or after 2005. The political leadership in Bihar were aware of their 
consequences. These practices were:  
 Centralisation and a multiplicity of layers in decision making  
 Poor recordkeeping resulting in an overload of litigation against the state, 
mostly from employees and suppliers  
 Mismatch between the rain, flood and budget cycles 
 Vacancies in state government offices, particularly at the middle and 
senior levels  
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While some of these practices might be labelled ‘bureaucratic’ in the pejorative sense of 
the term (procedure as obstacle), others were a failure to observe even the basic 
bureaucratic routines of record keeping. It would therefore be difficult to explain this 
behaviour in terms of bureaucratic obstructionism.  
6.1.1 Extreme Centralisation 
State governments are large organisations and the delegation of powers is a delicate 
balancing act to ensure that there is policy coherence and responsiveness to citizen 
needs. Between 1990 and 2005, I observed a systematic effort in Bihar, both formal and 
informal, to centralise decision making in the office of the chief minister. The procedure 
for sanctioning a new scheme is illustrative of this trend. Most central grants to states 
are released in two or more instalments. The money is routed either to the state 
government or to an authorised operating agency outside the state but controlled by it. 
All money received by the state government is credited to the consolidated fund of the 
state. There are prescribed procedures for spending money from the consolidated fund.  
In Bihar under Yadav, unlike in other states, the state cabinet had to approve all 
expenditures from the consolidated fund of more than 2.5 million rupees (£30,000) - a 
tiny sum for a government responsible for over 90 million people. This rule applied 
even for schemes that it had already approved. Consequently, actual spending of the 
first instalment from Delhi could not even begin until well into the financial year. Since 
60 per cent of the initial instalment had to be spent before a second instalment could be 
claimed, the second instalment often was not even requested or, if requested, arrived too 
late to be used in the financial year for which it was sanctioned (World Bank 2005).   
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For example, in October 2002, the relevant departmental committee of the Bihar 
Government approved a proposal for the release of the first instalment of funding for the 
NOAPS scheme. The state cabinet also had to approve it, but did not do so until January 
2003. By the time the state government requested and received the second instalment 
from Delhi it was already the 29th of March. The financial year ended two days later 
and the money could not be used.
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A review of the governance problems in Bihar by the World Bank confirmed that:   
... there are some additional unique factors that contribute to the governance 
problems facing Bihar. One of these is Bihar's highly centralized 
government, which impedes decision-making and project implementation. 
For example, high-level authorization and committee approval is required 
for even relatively minor decisions on purchases, tenders, land leases, and 
other personnel matters. This has led to serious bottlenecks that, among 
other things, slow the disbursement of funds and the project cycle of 
government programs. (World Bank 2005: 3) 
In a public interest litigation (PIL) on the ICDS, the court commissioner appointed by 
the Supreme Court of India had this to say on the £30,000 provision in Bihar:  
There is no such parallel provision in the transaction of business rules 
neither in the central government nor in any state government. The whole 
process is time consuming, resulting in delays in release of funds ranging 
from four to six months. Doing away with this rule in itself will expedite 
financial releases, giving more time to the field staff to use and then claim 
second instalments. (N. Nayak and Saxena 2006: 3682) 
                                                 
84 In Bihar today, individual government departments can, with the approval of the Finance 
Department, spend any amount of ongoing schemes once the state budget has been approved 
by the state legislature. 
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The problem of excessive centralisation is also evident in the case of transfers and 
posting of employees. All transfers down to the block level
85
 were done at the state 
headquarters under the influence and control of departmental ministers. This delayed 
decision-making and affected discipline and control. Consequently, senior officers in 
the state secretariat remained busy with routine administration, leaving little time for 
policy issues and capacity building. A World Bank study found that:  
... the existing civil service rules envisage a merit-based system of 
recruitment, placement, promotion, sanctions and rewards. However the 
system operates in an ad hoc, non-transparent and non-meritocratic manner. 
Problems related to the work environment (including those faced by women 
employees), infrastructure, and accommodation, local tensions and delayed 
salaries together affect staff morale. There also appears to be a breakdown 
of hierarchy and the loss of control by district magistrates, heads of 
departments and departmental secretaries over subordinate personnel. The 
district magistrates appear to be frustrated by centralization, absence of 
support and understanding from their superiors, and inaction on reports of 
malfeasance and inefficiency at subordinate levels. (World Bank 2005: 54-
55).  
The trend to centralise existed also in engineering departments. All works with an 
estimated outlay over £1,200 needed the approval of an executive engineer and full 
payment could be made only after the executive engineer signed the measurement book. 
The financial power of the executive engineer to approve payments was limited to 
£5,900, and all estimates above this required the scrutiny of a superintending engineer. 
This procedure seriously delayed projects due to Bihar’s huge shortage of engineers 
(Government of Bihar 2006).  
Another example of this concentration of administrative power was the role played by 
the principal secretary to the chief minister: 
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 A block is the fourth tier of public administration in India. The first three are state, district and 
sub-division. 
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Mukund Prasad has been the most trustworthy official of Laloo Yadav. At 
various times when Mr. Yadav could not attend to the affairs of the state 
directly- such as when he was in prison or gone abroad, the reins of the 
government were not given to some RJD politician but to Mr. Prasad ... 
Perhaps, in the history of the Indian bureaucracy no other IAS or even ICS 
officer has wielded so much of power as Mr. Mukund Prasad ... It is not as 
if Mr. Laloo Yadav was only a figurehead; undoubtedly his was the final 
word but it was whetted by Mr. Prasad and his opinion was carefully 
considered and taken into account ... It was clear to everyone in the 
bureaucracy that none could be posted or transferred and no expenditure can 
be made without a nod from 'Mukund Babu'. His power was immense and 
Lallo's (sic) faith in him was complete... Prasad has been a clean officer. 
Even the worst of detractors would not accuse him of financial irregularity. 
It was said of him that he would even fine himself if ever his bills were 
inflated or turned out to be wrong. In the corrupt world of Bihar government 
Prasad was one of the few who could not be bribed, influenced or 
compromised. (Verma 2002) 
Centralisation of administrative power was therefore a key feature of the Yadav regime, 
and it played an important role in compromising the ability of the Bihar Government to 
claim centre–state fiscal transfers from Delhi.  
6.1.2 Poor Record Keeping 
Government business in India is conducted according to an elaborate system of formally 
coded rules and procedures. Good record keeping is vital for such a system to function, 
and there are clear rules and procedures that prescribe how records are to be maintained, 
many of which date back to British colonial administration. Over time, this system has 
fallen into disuse in Bihar. Finding the necessary papers for sanctioning the payment of 
retirement benefits to staff, whose personal files were typically over 30 years old, 
became a big obstacle. Deductions made from salaries for credit into provident funds 
and insurance accounts became problematic because accounts were not properly 
maintained, and no systematic efforts at computerisation were made.  
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As a result, the Bihar government in 2005 faced over 5,500 contempt applications in the 
High Court at Patna. Of these, over 1,500 related to the non-implementation of orders 
involving the payment of retirement benefits (World Bank 2005: 58). Other contempt 
applications involved service matters of government employees, irregularities in 
obtaining land revenue, non-payment of admitted contractual dues and breach of 
statutory rights by public utilities (Government of Bihar 2006). The large number of 
contempt applications had two direct effects on administrative capacity. One, senior 
officials needed to repeatedly appear in person before the judge to either apologise or be 
punished. Two, it prioritised the welfare of a privileged, largely upper caste, group of 
citizens (those with the resources to bring legal cases) over other pressing policy 
concerns. Both of these trends had a debilitating impact on administrative capacity. 
They reduced the time available to senior management to complete the (complex) 
formal claiming, accounting and spending procedures they needed to accomplish in 
order to access the grant programs Delhi had to offer. 
6.1.3 Budget Procedures 
The budget cycle in Bihar was another reason for the inability of the state to deliver on 
its spending commitments. The Central Government and most state governments in 
India pass a full budget before April, as the financial year begins on 1 April. Oftentimes 
during Yadav’s tenure, Bihar did not pass its full budget until June or July (World Bank 
2005: 45). In many of these years, the state budget was passed in two instalments; first 
through a vote-on-account
86
 for four months in March and later in June/July for the 
                                                 
86 According to the Indian Constitution, all revenues received by a state government and the 
loans raised by it are to be put into the Consolidated Fund of that State. When the state 
assembly is not able to vote the entire budget before the commencement of the new financial 
year, it is necessary to keep enough money at the disposal of government to allow it to run the 
administration of the state. A special provision is, therefore, made for a ‘vote-on-account' 
through which the government obtains the approval of the state assembly for a sum sufficient to 
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remaining part of the financial year. Consequently, funds were allotted in instalments to 
departments and districts, while implementing agencies had to wait and undertake 
double the paperwork before funds could be received (Government of Bihar 2006).  
Accentuating the delays caused by the slow budgetary process was the cycle of rains 
and floods that affect Bihar during the monsoon period from July to October of each 
year. This cycle limits the period during which engineering works can be carried out.  
6.1.4 Large Numbers of Vacancies 
The case of engineers provides a stark example of how understaffing compromised 
administrative capacity in Bihar. One reason for an acute shortage of engineers in Bihar 
was that the departmental promotion committee would not hold meetings, and when 
meetings were held, the committee’s recommendations would not be cleared for 
implementation. The engineer-in-chief positions that commanded the two principal 
engineering departments in Bihar, the Road Construction Department (RCD) and the 
Rural Engineering Organisation (REO), both sat vacant for years on end. In 2005 all 15 
of the chief engineer positions as well as 81 of the 91 superintendent engineer positions 
in the two cadres/departments had no incumbents. Although a less severe issue in lower 
tiers, in 2005 total vacancies amounted to 1,305 of 6,393 positions for executive, 
assistant and junior engineer roles (Government of Bihar 2006). 
                                                                                                                                               
incur expenditure on various items for a part of the year. A vote-on-account deals only with the 
expenditure side of the government's budget. A budget is a complete set of accounts, including 
both expenditure and receipts. 
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This understaffing meant that existing officers were required to look after three to four 
offices at any one time. Important documents, like the Schedule of Rates
87
, would not 
be updated for years. Consequently, construction works that could not be tendered out 
to contractors were completed using unrealistic and out-dated rates for labour and 
materials, forcing departmental officers to prepare false vouchers and muster rolls to 
compensate for unworkable rates. The Bihar Government’s own white paper analysing 
the situation said:  
There has been an acute shortage of technical personnel at all levels in the 
Road Construction Department and Rural Engineering Organisation. There 
has not been any significant recruitment at entry levels and promotions have 
not materialized. The Quality Control Organisation in the Road 
Construction Department is non-functional for want of equipment, 
chemicals and personnel. Advance Planning Wing is also non-functional. 
There has been a total collapse of technical administration. This is a serious 
constraint not only for implementation of works but also for preparing 
project proposals for getting more funds from the Central Government or 
other sources. (Government of Bihar 2006: 25) 
Block development officers (BDO) and circle officers (CO) are senior officers in charge 
of development and land and revenue administration respectively, at the sub-district 
level. They work at the front line of government, touching the lives of citizens on a day-
to-day basis. If a district magistrate is the government representative at the district level, 
the BDO/CO is the equivalent at the block/circle level. Yet in 2005 over a third of these 
positions did not have a full time incumbent. Out of a total of 534 blocks in Bihar State, 
193 (36 per cent) did not have a full-time BDO (Government of Bihar 2006). The Bihar 
Administrative Service (BAS) cadre, from which BDOs, COs and senior officers up to 
the rank of additional secretary are drawn, had 633 vacancies against a sanctioned 
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 The Schedule of Rates is a key pricing document used in Measured Term Contracts. These 
contracts are used to determine payments for maintenance and new works that are not 
procured through open tender. 
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strength of 2,248. The Bihar Public Service Commission, responsible for the 
recruitment of BAS and all class I and II officers, had only three members and its 
chairman position was vacant for a critically long period (World Bank 2005).  
Consequently, orderly decision-making and the conduct of public affairs was severely 
compromised. Officers barely managed to deal with crises as they emerged and routine 
but important duties were left unattended. The predominant theme for administrators 
during this period was vyavastha (‘manage’ in Hindi). Vyavastha implied that your 
competence as an administrator was judged on the basis of how you ‘managed’ affairs 
with inadequate human and financial resources. This naturally resulted in administrators 
turning a blind eye to a range of unorthodox practices including forgery, temporary 
embezzlement and approvals without adequate scrutiny.  
Primary education and health sectors also suffered from a large number of vacancies. 
Between 1996 and 2006, only 30,000 primary school teachers were recruited out of the 
90,000 needed. Consequently, the pupil teacher ratio (PTR), which was already 90:1 
against the national norm of 40:1, worsened to 122:1 (Government of Bihar 2006). If 
efforts under the SSA had achieved its avowed goal of 100 per cent enrolment, this ratio 
would have increased dramatically. It is pertinent to note that the failure to recruit 
teachers occurred despite a commitment from the GOI to pay the cost of their salaries. 
By 2005, shortages in the health sector amounted to 90 per cent vacancies of doctors 
and 95 per cent vacancies of paramedical staff (Government of Bihar 2006: 32). The 
vacancies in sanctioned posts in ICDS program were substantial. Although only 4 per 
cent of positions at the level of the anganwadi (day care centre) worker and helper (the 
lowest two positions requiring only minimal educational qualifications) were vacant, at 
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the supervisor level, vacancies amounted to 85 per cent. In the case of child 
development project officers (CDPOs), 21 per cent of positions were vacant (N. Nayak 
and Saxena 2006). These vacancies were so extensive that it reflected in the macro 
figures for Bihar. For example,  
... salary expenditure actually declined from almost 50 per cent to 37 per 
cent over the same period, resulting in diminished administrative capacity in 
many departments. Most important for growth, expenditure on social 
services remained constant, at the same time as expenditure on agriculture 
dropped from 6.8 per cent to 2.2 per cent and on irrigation from 13.3 per 
cent to 4.7 per cent. This is particularly troubling given the importance of 
agriculture for Bihar’s economy. (Frankel and Witsoe 2006: 8) 
Vacancies, therefore, were extensive across most sectors during the Yadav regime. 
Naturally, this trend negatively affected state administrative capacity, particularly the 
ability to implement development programs. 
6.2 The Broad Political Strategy 
 
Dalits and even backward caste people were not allowed to wear good 
clothes or put on shoes in the villages of Bihar. They could not remain 
sitting or stand with their heads up before upper caste men or argue with 
them. Such was the stranglehold of the feudal order in the village that upper 
caste landlords were supposed to have an undisputed right over Dalit and 
backward caste women. (Bharti 1990: 980) 
Attempts to mobilise the majority of Bihar’s population against the small minority of 
upper castes that dominated the state’s politics, professions, education systems, police 
service and public bureaucracy go back many decades (Robin 2009). They were 
organised and animated in particular by the social movement and Socialist Party led by 
Jayprakash Narayan and Karpoori Thakur. The fruits of this labour, as measured by 
representation in the state assembly, began to materialise in the 1970s (see Table 6.1).  
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In the 1980s, Yadav became prominent among a range of politicians who were 
reflecting, spearheading and shaping this lower caste revolt
88
. Following their concerted 
efforts over many years, the pattern of representation in the state assembly changed 
markedly. The upper castes lost out, although they remained over-represented relative to 
their numbers, and recently have gained back some of their earlier losses. These losses 
were mirrored by gains for the Yadav, Kurmi, Koeri and Baniya castes, who are 
dominantly cultivating and/or trading groups, actually middling in the caste hierarchy.  
After the 1977 state elections, the upper-caste MLAs outnumbered the Yadavs, Kurmis, 
Koeris and Baniya caste members by 50 per cent. As the share of upper caste MLAs 
decreased over time, the share of these four castes reached a high point in 1995, when 
they had twice as many MLAs as the upper castes (Table 7). The Yadavs are by far the 
most numerous single caste in the state and by 1995 they were significantly over-
represented in the state legislature. Based on these numbers, one could talk of a ‘the rise 
of the Yadavs’. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Much the same was happening in other parts of what is often called the ‘Hindi belt’ of 
northern India, notably in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh (Jaffrelot 2009). 
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Table 6.1 Percentage distribution of Bihar MLAs among main caste and 
community groups, in election years (1952, 1977 and onwards) 
 1952 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Upper Castes*  46 41 37 39 35 22 23 30 
Backward Castes**  19 28 29 25 34 44 35 35 
(of which Yadavs)  (8) (15) (14) (15) (19) (26) (21) (23) 
Muslims   8 8 9 10 6 7 9 10 
Scheduled Castes 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 17 
Scheduled Tribes  11 9 9 9 9 8 9 –  
Others*** 2 - 1 2 1 4 9 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ratio of Upper Caste to Backward Caste Members 
 
2.4:1 1.5:1 1.3:1 1.6:1 1:1 0.5:1 0.7:1 0.9:1 
* Upper Castes comprise Brahmins, Bhumihars, Bengalis, Rajput and Kayasthas. 
** Unlike other parts of this thesis Backward Castes here comprise Yadavs, Kurmis, Koeris and Baniyas. 
*** From the 1995 elections onward, there is significant representation of the Extremely Backward Caste category 
Source:  Adapted from Robin (2009: 100) in Annexure 8 
 
However, the Yadavs only once, in 1995, accounted for more than a quarter of MLAs, 
when over a third of the Assembly seats were held by Yadav’s party (Robin 2009: 86). 
Yadav created an electoral coalition, organised first as the Janata Dal and then the RJD 
Party, around (a) his own Yadav caste; (b) other less numerous castes (Kurmis, Koeris 
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and Baniyas); (c) the Muslim community; and (d) the large, lower-status SC (Dalit) 
community.  However, his command of SC votes became decreasingly certain as their 
political leaders began to turn the SC vote into an autonomous electoral force. Thus, 
Yadav commanded votes mainly in the middle rungs of the caste hierarchy
89
.  
Although Yadav’s core electoral support group did not comprise a majority of the 
electorate, it was, if effectively managed, well placed to dominate elections and 
government in a situation in which there were powerful tensions, often spilling over into 
violence, among a range of groups positioned slightly differently in the caste hierarchy. 
He solidified his core electoral support by maintaining a mood of continuous rhetorical 
mobilisation among his supporters against the upper caste minority. This is illustrated in 
quotes from Yadav’s speeches, cited in Thakur: 
‘These people have oppressed and suffocated you for thousands of years, 
they have made you labour and they have kept the fruits for themselves.’…  
‘This government, this power, the state, this is all yours. You have been 
deprived of your share because those who ruled the state were not bothered 
about you ... But now your man has captured the establishment... “Burabal 
Hatao”: wipe out the upper castes’. (2000: 85) 
 
 
The word Bhurabal was one of Yadav’s typical inventions, a crude acronym for the 
categories that made up the upper castes: Bhumihars, Rajputs, Brahmins and Lalas 
(Kayasthas) (Witsoe 2011: 78).   
                                                 
89 This electoral positioning was to some degree imposed on Yadav and his predecessors. The 
most consistent and coherent electoral competition that they had to face was a ‘coalition of 
extremes’ in the shape of a local Congress Party with strong support among both the upper 
castes and the STs (Robin 2009: 82-3). Yadav never received much support from the ST 
population, and was strengthened electorally when, at the division of the state in November 
2000, all seats reserved for ST candidates were relocated to the new state of Jharkand.  
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6.3 State Incapacity by Design: The Logic 
As described above, one of the reasons for Yadav’s extended dominance was that he 
used both rhetoric and policy to continuously maintain a mood of confrontation with the 
upper caste ‘enemy’, and so keep his electoral base mobilised. In this section, I discuss 
the six building blocks of this strategy by listing them as claims and subsequently 
elaborating on each.   
An important component of Yadav’s strategy of confrontation was to avoid appointing 
members of upper castes to much sought after government jobs (claim 1), even though 
they had the required educational qualifications (claim 2). New appointments were 
made and promotions given only if it was felt that members of the communities in the 
dominant electoral coalition would be the biggest beneficiaries. However, those groups 
were historically so deprived that often it was difficult to find members with sufficient 
educational qualifications (claim 3) who could be appointed to even middle-ranking 
public sector jobs. Attempts to favour supporters either by manipulating the selection 
process or by changing eligibility criteria without having the powers to do so were 
thwarted by an upper-caste judiciary and other institutions of oversight such as audit 
and media over which the state government had little control (claim 4). Thus, posts 
were often left vacant, despite the availability of funds to fill them (claim 5). Vacancies 
were more common at higher levels of the public service, where there were even fewer 
plausible candidates from historically excluded groups. The political leadership 
preferred to leave posts vacant, to send clear signals both to its own supporters (‘this 
government is really serious about humbling the old elite’) and to its upper caste 
opponents (‘your era of dominance has ended’).  
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Despite the strategy of selective appointments and promotions and a large number of 
vacancies, upper castes continued to hold a majority of posts in the Bihar bureaucracy. 
Therefore according to the tenets of Yadav’s leadership, this upper-caste-dominated 
bureaucracy (claim 6) had to be constrained. Beyond appointments, the leadership 
resorted to exercising intense political oversight over the decisions of public servants, 
made possible in part by the aforementioned centralisation in decision-making 
procedures. Thus, they deprived public servants of the autonomy they needed to work 
effectively, and tied the whole system in proverbial ‘red tape’. Upper caste elements in 
the bureaucracy fought back by refusing to take decisions and by running to a 
sympathetic judiciary with their grievances. The weakening of the public service that 
ensued was both a consequence of restrictive oversight and also directly sought after by 
the leadership. In effect, this weakening helped to maintain a mood of confrontation 
with the upper caste ‘enemy’. Public services, particularly security and physical 
protection, could then be denied to all except those who had access to powerful RJD 
patrons. To a significant extent, a lack of public sector capacity and the insecurity of 
persons and property were therefore the result not of deep history, but of contemporary 
political strategy.  
In the above explanation of Yadav’s logic, I have made six claims: 
1) The regime displayed an aversion to making new appointments despite 
the fact that government jobs were much sought after by the people of 
Bihar 
2) There was no shortage of qualified people to appoint  
3) It was difficult to find candidates from communities in the dominant 
electoral coalition who had sufficient educational qualifications 
4) Institutions of oversight thwarted attempts to manipulate recruitment 
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5) Vacancies were not filled despite finances not being a constraint 
6) The bureaucracy remained dominated by the upper castes 
I will now discuss each of these claims and the evidence to support it.   
6.3.1 An Aversion to Making Sought-After Appointments 
The people of Bihar are well known for their desire for government jobs. This was 
visible in their enthusiasm for jobs in the following agencies/departments/services:  
1) The All India Services90: IAS, Indian Foreign Service (IFS) and Indian 
Police Service (IPS) 
2) Public sector jobs in other states 
3) The BAS and other positions in the Government of Bihar 
6.3.1.1 All India Services 
Members of the IAS, IFS and the IPS occupy almost all senior positions in state 
governments and in the Government of India. Recruitment to these and other services is 
through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The annual all-India civil 
service examination organised by the UPSC has close to 300,000 applicants. The IAS 
recruits about 50 to 80 persons, the IPS about 100 to 150 and the IFS about 10 to 15. 
Competition is high and the recruitment process is credible. Close to 50 per cent of 
those selected to these three services in the last 15 years were from Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh. As for the IAS, Bihar has for many years been the second largest supplier of 
new officers (Ashish Sinha 2010). This trend is corroborated by the head of the Asian 
Development Research Institute (ADRI) who said, ‘In 10 years, either the DM or the 
                                                 
90 The IAS, IPS and IFS are called the ‘All India Services’ because they work for the central and 
state governments. All other services, like the Indian Foreign Service, Indian Railway Service, 
and Indian Revenue Service are central services because they only work for the Central 
Government. 
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SP[
91
], if not both, in each of the 500-odd districts in the country will be a Bihari’ (Jha 
2005). In monetary terms, the private sector in India offers much more than a job in 
government, yet for the people of Bihar a job in government continues to be hugely 
prestigious. I will not go into the reasons for this, as my aim is only to show that 
government jobs in general and those with government in Bihar in particular were 
popular among Biharis.  
6.3.1.2 Public Sector Jobs in Other States 
The prestige of a job in the public sector, few local opportunities and large number of 
qualified people has meant that people from Bihar respond in large numbers whenever 
there is public sector recruitment in any part of India. Local aspirants resent this. On 
occasion, they even resort to violence. An example is the attack against people from 
Bihar in October 2008 during recruitment to the Indian Railways in Mumbai (Press 
Trust of India 2008b). Similar, though less violent, protests occurred in Karnataka in 
January 2008 (Press Trust of India 2008c). During my fieldwork in Bihar, I found that 
families in Bihar prefer to have at least one member working in a government 
department rather than in a higher paying position in the private sector. 
6.3.1.3 Bihar Administrative Service and Others 
In 2007, after a new government took office, the Bihar Public Service Commission 
invited applications for a number of positions after a five-year hiatus
92
. The openings 
were general recruitment to the BAS (deputy collector) and other positions such as 
Bihar Police Service (deputy superintendent of police), battalion commander (home 
guards), Bihar Finance Service (commercial tax officer), Bihar Education Service, Bihar 
                                                 
91 SP is short for superintendent of police, the police chief of a district. 
92
 This was not applicable to the IAS whose recruitment is done by the UPSC in Delhi. Officers 
selected by the UPSC are allotted to state cadres by the Government of India. 
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Labour Service, Bihar Jail Service (jail superintendent), assistant exchange officer and 
assistant registrar in the Bihar Co-operative Service. Over 176,000 people took the 
preliminary written test and 19,318 were shortlisted for the main examination (Bihar 
Public Service Commission 2008). The response to recruitment of teachers was equally 
enthusiastic. In August 2008, when the Human Resources Department of the 
Government of Bihar invited applications for the appointment of 92,000 teachers (Press 
Trust of India 2008a), it received 4 million applications (Bihar Times 2008). Both these 
examples show that working for the Government of Bihar was an extremely popular 
career option. 
6.3.2 No Shortage of Qualified People 
It is usual for low-income countries and regions to face human resource shortages. Sub 
Saharan Africa, for example, is said to have a shortage of over 820,000 doctors, nurses 
and midwives. It is estimated that this will require 600 additional medical and nursing 
schools to train for two decades before this gap can be closed (Conway et al. 2007). 
India, however, with the world's third largest scientific community (Eisemon 1982) and 
an university system that is the largest outside North America (Eisemon and Davis 
1992) is better equipped with trained professionals than other developing countries. As 
is well known, India has become a world leader in information technology and 
information technology-enabled services, with annual revenues of US$ 64 billion in 
2008 (Financial Express 2008). While this signals a comfortable human resource 
situation in India at large, it does not tell us anything about the situation in Bihar, one of 
the most backward states in the country. I therefore investigated two aspects of the 
human resource situation in Bihar to understand the availability of qualified public 
service candidates: 
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1) Educational attainment of the population  
2) Employment rates among those with educational qualifications required 
for government jobs 
6.3.2.1 Educational Attainment 
According to the NSS ‘... a person who could read and write a simple message in any 
language with understanding was considered a literate’ (National Sample Survey 
Organisation 2001a: 29). According to this definition, Bihar with 35 per cent rural and 
61 per cent urban literacy was the least literate state in India as of 1999-2000 (National 
Sample Survey Organisation 2001a: 59 & 64). What this figure does not reveal is that in 
the literacy category from which most government recruitment takes place (i.e., 
educated to level secondary and above), Bihar—at 25 per cent for urban and 7 per cent 
for rural—was close to the national figure of 27 per cent for urban and 8 per cent for 
rural (National Sample Survey Organisation 2001a: 96 & 99). Therefore, Bihar did not 
seem to be at a disadvantage during the Yadav regime when compared with other Indian 
states in terms of availability of qualified personnel for government jobs. Furthermore, 
even if Bihar did have a shortage, it would have been possible to find eligible persons 
from other states to fill public positions, as India does not have restrictions on citizen’s 
travel and work. Enquiries during my fieldwork revealed that, until the 1960’s when 
there was a shortage of qualified persons to serve as engineers, nurses and even the IAS, 
local skill shortage was indeed overcome by recruiting from other parts of India. 
6.3.2.2 Employment Rates 
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) of India regularly collects and 
publishes information on what they call ‘the education level specific worker population 
ratio’. This is the proportion of employed persons above the age of 15 (compared with 
the total number of persons) that fall into each of six educational categories: not literate; 
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literate and up to primary; middle; secondary; higher secondary; and graduate and 
above. In rural Bihar in 1999-2000, 41 per cent of persons who had higher secondary 
level qualifications and 25 per cent of those who had graduate or higher level 
qualification had no work. In urban Bihar, this figure rises to 72 per cent and 42 per 
cent, respectively. Compared to the all-India figure of 47 per cent for rural–higher 
secondary and 31 per cent for rural–graduate and above, as well as 60 per cent for 
urban–higher secondary and 40 per cent for urban–graduate and above, it can be said 
that availability of qualified persons in Bihar was similar to the national situation in 
rural areas and better in urban areas. See Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 Education level specific worker-population ratio (1999-2000) 
 Rural Urban 
 
Higher 
Secondary 
Graduate and 
above 
Higher 
Secondary 
Graduate and 
above 
Bihar 59% 75% 28% 58% 
All India 53% 69% 40% 60% 
Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (2001a: 96 & 99) 
Taken together, both education levels and employment rates indicate that Bihar did not 
face a human resource shortage during the time Yadav was in power.  
6.3.3 Shortage of Qualified People from Yadav Supporters 
In Chapter 1, I described that when I was state director for the SSA in Bihar in 2004, the 
GOI was pressing hard for the recruitment of additional teachers, but the state 
government was reluctant. This attitude was surprising because the Central Government 
was picking up the salary bill of the new appointees. The Bihar government could have 
therefore taken credit for providing jobs without having to pay for it. When the pressure 
from the Delhi became too much, the State agreed to the scheme, but only after 
lowering the eligibility criteria for teachers without having the power to do so. The 
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courts soon stepped in and stopped this practice. Though the Bihar government filed an 
appeal with the Indian Supreme Court, all teacher recruitment in the state was stopped 
for many years (Sify 2010).   
I investigated this apparently contradictory behaviour of the political leadership during 
my fieldwork. I found that the lack of enthusiasm was due to the perception that very 
few BC, SC and Muslims had the teacher-training qualification that was a prerequisite 
for recruitment according to national guidelines. This meant that if the Bihar 
government had gone ahead and recruited as per these national guidelines, it would have 
needed to recruit upper-caste teachers, thereby going against its political rhetoric. 
Teacher vacancies, money earmarked for education remaining unused and poor state 
capacity to provide quality education, were therefore the consequence of a 
straightforward political calculus.  
During my fieldwork, I turned to data from the NSS on the educational status of BC and 
SC
93
 to further explore this issue. My findings in Table 6.3 below show that BCs and 
SCs, the core supporters of the Yadav regime, were educationally disadvantaged 
compared to the upper castes. For example, as a proportion of their population, upper 
castes who had studied up to the graduate level were three times as many as BCs and six 
times as many as SCs. In the case of individuals who had completed higher secondary, 
the percentages were 39, 20 and 9 respectively for upper castes, BCs and SCs. This by 
itself is not conclusive proof, but it lends credibility to the claim that the ruling coalition 
found it difficult to find eligible candidates from communities that supported them for 
appointment to government jobs. 
                                                 
93 I could not differentiate for Muslims because the NSS does not have state-wise break down of 
educational attainment by religious group. 
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Table 6.3 People educated to various levels in Bihar by social category (1999–2000) 
 Rural Male Rural Female Urban Male Urban Female 
 HS Grad NL HS Grad NL HS Grad NL HS Grad NL 
Scheduled 
Caste 
1.9 1.6 70 0.4 0.2 93.6 4.8 6 38.1 2 1 69.1 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
1.5 2 54.5 0 0.1 82 6.2 16.5 25.5 4 10.9 48.2 
Backward 
Castes 
3.7 2.8 48.6 0.5 0.2 80.6 11 14.3 22.6 5 3.8 54.5 
Upper 
Castes & 
Others 
8.2 9.3 27.8 2.1 1.1 58.4 17 33 10 12 15.2 27.4 
 
HS: studied up to higher secondary; Grad: studied up to graduation; NL: not literate. Source: 
National Sample Survey Organisation (2001b) 
6.3.4 Oversight Institutions Thwarted Attempts to Manipulate Recruitment 
The president of India appoints judges to the states’ High Courts after consulting with 
the chief justice of India, the governor of the state (who is appointed by the GOI), and, 
in the case of appointment of a judge other than the chief justice, the chief justice of the 
state’s relevant High Court. Judges are usually chosen from amongst prominent lawyers 
who practise in the local High Court. Given Bihar’s history of being dominated by 
upper castes, this meant that the bench was predominantly upper caste, and there was 
little that the State Government could do to influence judicial appointments or the court 
registry that decides which cases are placed before which bench.  
Mandatory audits are also another oversight institution. Officials who audit government 
spending are drawn from the Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IAAS). Like the IAS, 
auditors are recruited by the UPSC, but unlike the IAS, their placement is determined 
by the CAG. Neither the state government nor the GOI has a role in their selection, 
career advancement or postings.  
168 
Finally, the media also served to hold the government accountable. Indian media is 
independent from state and Central Government control, and the government of a poor 
state such as Bihar spends very little on advertising. The commercial interest of the 
media is therefore centred around revenues from readership, viewership and commercial 
advertising. Given that illiteracy and poverty levels were high among supporters of 
Yadav’s party, there was little incentive for the media to be sympathetic to the interests 
of the incumbent party. On the contrary, exposing instances of official wrongdoing 
made valuable copy. 
The use of recruitment as a source of rent or to provide jobs to core supporters is a not 
an uncommon strategy in many Indian states, but for the Yadav regime this was difficult 
to do, for the reasons previously discussed. Additionally, an upper-caste bureaucracy 
and judiciary working alongside independent auditors and media thwarted the regime’s 
attempts to bend the recruitment rules and worked to expose corruption.  
For many years, except in the case of police constables, there were still no serious 
efforts to fill vacancies:  
Civil service recruitment is another serious problem, with large imbalances 
across functional needs and levels. Important vacancies, such as positions 
for teachers and engineers, exist alongside serious overstaffing in the lower 
ranks. (World Bank 2005: 3-4) 
Public sector recruitment in India is subject to elaborate rules and procedures. Any 
attempt to distribute jobs as patronage by a BC-dominated party would come under 
attack from an upper-caste dominated judiciary: 
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About 80 per cent of the judiciary belongs to the forward castes... It is 
reported that interests represented by the forward castes are reflected in 
judicial pronouncements, undermining the implementation of much socio-
economic legislation. (World Bank 2005: 59) 
For example, results from an exam held in 2003 to promote government staff as 
members of the BAS were declared after a two-year delay in 2005. Following a petition 
by some candidates, the High Court intervened, stayed the results and ordered a 
vigilance enquiry which resulted in the arrest of the chairman of the Bihar Public 
Service Commission (BPSC), another member and seven officials (Balchand 2005). In 
2008, following a three year enquiry by the state vigilance department, the High Court 
concluded that the exams were not properly conducted and cancelled the results (2008).  
Bihar therefore experienced a curious situation in which institutions of good governance 
while maintaining the rule of law, helped create perverse political incentives that had a 
detrimental effect on state capacity.   
6.3.5 Finances Were Not a Constraint 
I argue that finances were not a constraint to hiring government personnel by discussing 
the answers to two questions:  
1) How did Bihar compare with other Indian states in terms of its budget 
deficit? 
2) What was Bihar’s policy when it came to recruiting staff for schemes 
whose staffing costs it did not have to bear?  
Each question is elaborated below. 
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6.3.5.1 Budget Deficit 
State governments in India face rising voter expectations, increasing staff costs and 
inadequate resources. Consequently, most states run up substantial budget deficits. 
Persistent deficits indicate non-availability of spare cash that could otherwise have been 
used to hire new staff. At an all-India level, for the three years between 2003 and 2006, 
state governments in India had a total revenue deficit
94
 (RD) of Rs. 1,096 billion. In 
terms of primary deficit (PD), this amounted to Rs. 677 billion (Reserve Bank of India 
2008: 121). Bihar, however, was an exception. Bihar’s average RD/GSDP and 
PD/GSDP ratios during this period were 0 and -0.8 respectively (zero indicates that 
there was neither a deficit or a surplus and the negative PD/GSDP ratio indicates that 
there was a surplus rather than deficit) (Reserve Bank of India 2008: 34). Bihar also had 
a substantial cash surplus with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) (Business Standard 
Economy Bureau 2006; Patnaik and Sidhartha 2005) and rarely used the ‘ways and 
means advances’ and ‘overdraft’ facilities available to it from the RBI (Accountant 
General Bihar 2001, 2003; Principal Accountant General (Audit) Bihar 2004). 
Annexure 5 has data on the ways and means advances of other states. 
6.3.5.2 Recruiting History 
Programmes like the ICDS and the SSA are CSS schemes in which additional staff 
costs were to be met from within each initiative’s budget, almost all of which was 
funded by the Central Government. Yet, these schemes had a large number of staff 
                                                 
94 Conventional deficit represents the difference between aggregate disbursements and 
aggregate receipts. Aggregate receipts include: (i) revenue receipts; (ii) capital receipts 
excluding ways and means advances and overdraft from the RBI, and (iii) net receipts under the 
Public Account excluding withdrawals from the Cash Balance Investment Account and deposits 
with the RBI. Aggregate disbursements include: (i) revenue expenditure and (ii) capital 
disbursements excluding repayment of ways and means advances and overdraft from the RBI. 
Revenue deficit is the difference between revenue expenditure and revenue receipts. Gross 
fiscal deficit is the difference between aggregate disbursements net of debt repayments and 
recovery of loans and revenue receipts and non-debt capital receipts. Primary deficit is gross 
fiscal deficit less of interest payments. Ways and means advances and overdraft are facilities 
provided by the Reserve Bank to enable states to manage their cash flows. 
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vacancies. For example, in the ICDS, 85 per cent of supervisory and 21 per cent of 
CDPO positions were vacant (N. Nayak and Saxena 2006). Similarly, for the SSA, over 
60,000 primary school teacher positions were vacant (Government of Bihar 2006; 
Times News Network 2006). A World Bank team looked into the question of finances 
being a constraint on public sector employment in Bihar and concluded that:  
In some instances the state appears unable to raise institutional matching 
loans, and lacks adequate internal financing to meet counterpart financing 
requirements... However, this does not appear to be the binding constraint in 
most programs. These issues go beyond implementation problems affecting 
central assistance and schemes to deeper questions of basic administration, 
governance, institutions and capacity building. (World Bank 2005: 46) 
Thus, the above analysis indicates that Bihar 
 was in a better financial position (in terms of liquidity) than most other 
states 
 had not filled vacant positions in schemes were additional staff costs 
were to be paid from central funds 
It therefore appears that inadequacy of financial resources was not a likely reason for 
Bihar’s failure to fill vacant positions. 
6.3.6 Bureaucracy Was Dominated by Upper Castes  
The following quote explains the reasons and consequences of upper-caste domination 
of the bureaucracy in Bihar: 
There is, in fact, a fundamental tension between lower caste empowerment 
and state directed development. The key levels of the bureaucracy and the 
police have long been controlled by people from upper caste backgrounds in 
Bihar and this control served to reinforce the domination of upper caste 
landlords in the countryside... The political assertion of lower castes from 
the early 1990s resulted in a deep-seated conflict between a new lower caste 
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political leadership and a largely upper caste bureaucracy, police, and 
judiciary. This is why the politics of caste empowerment resulted in a 
general breakdown of public institutions in Bihar. (Witsoe 2007a: 1) 
The idea of political neutrality is fundamental to the way civil service in India is 
organised. It is in the name of neutrality that civil servants receive special protection 
under the Indian Constitution
95
. The tension created whenever a new political elite 
comes into office and has to deal with a pre-existing civil service is not new in India. 
Soon after Indian independence for example, sceptics asked,  
... would the members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), who studied 
Shakespeare, played golf, wore British hats, and took orders from no one 
but their British superiors, now serve the khadi-clad Congress leaders 
sympathetic to the cause of the Indian downtrodden? (Kohli 1989: 62) 
 
At that time, leaders like Sardar Vallabhai Patel
96
 successfully argued that the civil 
service should continue in the interest of stability. Leaders of post-1990 Bihar led by 
Yadav and the RJD thought differently. Long after the euphoria generated by 
independence from a colonial power, they had to stay true to the political rhetoric that 
brought them to power: 
Now the king is not born from the womb of queens. The kingdom now 
comes from your votes, from your majority... Previously the collector 
(District Magistrate) and the S.P (Superintendent of Police) were Mishraji, 
Tripathiji, Sinhaji, Vermaji (all forward caste names), now they are Yadavji, 
Mahatoji, Saahji (all backward caste names). (P. K. Chaudhary and Shrikant 
2001: 249-50; cited in Witsoe 2007b) 
                                                 
95 Article 311, clauses 1 and 2 of the Indian Constitution specifies that only the appointing 
authority can dismiss or remove a civil servant of the central or state government. In addition, 
no such person can be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank, except after an inquiry in which 
he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity to be 
heard with respect to those charges.  
96 Patel was Independent India’s first home minister. 
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Finding enough BC officers who could be made district magistrates and superintendents 
of police was not easy because in India, all heads of departments in the state 
government have to be appointed from amongst members of the IAS. In the case of the 
police, they have to be from the IPS. Recruitment to the IAS and the IPS is by the 
UPSC and, though there is reservation for candidates from disadvantaged social groups, 
recruitment is largely perceived to be meritocratic, favouring the upper castes because 
of higher educational achievements.  
The ruling party in Bihar therefore did what it could do. It redeployed civil servants so 
that only those who belonged to core support groups held key positions. There were 
limitations to this strategy because of a lack of human capital among backward 
communities and their poor representation in the civil and police services. For example 
in 2002, in the Bihar cadre of the IAS, out of a total of 244 officers only 39 were 
Muslim, Yadav or SC (Witsoe 2007b: 63). Table 6.4 has a detailed breakdown of these 
figures. 
Table 6.4 Caste in the Indian Administrative Service (Bihar Cadre) in 2002 
Caste Category Total  From Bihar Other State 
Upper Castes 
(Brahmin (60), Kayasth 
(54), Bhumihar (7), 
Rajput (22)) 
143 108 35 
Scheduled Castes 25 8 17 
Scheduled Tribes 7 0 7 
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Backward Castes 
(Bania (15), Yadav (4), 
Kurmi (3), Jain (2), 
Other Backwards (9)) 
33 15 19 
Muslim 10 9 1 
Christian 3 0 3 
Sikh 2 0 2 
Unidentified 21   
Total 244   
Source: Adapted from Witsoe (2007b: 54) 
In spite of this Chaudhary (1999) estimated that in 1995 out of a total 50 districts in 
Bihar at that time, 26 district magistrates and 30 deputy development commissioners’ 
were from backward castes
97
. Where such deployment was not possible, posts were kept 
vacant and officers from adjoining areas or other departments supervised routine work.  
Upper caste elements in the bureaucracy did not remain mute spectators. They fought 
back by abetting system collapse and passing the buck when required to take decisions. 
They drew succour from the fact that the judiciary was sympathetic to the idea that the 
state was being mal-administered for political gain. All of this had its obvious costs: 
Bihar’s poor economic performance... is comprehensible only in the larger 
context of a struggle for control of the state, a struggle pitting the elected 
political leadership belonging to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in the 
state government against officials in the bureaucracy and judiciary, both of 
which remained dominated by persons from upper caste backgrounds. At 
the state level, conflict between the political leadership and the bureaucracy 
perpetuated ingrained administrative inefficiency that marginalized 
development issues. Meanwhile, an activist judiciary immobilized the chief 
                                                 
97
 The Chaudhary numbers refer to the period before Bihar’s division, while the Witsoe numbers 
are for Bihar after division. 
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minister, Lalu Prasad Yadav... with enormous amounts of litigation against 
the state government, paralyzed administrative decision-making. (Frankel 
and Witsoe 2006: 2) 
One significant instance that needs highlighting was the sensational criminal case 
against Yadav when he was the chief minister that came to be known as the ‘fodder 
scam’. 
District level officials in the Bihar Animal Husbandry Department, with the connivance 
of officials in the state capital, had been withdrawing amounts from the district 
treasuries in excess of what was budgeted. They did this by submitting false bills for 
supply of fodder to ST beneficiaries in the tribal areas of the state. When detected, the 
prosecuting agency concluded that the chief minister was also a party. It merits mention 
that this fraud had been going on for many years before Yadav became chief minister. 
In fact, the Animal Husbandry Department was notorious in the state for its misuse of 
public funds, and was a source of rent for the ruling party over a number of years. Yet 
the arrest of the chief minister in the ‘fodder scam’ was sensational and had a 
dampening effect on decision making in government. Though Yadav resigned and went 
to jail, he made his wife the chief minister and continued to rule in absentia with the 
help of trusted civil servants. The manner in which the judiciary handled the case, 
particularly in granting bail to a former upper caste chief minister Dr. Jagannath Mishra 
(later cancelled), gave rise to slogans such as 'jail for Yadav and bail for Mishra'. The 
haste with which law enforcement agencies egged on by the media, pursued the arrest of 
Yadav, even illegally seeking the help of the army, led many to believe that this was the 
establishment striking back (Roy 1997). 
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In concluding this section it can be said that Yadav gave credibility to his anti-elite 
rhetoric by refusing to recruit members of the upper castes into the public service, and 
by maintaining very close political control over administrative actions of officers 
already in service. The costs, knowingly incurred, were loss of administrative capacity 
and, indirectly, sacrifice of fiscal transfers from Delhi. It is this phenomenon that I have 
labelled ‘state incapacity by design’. 
6.4 Pockets of Productivity 
Despite the detrimental consequences of his politics for state capacity, Yadav ensured 
that the state was able to deliver important (but selective) benefits to his core supporters. 
One core component of this political base—his own Yadav caste—benefited from a 
highly uneven pattern of cooperative development
98
. When Yadav first came to power, 
there existed in rural Bihar, as in most of India, a wide range of agricultural 
cooperatives. These were dominated by the main landowners, normally the upper castes. 
The new government set about systematically dismantling these cooperatives, first by 
suspending cooperative statutes and elections and putting the organisations under the 
direct control of appointed public servants. As registrar of cooperatives societies 
(regulator) from 2003–2004, I saw first hand how one section of the cooperative 
movement not only bucked this trend, but flourished: the dairy cooperatives. As a 
World Bank study notes:   
The profitable Bihar State Cooperative Milk Producers’ Federation Ltd 
(COMFED) has been extraordinarily successful and has improved the lives 
                                                 
98 While Yadavs, other cultivating castes, Muslims and to a lesser extent Scheduled Castes 
were the main components of Yadav’s electoral coalition, the Yadavs were central to the patron-
client network.  They, to a large degree, controlled access to the public service; enjoyed special 
privileges within the public service; and seemed to have a license to engage in kidnappings for 
ransom not enjoyed by other groups. 
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of many thousands of families... COMFED’s success points to the critical 
importance of professional management that is free from political 
interference. (World Bank 2005: 5) 
Not surprisingly, Yadavs are traditionally associated with dairying. 
Similarly, selective practices within the sphere of policing and security were directed at 
retaining Muslim votes. Muslims in India have for several decades been vulnerable to 
inter-communal violence (Sengupta 2005; Wilkinson 2002). The Minorities 
Commission of India calculated that, in the communal riots that took place between 
1985 and 1987, 60 per cent of the people killed were Muslim, and Muslims suffered 73 
per cent of reported property damage (Sengupta 2005). Before Yadav became its chief 
minister, Bihar experienced many such incidents, including the Bhagalpur riots in 
October 1989. To preserve his Muslim support, Yadav ensured that this situation 
changed, and Bihar became something of a haven against inter-communal riots. In 
1992, when the struggle that led to the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque was 
accompanied by communal riots all over India, Bihar was an island of peace. This 
reflected a clear political decision: 
Lalu Yadav, when asked why Bihar had been so quiet despite its woeful 
record of past riots, explained how his government had arrested returning 
militants from Uttar Pradesh (the site of Ayodhya) before they could reach 
their towns and villages, and how he had threatened all district magistrates 
and station house officers with the loss of their jobs if they allowed any riots 
to break out in their town. ‘The political will of the state government’ he 
said, ‘was clear’. (Wilkinson 2006: 86) 
It was not that the police in Bihar were generally effective. The state remained relatively 
lawless, and the business of kidnapping for ransom thrived. Kidnapping was inevitably 
aimed mainly at the higher castes, and was believed to receive high-level political 
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support and protection, if not direct sponsorship. The Bihar government did not 
generally exercise discipline over the police, but retained control sufficient to ensure 
that the service could be used for politically crucial tasks. When the government 
changed in 2005, the crime rate in the state began to decline substantially, above all the 
kidnapping rate. This is described in more detail in Section 6 below.  
6.5 State Incapacity by Design: Electorate Arithmetic 
As we have seen, Bihar has a long history of economic, social and political power being 
in the hands of the upper castes. Although there were changes for short periods when 
non-Congress
99
, non-upper caste leaders became chief ministers, it was not until Yadav 
became chief minister in 1990 that real change began to occur. One of the paradoxes of 
Indian democracy (as in Bihar) was the dominance of upper castes over a majority non-
upper caste electorate for whom caste was a dominant factor in determining voting 
behaviour. Table 6.5 below shows the distribution of households by social group for 16 
major states
100
.  
Table 6.5 Distribution of households by social group for major states (30 June 
2002) 
Rural + Urban 
Sl. 
No 
State %ST %SC %UC % OBC 
OBC 
rank 
1 Andhra Pradesh 6 21 27 46 5 
2 Assam 10 11 56 23 13 
3 Bihar 1 21 20 58 2 
4 Gujarat 15 11 38 36 8 
5 Haryana 1 24 42 33 10 
6 Himachal Pradesh 7 23 52 18 14 
                                                 
99 The Indian National Congress Party is the biggest political party in India in terms of 
membership. The party's modern liberal platform is largely considered to be center-left. It was 
founded in 1885 and became the leader of the Indian Independence Movement. 
100 Data from these states were used in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5. 
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7 Karnataka 5 18 44 33 10 
8 Kerala 1 11 35 53 3 
9 Madhya Pradesh 16 17 26 41 7 
10 Maharashtra 9 14 49 28 12 
11 Orissa 25 20 19 36 8 
12 Punjab 1 36 48 16 15 
13 Rajasthan 15 18 25 42 6 
14 Tamil Nadu 1 20 5 73 1 
15 Uttar Pradesh 1 25 24 50 4 
16 West Bengal 5 29 61 5 16 
 
All-India (All States 
and UT’s) 
8 20 33 39  
ST – Scheduled Tribe, SC – Scheduled Caste, UC – Upper Caste, OBC – Other Backward Classes 
 
Calculated using data from National Sample Survey Organisation (2003: 42) and Registrar 
General & Census Commissioner of India (2006: 55-56) 
Of particular interest in Table 6.5 is the share of Other Backward Classes (OBCs)—a 
constitutional category of middling castes distinct from SCs and STs and consisting of 
among others, caste groups who formed Yadav’s core electoral base. In 11 out of 16 
states, they were more than 30 per cent of the population. Tamil Nadu had the highest 
share with 73 per cent and Bihar, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh had more 
than 45 per cent.  
One of the significant transformations of politics in India has been the rise in political 
power of OBCs, what Yadav called a ‘second democratic upsurge’ (1996: 96). While 
states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu took an early lead, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were late 
starters
101
. In Bihar, although the OBCs’ share in the population was 58 per cent, they 
had to wait until 1990 to achieve political dominance. In 1984, the percentage of MPs 
who were OBCs was less than 20 per cent; by 1991 this had risen to 37 per cent. The 
share of MLAs who were OBCs rose from one third in 1985 to a little less than half by 
1995 (Jaffrelot 2003). The growth in influence of OBCs is also evident from their 
                                                 
101
 Caste categories are to some degree arbitrary. The underlying story is the rise to power of 
numerous rural, cultivating castes. 
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numbers in the state cabinet. From 38 per cent when Karpoori Thakur
102
 was chief 
minister, the share of OBCs increased to 47 per cent in 1994 when Yadav was chief 
minister (Jaffrelot 2003). The following passage with quotes from Yadav gives a 
flavour of the changes: 
[He said] ‘The forward castes used to rule Bihar. I have finished them 
off.’… [Yadav] then pointed to various forward caste leaders in the room... 
and named them by caste, ‘Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput...’ The implication 
was clear; they now served him... ‘Now look at what a tall chair I am sitting 
in (the chief minister’s chair)! I have proven that ballot boxes are more 
powerful than machine guns. Votes can decide whether a man will be in the 
dust or riding in an airplane. I am a true Naxalite (militant, communist 
revolutionary), from birth, a democratic naxalite’... (Witsoe 2011: 77) 
Rhetoric is one thing. Making it electorally viable is what differentiates successful 
political entrepreneurs from the also-rans. There were three discernable elements to 
Yadav’s electoral strategy during the period, elaborated below: 
 Managing expectations: managing the tension inherent in his political 
strategy by making only very sparing promises about the material 
benefits that he would bring.  
 Reincarnating the client as patron: creating a new elite from amongst the 
Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and Muslims; his core voters.  
 Electoral arithmetic: the dominant party’s ability to win elections with 
less than one third of the votes polled. Yadav could achieve this by 
securing the votes of less than 50 per cent of his supporters. 
6.5.1 Managing Expectations  
A corner stone of Yadav’s ability to win elections despite his governance track record 
had to do with his success in managing the tension inherent in his political strategy. The 
                                                 
102 Thakur was the first non-upper caste, non-congress chief minister of Bihar after Indian 
independence. 
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inherent tension was that, by consistently undermining the capacity of the state 
apparatus under his control, he limited his ability to deliver what would elsewhere in 
India be considered normal developmental goods. As a chief minister in a federal 
system in which power is weighted toward the Central Government, Yadav had limited 
capacity to alter the rules of the game. Delhi could at any moment have dismissed him 
and imposed president’s rule on the state. His decision to subordinate concerns about 
the organisational capacity of the Bihar government to his political strategy left him 
with a problem: he could not credibly promise to deliver development outcomes on a 
broad scale to much of the electorate in the long term.  
Yadav solved this problem in part by promising and delivering only select benefits, and 
in part by breaking with tradition in Indian politics and not vigorously promising broad 
‘development’. For example, if during his many trips to villages, he was asked to 
provide better roads, he would tend to question whether roads were really of much 
benefit to ordinary villagers, and suggest that the real beneficiaries would be contractors 
and the wealthy, powerful people who had cars. He typically required a large escort of 
senior public officials on these visits, and would require them to line up dutifully and 
humbly while he himself was doing his best to behave like a villager. He might gesture 
at this line-up and ask ‘Do you really want a road so that people like this can speed 
through your village in their big cars?’ Yadav was not trying to fool most of his voters 
most of the time. He was offering them other tangible benefits: izzat and the end of 
local socio-political tyrannies. But the strategies he used to deliver those benefits 
limited his ability to deliver on development in a more material sense.  
Izzat as a political strategy had two parts:  
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1) Preventing communal riots that badly affected his Muslim supporters 
2) Ensuring that local officials treated members of castes groups that were 
core supporters with respect 
I explain both of these strategic elements in more detail below. 
6.5.1.1 Preventing Communal Riots 
One of the most important agenda items for Muslims in India is the prevention of 
communal conflict. Consequently, an important objective of the ruling party that 
depended on Muslim votes for its political survival was to prevent communal conflict. 
The Bihar government led by Yadav was very effective in this respect.  
In October 1989, a congress government was in power in Bihar, and I was joint 
secretary in the department of agriculture in Patna when riots broke out in Bhaghalpur 
district. The Bihar government deputed me from my posting in Patna to work with the 
divisional commissioner
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 of Bhagalpur to control the violence. In 1992, during 
Yadav’s tenure, I was district magistrate in Palamau, Bihar. This enabled me to 
experience the difference in approach between two incumbent parties in dealing with 
communally-charged situations.  
The message of the state government under Yadav and the RJD was clear and effective 
and everyone understood his determination. However the approach to preventing 
communal violence was in direct contrast to the leadership’s approach to controlling 
crime. The crime situation was so bad that,  
                                                 
103
 A divisional commissioner is the head of a division and has a number of districts under 
him/her.  
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... annoyed at the rising crime graph and jailbirds having a free run from 
behind the bars, the Patna high court on Tuesday observed that the situation 
appeared to have gone beyond control. A division bench comprising acting 
Chief Justice Nagendra Roy and Justice S N Hussain made the observation 
when Inspector General of Police (Prisons) Deepak Kumar Singh told the 
court that efforts were being made to curb criminals from running their 
gangs using mobile phones from jails. (Press Trust of India 2004)  
As previously described, kidnapping for ransom was a thriving industry during this 
same period: 
Kidnapping for ransom is Bihar's biggest and, these days, only industry. 
Between 1992 and 2001 ... local police recorded 24,338 cases of kidnapping 
in the state, an average of more than six a day. Officers admit the real figure 
may be 10 times higher than that... some politicians may be getting in on the 
kidnap game. Superintendent Shoba Ohatker, who has busted more kidnap 
gangs than any other officer, says that in her three years on the job, she has 
arrested suspected kidnappers hiding in the homes of local politicians four 
times. (Perry 2003) 
The state government and police machinery that was so successful in preventing 
communal violence looked the other way when it came to kidnapping. Such selective 
use of government capacity was a core part of the administration’s response to the 
political realities of the state: the electoral promise to overthrow upper-caste hegemony, 
including upper caste-hegemony over crime. One way to change the balance of crime 
was by having one of the lowest police-to-population ratios in the country: Bihar had 85 
police per 100,000 citizens, while the national average was 136. This meant that Bihar's 
police force, which in 2000 had a strength of 87,000, needed to recruit another 50,000 
officers to reach the national average (BBC News 2000). 
In spite of this, there was nothing extraordinary about crime figures from Bihar: 
Bihar has earned a reputation as a lawless and dangerously violent state. 
Upon closer examination, however, overall crime rates in Bihar do not look 
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very different from other parts of north India which also have high crime 
rates. (Frankel and Witsoe 2006: 31) 
I observed that this clamour about increased crime was, among other factors, caused by 
the change in the nature of people who suffered its consequences: the old elite became 
the new victim. As described by the World Bank, 
Although official statistics suggest that Bihar's crime rates are similar to 
many other states, the general perception of widespread lawlessness and 
organized crime is quite different. Thus Bihar has the reputation of being a 
high-risk state, where extortion and crime is directed towards businesses 
and professionals. (World Bank 2005: 4) 
Thus, the numbers remained unchanged but the perpetrators and victims had switched 
places: 
Upper caste mafia groups have a long history in Bihar. Paralleling the 
political empowerment of lower caste groups, over the last fifteen years 
OBC mafia-politicians have emerged to assert the new dominance of 
backward caste groups in crime syndicates as well. (Frankel and Witsoe 
2006: 32) 
Crime in Bihar therefore had a political purpose. Given the lack of human capital 
amongst their core supporters and the actions of an alert judiciary, the ruling party was 
unable to open the doors of government employment to its supporters. They therefore 
resorted to letting them dominate crime while denying this to others: 
Between 1992 and 2005, criminal groups carried out a reported 30,000 
kidnappings for ransom in Bihar...There is also a widespread belief 
throughout India that criminal figures are being protected by politicians in 
Bihar. After the imposition of president’s rule in March 2005, 12,000 
absconding criminals were arrested within a twelve-day period including ‘at 
least 500 who were feared gangsters.’ Bihar’s Director General of Police, 
Narain Mishra commented, ‘Now criminals know that nobody can save 
them. Under president’s rule they have lost their patrons.’ The fact that 
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crime in Bihar has disproportionately targeted a better-off urban population, 
and the perception that politicians, including many of those who were in the 
ruling government... (Frankel and Witsoe 2006: 31) 
Achieving this duality and social engineering—changing the social composition of 
victims and beneficiaries and preventing riots while failing with general crime—was a 
masterstroke in both administrative and political terms. 
6.5.1.2 Ensuring that Local Officials Treat Supporters with Respect 
One of the platforms on which the new political elite mobilised support was the notion 
of izzat, or self-respect:  
A significant transition in the perception of the poor peasants and 
agricultural labourers with regard to their needs and aspirations was also 
noticed in the villages ... Although even today they are struggling to earn 
enough to be able to provide for two square, meals a day, their concerns are 
not limited only to economic needs. The question of ‘izzat’ (respect) and 
political rights have become very important in their perception. (Sharma 
2005: 969) 
The success of Yadav’s electoral strategy was largely made possible because he was 
able to give marginalized groups who lacked both human capital and physical assets a 
voice. Prabhat P. Ghosh, director of the ADRI in Patna states that  
In some areas of Bihar, if you carry a Yadav surname, that itself is a 
protection for you. People will presume that you have got connections and 
that you can approach political parties. This was the exact opposite 15 to 20 
years ago when a Brahmin surname guaranteed a certain stature to you. 
(Bhagat 2004) 
So much was the emphasis on respect during the first term of Yadav’s government, a 
popular Janata Dal (later RJD) slogan was ‘vikaas nahiñ, samaan chahiye’ (we need 
dignity, not development) (Frankel and Witsoe 2006). Yadav declared, 
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‘Yahan caste par vote hota hai, vikas par nahin’ (people vote on caste lines, 
not on development). ‘It is all about power. They (the upper castes) want to 
capture power again but hamara log power chhorna nahin chahte hain’ (my 
people are not prepared to give up power). (Chatterjee 2005) 
In Chapter 3, I described the extent of social exploitation that BCs have historically 
experienced in Bihar. That the ruling party was able to give them izzat in spite of being 
unable to do much about the caste composition of senior civil, police and judicial 
officers, was a matter of great skill and administrative acumen that few realise or 
acknowledge. Frankel and Witsoe describe how 
The social respect traditionally paid to upper caste villagers had ceased, as 
had the degrading acts of subordination that many lower caste villagers had 
been forced to endure. Lalu’s rise to political power offered lower caste 
villagers a sense of social—even familial—ownership in the state... One 
petty cultivator, when asked why he votes for the RJD, pointed to his house 
and replied, ‘I vote for my own family; why would someone from another 
house help me?’ Lower caste RJD supporters experienced a sense of 
democratic empowerment with Lalu at the helm of the state; they felt that it 
was ‘their’ government. This represented a dramatic change from earlier 
governments, considered at best a benevolent patron (maañ-baap) by the 
poor, and at worst an institution reinforcing their oppression. (Frankel and 
Witsoe 2006: 22) 
Whatever its other failings the Yadav regime therefore had succeeded in convincing 
their core supporters that their government had given them something of great value—
izzat.   
6.5.2 Reincarnating the Client as Patron  
The backbone of Yadav’s strategy was the creation of a new elite from amongst caste 
groups that were core supporters of the RJD. There were two elements to this strategy: 
1) Choke the flow of state resources to upper castes 
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2) Ensure that core supporters received preferential treatment in the award 
of government contracts and when acting as intermediaries on behalf of 
others. 
The overarching strategy that accomplished this turnaround was to ensure that citizens 
had access to public services and state resources not as entitlements but as clients via 
patrons who had privileged access to the state. This brought about a radical shift in 
power relations in the rural and urban areas. In the past, upper-caste politicians and their 
political fixers
104
 played the role of patron. Following the emergence of a new set of 
public representatives in the 1990s, the RJD ensured that a new set of political fixers 
(and local party workers) emerged from castes and communities who were their core 
supporters. They took on the new role of power brokers in citizen-state interactions.  
6.5.2.1 Choke the Flow of State Resources to the Upper Castes 
A feature of the mobilisation strategy of ‘aggressive social justice’ employed by the 
RJD was that it had to not only benefit its core supporters, it had to also deny benefits to 
upper castes. State incapacity by design was one way this was achieved. It ensured that 
citizens were unable to access services and state resources as entitlements. The only 
way citizens could get these resources was by using the services of a patron who had 
access to the state. These patrons were either MLAs or BC politicians who could reach 
the chief minister or the chief minister’s secretariat. This was one of the reasons behind 
concentrating administrative powers with a few key officials, as discussed earlier.  
6.5.2.2 Ensure that Core Supporters Received Preferential Treatment 
                                                 
104  Manor (2000: 819) argues that fixers ‘bring three important things to the political process — 
knowledge, skills and attitudes. They know the problems faced by people at the bottom; they 
are skilful in manipulating the system to benefit their clients and themselves; they are pluralistic 
in their attitude, always willing to help irrespective of ideology or rank. As a result, they are 
useful to those both members of the public and officials. 
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The RJD was a party without an established cadre of workers. One way in which it built 
up its local leadership was by ensuring that its members received small but lucrative 
contracts for public works funded from CSS resources. According to the guidelines for 
these schemes, there was a ban on the use of contractors. Public works were to be 
executed by departmental engineers, other departmental staff or groups of beneficiaries. 
This was not possible because of the huge shortage of engineers and departmental staff. 
Local officers under pressure to finish work turned to petty contractors who would not 
figure anywhere in the records but would be given money to organise construction. 
These petty contractors were invariably local party functionaries or their agents.  
Vacancies therefore fitted a political purpose. It was a delicate balance. On the one 
hand, there was a lack of confidence that CSS schemes would benefit core supporters. 
On the other, they had to ensure that local supporters got enough contracts to retain their 
loyalty. With the emergence of a new political elite, only those from BCs, SCs or 
Muslims could get anything done in government. This was true whether it was getting 
birth certificates from the municipal office, treatment in a government hospital or a 
permit to run a bus service. This pattern transformed yesterday’s clients into today’s 
patrons, a role reversal that was at the heart of the ruling party’s social engineering and 
electoral strategy. 
6.5.3 Electoral Arithmetic 
In elections to the state legislative assembly held in 1990, 1995 and 2000 (when Yadav 
and his wife became chief minister one after the other), the RJD came to power
105
 and 
remained in office by securing 26 per cent, 28 per cent and 28 per cent respectively of 
                                                 
105 The share of the dominant party in Bihar in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections was 31 per cent. 
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the votes polled
106
 (Election Commission of India 1990, 1995, 2000). They also 
required support from other political parties some of whom joined the government, but 
in terms of a winning electoral strategy the ruling party’s target was a vote share of a 
third of the votes polled. It seems that it was possible for Yadav’s party to achieve this 
vote share by servicing the needs of only their core support groups. Given the social and 
economic oppression these castes and communities traditionally experienced at the 
hands of the upper castes, Yadav was able to demonstrate his commitment by 
demonstrating an anti-upper caste bias and a policy framework that delivered material 
benefits without a high functioning state. 
Chandra explains that an electoral strategy based on ethnic mobilisation is viable 
because ‘voters expect co-ethnic elites to favour them in the distribution of benefits, and 
elites expect co-ethnic voters to favour them in the distribution of votes’ (2004: 47). She 
treats voters as strategic actors who value what the state has to offer. Casting ballots 
depends on voters’ estimation of what they can get from a prospective candidate. Party 
leaders seek to mobilise enough votes to come to power. In this game, the critical 
constraints are the ability of political parties and their candidates to make credible 
promises and of voters to judge the non-ethnic details of past performance. For 
example, whether past beneficiaries were rich or poor, urban or rural. This problem is 
more acute with promises to implement policies. Caste-based promises and presence of 
persons from similar castes in important posts within a party sends credible signals to 
ethnic voters because they are tangible and verifiable demonstrations of its commitment. 
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 In the February 2005 elections, the RJD’s vote share fell to 25 per cent and by October 
2005, it had further reduced to 23 per cent. On both occasions, the RJD was unable to form a 
government. 
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The following quote from a Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) study 
is indicative of the success that Yadav and the RJD were able to achieve via this 
strategy of ethnic mobilisation: 
... Laloo Yadav may have lost his popularity... but it is also important to 
note that he still seems to be popular among the yadavs, the Muslims, the 
dalits and the poor people in the state... these are the social communities 
who have voted for the RJD in large numbers during most of the elections 
held in the state during the past decade. (Kumar 2005: 192) 
Three points here are noteworthy: 1) the core voters of the RJD were from Backward 
Caste, Muslim and Dalit (Scheduled Caste) communities; 2) by 2000, Yadav’s 
popularity had decreased; 3) in spite of losing overall popularity, Yadav continued to be 
popular among his hard core Muslim and Yadav (MY) supporters. In terms of signalling 
commitment to core voters, this meant rewarding Muslims, BCs (particularly Yadav’s) 
and Dalits. Of these Muslim, Yadav and Dalits alone constituted 15 per cent, 7 per cent 
and 14 per cent of the population respectively (Kohli 1990: 208). See Table 6.6 below 
for details of the share of different social groups over the years. Together, these three 
caste/religious groups constituted 36 per cent of the population. Considering that 30 per 
cent was the targeted vote share, Lalu Prasad Yadav could make these three 
communities the focus of his politics. At this point it is important to mention that such a 
minimalist strategy was possible only because India has a FPTP electoral system, where 
candidates do not need an absolute majority to win an election. 
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Table 6.6 Share of different caste groups in Bihar beginning in 1931  
Sl. No Social Group 1931 1981-83 2002
107 
1. Upper Castes 13 15 20 
2. Other Backward Castes 50 48 58 
3. Scheduled Castes 14 14 21 
4. Scheduled Tribes N.A 8 1 
5. Muslim 13 15 14
108 
 
Sources: For 1931, Census 1931 cited in Frankel and Witsoe (2006); for 1981-83, Kholi (1990); 
for 2002, National Sample Survey Organisation (2003) 
Table 6.7 has details from a CSDS poll on the supply of civic amenities in Bihar. The 
poll was conducted in 2004 prior to the elections that brought down the Yadav regime. 
Table 6.7 Condition of the supply of civic amenities in 2004 (%) 
Civic issues 
Deteriorated 
% 
Improved 
% 
Same as 
before % 
No opinion 
% 
Total % 
Condition of roads 54 24 18 4 100 
Medical facilities 54 11 28 7 100 
Supply of electricity 54 11 24 11 100 
Security of life and 
property 
41 26 25 8 
100 
Supply of drinking 
water 
33 23 27 17 
100 
Source: (NES 2004, CSDS Data Unit cited in Kumar 2005). 
                                                 
107 The 2002 numbers are substantially different from the other two time periods because the 
predominantly ST areas of Bihar were taken out in 2000 to create a new state of Jharkhand. 
108 Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (2007) 
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The above table shows that, in keeping with the general opinion about Bihar, over 50 
per cent of respondents held the opinion that the conditions of roads, medical facilities 
and electricity had deteriorated. However, if you add the figures together, you find that 
the proportion of people who thought that the conditions had improved or had remained 
the same were: 
 40 per cent for roads 
 39 per cent for medical facilities 
 35 per cent for supply of electricity 
 51 per cent for security of life and property 
 50 per cent for supply of drinking water 
What this reveals is that an electorally adequate number thought that conditions had 
improved or remained the same, despite the majority being unhappy with roads, health 
care and electricity. We do not know the caste composition of the respondents to this 
survey, but one way this result could have been achieved was by targeting state 
resources to core supporters despite an all-round decline in state capacity to claim and 
use central grants. Though it is not conclusive proof, the caste-wise voting pattern in the 
1999 general elections as shown in Table 6.8 is indicative of such a pattern.  
Table 6.8 Caste and Community of RJD–Congress (I) and the BJP–JD(U) voters in 
Bihar %, 1999 General Election 
Caste RJD–Cong (I) BJP–JD (U) 
Rajput 8% 92% 
Other Upper Castes 13% 86% 
Kurmi-Koeri 19% 79% 
Yadav 79% 20% 
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Lower OBC 27% 55% 
Scheduled Castes 49% 43% 
Muslims 79% 19% 
Source: (CSDS Team 1999) 
The above table indicates that, in the 1999 elections to the Indian parliament 79, 49 and 
79 per cent respectively of Yadav, SC and Muslim voters endorsed the coalition 
consisting of the RJD and Congress (I). Using population shares of each of these three 
castes
109
 (i.e., Yadav, SCs and Muslims it is possible to do a quick calculation that the 
combined support base of the RJD–Congress (I) ticket was 24 per cent from just these 
three castes and communities. Yadav needed a vote share of around 30 per cent to win 
elections. A secure vote share of 24 per cent meant that the neglect of other 
communities was a viable electoral strategy for him and the RJD.  
6.6  Nitish Kumar’s Bihar 
Yadav’s ability to mobilise electoral support based on an ‘upper caste as enemy’ 
mentality was not infinite. His competitors, led by Nitish Kumar
110
, a former associate 
and party member, mobilised votes from two under-represented groups: the non-Yadav 
BCs, the numerous Extremely Backward Castes, victims of his politics i.e. the upper 
castes and sections of the SC community. In November 2005, Kumar became chief 
minister and quickly gained a reputation for effectiveness and for achieving 
development outcomes.   
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 Caste wise population shares are detailed in Chapter 3. 
110 Nitish Kumar was railway minister in Delhi from 2001 to 2004. Yadav succeeded him in 2004 
and remained in office until 2009. 
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The inclusive nature of the new coalition’s caste composition opened up new 
possibilities by dramatically changing political incentives. The leadership under Kumar 
promised to control crime, bring development and protect the interests of BCs, 
Muslims, SCs and upper castes. This changed the political economy and had a dramatic 
impact on many aspects of Bihar’s administrative capacity.  
Bihar today has one of the highest GSDP growth rates in India, government 
development spending has increased substantially, crime (particularly kidnapping for 
ransom) has fallen dramatically and the chief minister is now the toast of the media. 
During elections to the State Legislative Assembly held in November 2010, the 
coalition led by Kumar secured a four-fifths majority, winning 206 of 243 seats.  
Most importantly from the perspective of this thesis, Bihar began to claim and use 
substantially higher amounts of centre–state fiscal transfers after Yadav’s departure 
(Table 6.9 below has data on plan size and percentage expenditure). Since 2006/7, there 
has been a substantial increase both in the size of Bihar’s annual plan and in its 
utilisation. Both as secretary of finance and principal secretary of rural development, I 
have been associated with plan expenditure in Bihar during the later part of Nitish 
Kumar’s stewardship. The change from Yadav’s rule was dramatic. During the 1990–
2005 period, years would go by before the chief minister took departmental or district 
reviews. Whereas the 2005–2010 period was known for consistent follow up and 
attention to detail on all aspects of development spending.   
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Table 6.9 Bihar plan expenditure (Rs. crores) 
Year Approved Plan Expenditure % Expenditure 
1997-98 2268.42 1663.87 73.35 
1998-99 3768.74 2583.96 68.56 
1999-00 3630.00 2695.68 74.26 
2000-01 3155.00 1638.22 51.92 
2001-02 2644.00 1471.40 55.65 
2002-03 2964.40 2206.61 74.44 
2003-04 3320.00 2627.03 79.13 
2004-05 4000.00 3196.47 79.91 
2005-06 5356.28 4465.50 83.37 
2006-07 8250.00 8456.76 102.51 
2007-08 10200.00 9700.25 95.10 
2008-09 13500.00 12514.33 92.70 
 
Source: Government of Bihar Finance Department 
For the period between 2005/6 and 2007/8, Bihar at 10.5 per cent grew faster than the 
national average of 9.4 per cent. Bihar’s performance was second only to Haryana at 
11.0 per cent (see details in Table 6.10).  
Table 6.10 Per cent average real growth rates of Indian states (GSDP % at 
constant prices as of 26 June 2009) 
States  
2005-06 to 2007-08 
 Bihar  10.5 
Jharkhand  7.9 
Assam  6.0 
Madhya Pradesh  10.2 
Chhattisgarh  5.5 
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Rajasthan  7.2 
Orissa  8.1 
Uttar Pradesh  6.5 
Uttaranchal  8.4 
Gujarat  10.2 
Haryana  11.0 
Himachal Pradesh  8.8 
Karnataka  7.2 
Kerala  9.7 
Andhra Pradesh 9.4 
Maharashtra  9.6 
Punjab  6.1 
Tamil Nadu  9.2 
West Bengal  7.4 
ALL INDIA 9.4 
 
Source: Planning Commission of India (2009) 
 
Table 6.11 below has data on crime in Bihar. Since 2005, there has been a steady 
decline in all years for all types of crimes (except for murders in 2008), with the most 
dramatic fall in kidnapping for ransom. This is significant because of the reputation 
Bihar had gained as the ‘kidnapping capital’ of India (Tewary 2005). 
Table 6.11 Bihar Crime Record 2001-2009 (September) 
Year Murder Dacoity Robbery Kidnapping 
for Ransom 
Road 
Robbery 
2001 3619 1293 2175 385 1296 
2002 3634 1259 2236 396 1323 
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2003 3652 1203 2425 335 1430 
2004 3861 1297 2909 411 1875 
2005 3423 1191 2379 251 1310 
2006 3225 967 2138 194 1251 
2007 2963 646 1729 89 1109 
2008 3029 640 1536 66 897 
2009  
(till September) 
2438 505 1253 62 720 
Source: Government of Bihar (2009) 
Given Bihar’s recent success with economic growth, public expenditure and crime 
control, it was not surprising that within two months of assuming office, Nitish Kumar 
was voted ‘best Indian chief minister’111 in a CNN-IBN poll112 conducted by the CSDS. 
Over three and a half years later, in August 2009, the business daily Economic Times 
chose him as the ‘Business Reformer of the Year’113. 
It is interesting that Yadav and Kumar have much in common. Both came into 
state/national politics through the student union and the JP movement
114
. In 1973, the 
Patna Engineering College Students’ Union elected Kumar as its president. The same 
                                                 
111 78 per cent of those polled felt that Kumar was the best Indian chief minister at the time. 
112 The findings of the IBN-HT poll are based on the State of the Nation Survey conducted in 29 
states of the India in the second week of January 2006. The survey was conducted at 956 
locations spread across 230 Parliamentary constituencies in which 15,141 respondents were 
interviewed. 
113 With the kind of electoral mandate that Kumar obtained in the 2010 elections, it appears that 
Bihar is headed towards a Tamil-Nadu-type of two party competition, centered around two 
leaders with mass appeal. If the political competition that emerges is programmatic, if the 
economic growth of recent years is sustained and if the power sector problems are addressed 
Bihar may witness a transformation that nobody thought was possible even five years ago.  
114 Jayaprakash Narayan, widely known as JP, was an Indian freedom fighter and political 
leader, remembered especially for leading the opposition to Indira Gandhi in the 1970s and for 
giving a call for peaceful Total Revolution. 
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year, the Patna University Students’ Union chose Yadav as its president. Both went to 
jail in 1974 under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA
115
), and during the 
emergency in 1975. Both are BC leaders and, unlike Congress Party chief ministers 
elected during the 1970s and 1980s, they owed their leadership positions to the people 
of Bihar
116
.  
Despite having so much in common, their performance in terms of promoting economic 
development in Bihar was substantially different. There are many potential 
explanations, many of them reaching deep into the social and political structure and 
culture of the state (Clements 2005; Witsoe 2007b). Some have argued that Bihar’s 
rapid progress since 2005 was possible only because of the dramatic social re-
engineering that Yadav was able to achieve
117
. It is too early to reach a definitive 
conclusion, but a few aspects of the differences between the Yadav and Kumar regimes 
illustrate the main research question of this thesis: 
 The dramatically improved performance after 2005 was possible even 
though most other conditions, including the level of competency of the 
state apparatus, remained the same 
 Because upper castes were an important part of the ruling coalition that 
Kumar assembled, he was no longer constrained by the dichotomy 
between the ruling elite and the bureaucratic elite 
 By mobilising support on a platform that promised BC, Muslim and SC 
empowerment as well as economic development and crime control, the 
                                                 
115 MISA was a draconian law enacted by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to detain political 
opponents. 
116 Congress chief ministers during the period owed their offices to the patronage they enjoyed 
from leadership in Delhi. 
117 Others have said that Yadav was able to accomplish what he did with the railways only 
because of the steps that Kumar had initiated as railway minister. 
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political circumstances for enhancing administrative capacity and 
improving the use of fiscal transfers was possible under Kumar 
The improved all round performance was the result of a political need. The positive 
impact this had on state capacity—‘state capacity by design’—was intended and real. 
6.7 Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Railway 
Yadav was railway minister in the Central Government from 2004 to 2009. Unlike his 
record in Bihar, he gained a reputation for being a successful reformer, and for being 
responsible for a marked improvement in the performance of India’ national railways. 
Within two years of assuming office, the Indian Railways, once described as terminally 
ill (NCAER 2001), went from being on the verge of bankruptcy to an entity with 
revenues of US$6 billion in 2007 (Olynec 2009). They became the second-largest, 
profit-making public sector undertaking in India (Raghuram 2007).  
The revival of the railway behemoth is now a popular case study in policy 
and business schools around the world. Prasad rejected advice from the 
World Bank to increase fares, layoff employees and privatise the core 
business of the organisation. Instead, he kept the 1.4 million employees, 
reduced fares, improved efficiency, and started partnerships with private 
companies. (Olynec 2009)  
More than the turnaround for the railways, this was a turnaround for Yadav
118
. Faced 
with a desire to one day become prime minister of India (Rediff India Abroad 2006), he 
                                                 
118 Some commentators have blamed the then principal secretary to the chief minister, a BC IAS 
officer from the Bihar cadre known for his personal integrity, for Bihar’s poor development 
performance between 1990 and 2005 (Verma). It is ironic that Yadav’s success as Railway 
minister is also sometimes attributed to another BC IAS officer from the Bihar cadre who worked 
with him as officer on special duty in the Railway Ministry. Geddes’ statement that ‘To 
understand how presidents make choices among potential appointment strategies, we need to 
first consider their long term goals’ (1994) rings true in an analysis of Bihar’s predicament. A live 
recording of the speech by Lalu Prasad Yadav and Sudhir Kumar his Officer on Special Duty 
(OSD) on the Indian Railways at the Lee Kuan Yew School Of Public Policy in Singapore can 
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set about demonstrating his competence for economic management. The man who as 
chief minister of Bihar so famously said ‘vikaas nahiñ, samaan chahiye’ (we need 
dignity, not development) (Frankel and Witsoe 2006), when faced with a different set of 
political circumstance argued that  
We have had enough of... slogans and discussions related to roti, kapda and 
makaan, (food, clothing and shelter) and it will continue. But the 
fundamental question is from where will roti (food) come? It will not fall 
from heavens. It will come from infrastructure, which includes power, 
railways, highways and ports. In the era of globalization, where nations are 
coming close and barriers have come down due to technological 
advancements like IT... (L. P. Yadav 2008) 
Here, an aspect of Yadav’s ability as a political manager needs reiteration. Until he 
became chief minister in 1990, no chief minister of Bihar since 1961 had lasted a full 
five-year term. With the exception of two chiefs, namely K.B. Sahay (1963–67) and 
Jaganath Mishra (1980–83), none even completed three years. It is against this backdrop 
that Yadav demonstrated his ability to dominate politics in Bihar for an unbroken period 
of 15 years, first as de jure and later as de facto chief minister
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.  
Unshackled from the mill stone of an anti-upper caste mandate and desperate to prove 
that he had what it takes to one day become the prime minister, Yadav took on the 
challenge of bringing back the railways from the brink. It is interesting that he used the 
services of a BC, Bihar-cadre IAS officer to make a success of his tenure in the railways 
(A. Singh 2007). It was therefore not his incompetence or the lack of competent people 
to assist him that explains why he governed Bihar the way he did. It was that he chose 
to use his talents, and those of his officers, in ways that suited his politics. 
                                                                                                                                               
be heard at http://nuscast.nus.edu.sg/PublicEvents/1/MODVideoOnly.asp?KEY=2A7CC58B-6CA7-4B33-
A26F-7C99AEA06D00#  
119 Except for an eight-day period in March 2000, when Kumar was chief minister.  
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6.8 Summary  
Informed by changes since a new government came to power in 2005, and the dramatic 
change in attitude and performance of Yadav as India’s railway minister, I argued in 
this chapter that the quality of governance under Yadav’s leadership worsened for some 
and improved for others. This was because of the particular political strategy that 
Yadav’s government pursued. This strategy led to a set of political circumstances 
wherein it became expedient to pay little attention to delivering material 'poverty goods'. 
The focus on delivering security (while maintaining overall background insecurity) 
meant that state capacity to use fiscal transfers could be sacrificed with very few 
political costs.  
I discussed four proximate reasons for Bihar under-claiming and under-spending 
centre–state fiscal transfers. I showed why these were the result of a specific political 
strategy to solidify core electoral support through rhetorical mobilisation against an 
upper caste minority who dominated the economy, society and politics. By refusing to 
recruit upper castes and by closely controlling those already in service, the Yadav 
regime knowingly destroyed state administrative capacity and sacrificed transfers from 
Delhi.  
He was able to do this and win elections because the FPTP electoral system and 
electoral arithmetic allowed him to win elections by neglecting everyone except his core 
supporters. Yadav alleviated the tension inherent in his political strategy by making 
only very sparing promises about the material benefits he would bring. Instead, he 
focused on intangible but real benefits for his poor and supporters who, prior to his 
coming to power, faced social oppression and physical violence on a daily basis.  
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By preventing communal riots, Yadav earned the support of Muslims. By ensuring that 
upper-caste landlords were not able to oppress SCs (Bhatia 2005), he secured their 
electoral support. These gains were cemented by giving cabinet positions to leaders 
from previously-disadvantaged groups and by ensuring that the largely upper-caste 
police and civil officials behaved sympathetically to Muslims and SCs. Backward 
castes, particularly Yadav’s, emerged as the principal source through which citizens and 
officials could hope to access what the state had to offer. They became the new patrons. 
Yet in some sectors, where the political incentive for performance survived, there were 
pockets of productivity. The extraordinary success of the police in preventing 
communal violence, while failing to control crime, along with the progress made by 
dairy cooperative societies appears to be evidence of an administrative duality that was 
driven by political incentives.  
Two changes, one for Yadav, when he left Bihar to become railway minster in Delhi, 
and the other for Bihar, when Kumar left Delhi to become chief minister in Bihar, 
provide an opportunity to make an important point. The point being that Yadav 
governed Bihar the way he did, not because of his incompetence, but because he was 
motivated by his politics to use his talents in other ways. The debilitating consequence 
of this reality on state capacity—or ‘state incapacity by design’—was unintended but 
real collateral damage. 
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Chapter 7 – Key Findings and Implications 
In this final chapter, I provide a review of my key findings and analysis of the Bihar 
paradox, and then go on to discuss how this research may have implications for both 
policy and theory. 
7.1 The Bihar Paradox: Key Findings 
This thesis has been concerned with why a political party, the Rashtriya Janata 
Dal (RJD) led by Lalu Prasad Yadav, which claimed to represent the poor and under-
privileged did not claim and spend large amounts of centre–state fiscal transfers that 
could have reduced poverty, provided employment and benefitted core supporters. It 
seems antithetical that, in Bihar, a rhetorically pro-poor government that failed to claim 
and spend grants and maintained a large number of public sector vacancies would enjoy 
repeated electoral success in the context of credible elections and a majority of poor 
voters. This phenomenon is the ‘Bihar paradox’. 
The Bihar paradox relates to existing research and literature on why democracies fail to 
pursue pro-poor policies even when the majority are poor. The first challenge in 
empirically testing the question of why the Government of Bihar failed to implement 
pro-poor policies was to narrow its boundaries. I did this by identifying CSS and SPA 
as a set of centre–state fiscal transfer created to fund schemes and programs that, if 
implemented, could have improved the lives of the poor. Though public spending is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for improving the lives of the poor, it is widely 
acknowledged that development expenditure by the public sector is an important driver 
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for poverty reduction in India (Harriss 2000; Sen 1996). The second challenge was to 
select democratically elected entities that operate within a common legal framework but 
have a diversity of social, economic, political and administrative contexts in order to 
study the impact of these factors on the uptake of such schemes—and by extension pro-
poor policies—in Bihar. Fortunately, Indian states naturally provide the diversity of 
socio-political conditions within a common legal framework. I therefore chose to focus 
on the extent to which states claimed CSS and SPA grants and spent CSS funds 
available to them. I used annual data from 1997/8 to 2004/5 for 16 states as the 
dependent variable in my quantitative analysis and as the marker for the case study on 
Bihar. 
The two data sets I assembled on CSS and SPA allowed me to compare Bihar with 
other Indian states. The analysis in Chapter 5 indicates that Bihar was not alone. Poor 
states in India generally claimed less CSS and SPA funds: as poverty levels increased, 
the amount of SPA and CSS funds claimed by states went down. A similar trend was 
found to exist with respect to CSS spending: as poverty levels increased, CSS spending 
also went down. These findings, though not central to this thesis, indicate that centre–
state fiscal transfers were not achieving an important purpose of India’s fiscal transfer 
system during this period: to decrease inter-state inequality. Rather, more grants were 
being claimed and spent by richer states, thereby worsening inequality.   
What is most significant for my line of enquiry, however, is that these findings revealed 
that Bihar was different: its level of under-claiming and under-spending was lower than 
would be expected by its level of poverty. This meant that Bihar’s poverty alone did not 
explain its underperformance. As I show, this anomaly was not driven by the fiscal 
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situation of the Bihar government, which was relatively cash rich. The primary reason 
for under-claiming and under-spending was ‘state incapacity by design’—the 
intentional hobbling of public-sector capacity by government leadership for political 
gains. 
I argue that, under Lalu Prasad Yadav’s watch, the quality of governance in Bihar 
worsened for some and improved for others. This was due to a particular political 
strategy he pursued in which it was expedient to pay little attention to delivering 
material 'poverty goods'. He mobilised particular caste groups by promising them public 
sector positions and izzat. By denying public sector jobs to non-supporters and 
demonising the upper-caste bureaucracy, Yadav polarized the electorate and deepened 
the loyalty of his core constituency. The focus was on delivering security to some 
(lower-caste supporters) while increasing insecurity for others (the upper castes and 
non-supporters). 
This strategy was largely achieved by centralising authority and ensuring that only 
officials from the ‘right castes’ occupied important positions. Thanks to the dominant 
position that upper castes enjoyed in the bureaucracy and the poor educational status of 
his supporters, many positions were kept vacant while work was shifted to trusted 
supporters, breaking formal channels of supervision. Oversight institutions dominated 
by the upper castes, such as the judiciary, would not allow recruitment rules to be 
broken in order to fill these vacancies with under-qualified Yadav supporters. The costs 
of a deteriorating bureaucracy (knowingly incurred) were a loss of administrative 
capacity and, indirectly, the sacrifice of fiscal transfers from Delhi. However, where it 
was necessary to deliver important selective benefits such as security to his electoral 
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base, administrative capacity was maintained. Yadav alleviated the tension between pro-
poor advocacy and decreased administrative capacity inherent in his strategy by making 
only sparing promises about the material benefits he would bring to his supporters. 
Importantly, despite an overall failure to promote general welfare and development, 
Yadav and his party continued to win free elections and remained in power between 
1990 and 2005. I argue that such non-performance across a range of government 
activities became electorally viable because of intense factionalism that enabled Yadav 
and the RJD to retain office by securing the electoral support of less than 30 per cent of 
the voters. This was possible because the anti-upper caste platform mobilised a core 
support group of BCs, Muslims and SCs, who together accounted for more than three 
quarters of the population. Of these, he privileged his own caste, the Yadavs, and this 
group emerged as the principal source through which citizens and officials could access 
state benefits. They became the new patrons.  
A more inclusive coalition that came to power after 2005 under the leadership of Nitish 
Kumar had a dramatic impact on the Bihar government’s capacity. Bihar today has one 
of the highest GSDP growth rates in India, development spending has increased, and 
crime (particularly kidnapping for ransom) has fallen. Most importantly from the 
perspective of this thesis, Bihar began to claim and use substantially higher amounts of 
centre–state fiscal transfers. From these changes, we can conclude that the 1990–2005 
failures were a product of the political incentives faced by the administration in power, 
rather than the configuration of the state apparatus. The post-2005 inclusion of upper 
castes in the ruling coalition alleviated the tension inherent in Yadav’s political strategy 
and allowed for a renewed focus on general empowerment (rather than the 
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empowerment of a few groups), economic development, increased bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity and real development outcomes.  
7.2 Implications for Policy 
By tracing the pathways through which administrative capacity is built—when the 
political imperative requires, or destroys it to further regime survival—the Bihar case 
suggests possible gains from exploring the political drivers of state capacity in other 
states in India and perhaps in other regions of the developing world. The trend in both 
the academic literature (Haggard and Kaufman 1989; Haggard 1990; Stepan 1978) and 
in policy circles has been to overlook the political drivers of state capacity (Saxena and 
Ravi 2006; World Bank 1995, 2005). This is non-productive for three reasons.  
First, it encourages investment in technical capacity and bureaucratic competence 
without understanding whether the particular kind of capacity being developed will lead 
to an improvement in the lives of people and to a reduction in poverty. For example, 
focusing on the technical knowledge of bureaucrats in Bihar would not have improved 
the use of transfers, as the problem had its origins in political incentives. 
Second, without an understanding of the political context, we may miss opportunities 
for poverty reduction by focusing efforts on improving dysfunctional symptoms or 
technical assistance, rather than working with the political incentives that politicians 
face. Later in this section I discuss how a more nuanced understanding of Bihar and its 
politics during Yadav’s dominance would have made it possible for both donors and the 
central government to work with the state government to reduce poverty within the 
existing context.  
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Third, ignoring political context leads to the straight-jacketing of schemes. This has 
happened with CSS, leaving very little flexibility for opportunistic programming that 
responds to possibilities that emerge at the intersection of political expediency and 
poverty reduction. 
Chapter 3 showed how Bihar has had a troubled history of economic growth, poverty 
reduction and social inequity. During the fifteen-year period from 1990 to 2005, while 
the situation with respect to social inequity improved, Bihar’s performance vis-à-vis 
growth and poverty reduction was problematic. This coincided with a lack of appetite 
for development spending. Large sums of money that could have reduced poverty, 
provided employment and benefitted core supporters went unclaimed and unspent.  
From my interactions with policy makers in Delhi, and those with international donors, 
I know that there was no appreciation of political drivers of Bihar’s or other poor states’ 
inability to claim and spend CSS grants. The following extract from a paper written for 
the National Advisory Council in India by one of India’s most respected IAS officers 
who currently serves as an advisor to the Supreme Court of India is illustrative of this 
perspective: 
… if on the whole, Bihar, Jharkhand and Assam, bring down the share of 
poor States in overall utilisation, it is not because of political factors. The 
most important factor is the state of their administration which is sleepy and 
indifferent to implementation of schemes. (Saxena and Ravi 2006) 
As an IAS officer who served with both the Government of Bihar and the Government 
of India during this period, I shared this analysis at that time. With hindsight and the 
findings from my research, I now have a different perspective. What most of us failed to 
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grasp were the policy implications and importance of the pockets of productivity that 
did exist in Bihar and the political rhetoric of the time.  
Discussions in Chapter 6 indicate that, despite being notorious for lawlessness and 
crime, the Bihar government was very effective in preventing communal riots. This was 
despite one of the lowest police–population ratios among Indian states and grave 
provocations during the Babri mosque and Ram temple dispute at Ayodhya. Chapter 6 
explains how, because Muslims suffered most during communal violence and Yadav 
was keen to garner their support, he used all the resources of his government to prevent 
future breakouts of communal violence. 
Another sector that witnessed this performance duality and failure was cooperatives. As 
registrar (regulator) of cooperative societies in Bihar from 2003 to 2004, I was witness 
to government’s lack of interest in this sector. As in the case of crime control, the lack 
of interest in developing cooperatives had its roots in politics. In the same way that the 
bureaucratic elite and the new rulers were from opposing caste groups, so it was in the 
cooperative sector. The leadership of cooperative institutions were in the hands of land-
owning, upper-caste members. However, the cooperatives that did receive government 
support and did very well were those with caste ties to Yadav, in this case dairy 
cooperatives (Tewary 2002). 
The policy lessons from these pockets of productivity are quite simple. When the 
political incentive is there, political will is rarely a problem. Many donors and policy 
makers know this. Yet their actions do not often correspond with this knowledge 
because they mistake ‘being apolitical’ with disregarding the political imperatives 
inherent in any governance context. 
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Failure to grasp this tenet of democratic politics (and not-so-democratic ones), led to 
our inability to act on opportunities for poverty reduction that were available. As an IAS 
officer, I have attended official review meetings in Delhi on behalf of the Bihar 
government. In most, we were berated for our inability to spend and improve 
performance. We never discussed how we could work within the political constraints of 
the time to improve the development impact of the plethora of schemes that we were 
seeking to implement.  
From Chapter 3, we know that the constituency Yadav was seeking to mobilise were 
poor and underprivileged groups. Together, these groups were over three-fourths of the 
population of Bihar. Anything that could have been done to improve their lot would 
have logically received political backing, had it not required the involvement of an 
upper-caste dominated state bureaucracy. Having mobilised electoral support by arguing 
that, ‘You have been deprived of your share because those who ruled the state were not 
bothered about you... But now your man has captured the establishment ... ‘Burabal 
Hatao’ wipe out the upper castes...’ (Thakur 2000: 85), Yadav’s options to engage this 
bureaucracy were limited. 
Two relatively unknown initiatives of Yadav—both of which failed, one due to lack of 
financial resources and the other because of inadequate management support—reinforce 
this point. The first was an attempt to improve uptake and quality of the IAY, which 
provided cash transfers to homeless Dalits for building houses. Yadav pursued this for 
some time, personally travelling to Dalit hamlets to supervise implementation and 
requiring his senior officers to do so. However, his efforts were not productive: 
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Laloo Yadav was a headache for officers, a nuisance and a nightmare. He 
would stop at the roadside and order a set of dwellings for the poor to be 
built without caring whether the land was the government’s or where the 
money would come from. He would dismiss officials and not wonder about 
replacements. (Thakur 2000: 87) 
The scheme was soon abandoned because many homeless Dalits were also landless. In 
Yadav’s judgement, his administration did not have the financial nor the considerable 
administrative resources required to buy land and make it available to the poor (an 
opportunity for Central Government or donor intervention that nobody identified). 
The second example was a scheme Yadav launched in December 1991, within a year of 
assuming office. He called it the scheme for Charwaha Vidyalayas (grazing schools). It 
was aimed at imparting basic education to children of poor farmers and landless 
workers who could not otherwise attend school because they had to graze their parent’s 
cattle. In other words, it was a school for Yadav children. The plan was to get children 
to bring their herd to school and learn while the animals grazed in the attached fields. 
He financed this scheme by drawing from a number of CSS. For example, he used 
TRYSEM
120
 for providing training, IRDP for subsidised credit, RLEGP
121
 for building 
the school and ICDS for providing day care and supplementary nutrition. For land to 
situate the school and the grazing grounds, he used state agricultural farms that were 
meant to produce seeds and demonstrate modern agricultural practices (Abhijit Sinha 
1995). A project this complex required coordination between many schemes and 
departments, and thus floundered for want of senior management support. This was 
another missed opportunity for donors
122
 and the Central Government to intervene in 
                                                 
120
 Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment. 
121
 Rural Labour Employment Guarantee Scheme 
122
 At one stage UNICEF showed interest and began to support the scheme, but enthusiasm 
flagged and they made a quiet exit. 
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order to combat poverty by providing management support and supplementary 
financing.  
 
What the above examples indicate is that despite serious issues with state administrative 
capacity in Bihar between 1990 and 2005, there were opportunities at the intersection of 
political expediency and poverty reduction, which neither the Central Government nor 
donors capitalised on. The record of international donors prior to 2005 was particularly 
bad, with 80 per cent of aid going to the most prosperous and reform-minded Indian 
states, with a disbursement in Bihar of almost zero (Khullar et al. 2008). 
The lessons from Bihar suggest a number of policy innovations. One is the need to find 
apolitical ways in which to shape political incentives. An example of this would be to 
aggregate data on public expenditure as well as outputs and outcomes from schemes on 
an electoral district basis, rather than current practice of reporting on the basis of 
administrative units. This has the potential to drive political competition in ways that 
are beneficial to the poor. A second suggestion is to be opportunistic and locate 
interventions that sit at the intersection between political expediency and poverty 
reduction, but this requires the ability to spot a window of opportunity when one 
presents itself and access to flexible funding, both of which governments and donors 
seem to shy away from. 
7.3 Implications for Theory 
The findings from this thesis reinforce the arguments made by Geddes (1994) that the 
institutionally-determined incentives that face political leaders might explain certain 
actions and behaviour that are otherwise unexpected. By recognising that economic 
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costs might have political benefits, this thesis highlights why the development of state 
capacity in Bihar depended on the extent to which it served the immediate career 
interests of the politicians in power. As described earlier, Geddes calls this phenomenon 
the politician’s dilemma: ‘the wrenching conflict between their own need for immediate 
political survival and longer run collective interests in economic performance’ (1994: 
18). 
The Bihar story revolves around a chance combination of circumstances and a political 
entrepreneur who seized the opportunity these conditions provided to rule over Bihar 
for 15 years, and in doing so perpetuated and deepened them. There may be other 
people in the world with Yadav’s ambitions, abilities, and particular political dilemma. 
Yet the specific circumstances that permitted him to stay in office for so long are also 
unlikely to recur frequently.  
Still, this story has significance beyond understanding the recent history of Bihar. It is 
centrally relevant to the ways in which we think about governance, particularly state-
building and public sector reform. First, the example of Bihar from 1990 to 2005 is yet 
another warning about how easy it is to foster pessimism by attributing governance 
problems in poor countries to deeply embedded historical or cultural factors, when in 
fact they may have more immediate, political and tractable causes. There is no doubt 
that Bihar has socio-political problems with deep historical roots, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, it was short-term political strategy, not deep history, which tipped 
Bihar into a particularly perverse pattern of governance during these years. Second, this 
story is part of a much larger set of contemporary cases where small groups of power-
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holders have pursued narrow, particularistic ends while consciously undermining 
government institutions from within.  
There is an enormous body of literature on the contemporary obstacles and setbacks to 
the creation of effective public authority in the poorer parts of the world. The literature 
typically sports labels like state-building, capacity development, institution building or 
public sector reform. The attention paid to actual state breakdown, and to the problems 
of recreating effective political order after civil war, has increased greatly over the last 
two decades. The end of the Cold War helped trigger a series of major authority failures 
in places like Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central 
Asia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor Leste. Yet we know very little on why 
this happened or what we can to do mitigate its effects. The more dramatic cases—
internal armed conflicts—have received considerable attention and we know a great 
deal more about the topic than we did two decades ago (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Munkler 2005; Wimmer et al. 2009).  
By contrast, the causes of the less visible kinds of authority failures—more routine, 
everyday declines in the capacities of public agencies and their responsiveness to 
citizens—have received less, and lower quality, research attention. The dominant mode 
in policy circles of explaining the accumulation of these routine failures, and thus the 
prevalence of poor governments in many poorer parts of the world, is exemplified in the 
‘Afro-pessimism’ literature123: failure is assumed or asserted to be deeply embedded in 
national and regional history and culture. Aid agencies tend implicitly to ‘naturalise’ 
poor governance in poor countries: ‘it exists because it is there’. Poor governance 
                                                 
123  For a critique of this outlook, see (Therkildsen 2005).    
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requires no explanation beyond listing sets of symptoms (corruption, low capacity, 
centralisation, weak property rights, and lack of accountability or popular voice, weak 
rule of law) that in turn validate intervention programmes. This perspective anticipates 
that, once the right interventions are made, there will be cumulative, if uneven and 
interrupted, progress in building effective public authority. 
The notion that the construction of public authority is mainly a matter of forward 
marches, (albeit at different and varying paces), is not consistent with the political 
science and historical literature on the subject. Scholars tend to emphasise the 
ephemeral character of most states or other forms of effective public authority. History 
tells us that most attempts to create durable, large-scale governance institutions fail, and 
that many successful institutions do not endure. Most polities are very fragile, and those 
that survive long enough are rare exceptions (Mann 1993; Scott 2009; Tilly 1992). 
Ganev, referring to Mann’s work on the history of state formation, writes: 
Mann’s principal insight is that organizational dominance of the state is not 
a static equilibrium occasionally disrupted by foreign invaders or armed 
revolts of oppressed masses. Rather, it is a necessarily precarious 
arrangement that may rapidly unravel if and when powerful groups launch 
an offensive to claim state-accumulated resources. (2007: 56) 
 
It follows that to understand contemporary ‘fragile’ polities, we need to re-balance the 
analysis, especially when dealing with policy options. Yes, we do need to continue to 
ask who is motivated and be able to build and strengthen legitimate, effective public 
authority. But we also need to look dialectically at the converse processes, and examine 
the more or less continuous incentives and initiatives to deconstruct, weaken or destroy 
public authority. It matters in particular that we should have a better understanding of 
216 
how this is done by powerful insiders, the same people who are often believed to be in 
need of external assistance for state building.  
A deeper understanding of the political circumstances in Bihar from 1990 to 2005 
showcases how the eroding of governance can be orchestrated to serve those in power. 
Although extraordinary, the example of Yadav’s ability to create ‘state incapacity by 
design’ can serve as a lesson—and perhaps a warning—to theorists, local actors and 
international donors who seek to understand and engage in state-building.  
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Annexure 1 – Caste Composition of Bihar (Sub-Region) 
 
Caste Composition of Bihar (sub region-wise) (%) 
Castes and Communities Bihar 1931 
 
North 
Bihar 
South 
Bihar 
First Total 
Chhota Nagpur 
Plateau
b Total 
Upper Caste 16.1 19.9 17.7 3.9 13.7 
Brahmin 6.7 5.8 6.4 1.7 5 
Bhumihar 3 6.2 4.1 0.4 3 
Rajput 5 6.2 4.1 0.4 3 
Kayastha 1.4 1.7 1.5 0.5 1.2 
Backward Castes 24.3 27.4 24.8 9.4 20.2 
Yadav 14 15.7 14.6 4.7 11.7 
Kurmi 3.5 4.4 3.8 2.9 3.5 
Koeri 5.3 6.3 5.7 1.4 4.4 
Baniya 0.5 1 0.7 0.4 0.6 
Extemely Backward Castes 22.2 20.3 21.3 10.2 18.2 
Barhi 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.6 1 
Dhanuk 2.9 2 2.6 0.2 1.9 
Ghatwar 0 0 0 0.6 0.2 
Kahar 0.7 4.3 2 1.1 1.7 
Kamar/Lohar 1.5 1 1.3 1.5 1.4 
Kandu, Kanu 2.3 2.4 2.4 0.2 1.7 
Kewat 1.4 0 0.9 0.1 0.7 
Khetauri
a 
0 0 0 0.3 0.1 
Kumhar 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Mali 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 
Mallah 3 0.7 2.1 0.2 1.6 
Nai 1.6 1.9 1.7 0.9 1.5 
Tanti 2.6 1.6 2.2 0.7 1.8 
Teli 3.4 2.9 3.2 2.2 2.9 
Tharu
a 
0.3 0 0.2 0 0.1 
Scheduled Castes 16.9 20.8 18.3 10.6 15.9 
Bhogta 0 0.1 0 0.7 0.2 
Bhuiya
a 
0.2 2.2 1 3 1.6 
Bhumij
a 
0 0 0 0.8 0.2 
Chamar 5.5 4.9 5.3 1.9 4.3 
Dhobi 1.1 0.9 1 0.5 0.9 
Dom 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 
Dusadh 5.7 6.2 5.8 0.9 4.4 
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Ghasi 0 0 0 0.5 0.1 
Hari 0.3 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Musahar 3.2 3.7 3.4 0.2 2.4 
Pasi 0.3 1.6 0.8 0.1 0.6 
Rajwar 0 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Turi 0 0 0 0.5 0.2 
Others 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Scheduled Tribes 0.8 0.4 0.6 32.3 9.9 
Chero ... ... ... 0.2 0.1 
Chik Baraik ... ... ... 0.3 0.1 
Gond ... ... ... 0.2 0.1 
Ho ... ... ... 3.9 1.2 
Kharia ... ... ... 0.9 0.3 
Kharwar ... ... ... 0.7 0.2 
Khetauri ... ... ... 0.3 0.1 
Mahli 
... 
... ... 0.5 0.2 
Mal Paharia ... ... ... 0.4 0.1 
Munda 0 0 0 5.4 1.6 
Oraon 0.2 0 0.1 6.1 1.9 
Santhal 0.6 0.4 0.5 11.9 3.9 
Sauria Paharia ... ... ... 0.7 0.2 
Others ... 0 0 0.8 0.2 
Religious Minorities 20.5 11.1 17 32.4 21.3 
Muslims 20.3 10.9 16.8 6.6 13.8 
Christians 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.6 1.1 
Sikhs 0 0 0 0 0 
Others
d 
0.1 0.1 0.1 22.2 6.6 
Unidentified ... ... ... 0.9 0.3 
TOTAL 99.8 99.9 99.9 98.9 99.6 
    (100.8)          (99.7)           (99.7)          (99.5) 
Source: Census of India 1931 cited in Robin (2009: 67) 
Notes:  
a
 Considered as Tribes in the Census 1931 
b
 Chhota Nagpur Plateau (it corresponds to the state of Jharkhand in the year 2001 plus the 
Manbhum district): Hazaribagh, Ranchi, Palamau, Garhwa, Lohardaga, Kodarma, Giridih, 
Sahibganj, Gumla, Pakaur, Chatra, Bokaro, Dhanbad, Deoghar, Dumka, East Singhbhum, West 
Singhbhum, Saraikala-Kharsawan
c 
c
 Both Saraikela and Kharsawan were former feudatory states and formed a single district only 
in 1931 
d 
Jains, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, tribal religions 
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Annexure 2 – Gadgil Formula 
Items (Weights %) 
Original 
Formula 
a.
  
(1969) 
Modified 
Formula 
(1980) 
Latest 
Formula 
(1991) 
Population 60 60 60 
Tax Effort 10 10 - 
Per Capita Income 
b.
 10 20 25 
Subsistence - - - 
Irrigation and Power Projects 10 - - 
Special Problems 10 10 7.5 
Performance: 
 Tax Effort 
 Fiscal Management 
 Progress in Respect of 
National Objectives 
c.
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
7.5 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Notes 
a. The Gadgil Formula. Population data are from 1971 
b. Assistance going to states having a per capita income below the 
national average 
c. Population control, child health and primary education, land reform 
& uptake of external assistance 
  
 
Source: World Bank (1995) 
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Annexure 3 – Per Capita Plan Allocation, 2001/2 
 
Per Capita Plan Allocation 2001/2  
(Rupees) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2005: 44) 
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Annexure 4 – Transfers by State Income 
 
Transfers Relative to the Per Capita Ranking of Major States 
1992-93 
 
Per capita 
Income 
Per capita State 
Revenue 
Per capita 
FC transfers 
Per capita PC 
transfers 
a.
 
Punjab 1 4 12 2 
Haryana 2 1 14 6 
Maharashtra 3 3 13 11 
Gujrat 4 2 10 7 
Karnataka 5 5 11 5 
Tamil Nadu 6 6 7 8 
West Bengal 7 11 8 12 
Andhra Pradesh 8 8 9 10 
Kerala 9 7 6 3 
Rajasthan 10 9 2 4 
Madhya Pradesh 11 10 5 13 
Uttar Pradesh 12 12 4 9 
Orissa 13 13 1 1 
Bihar 14 14 3 14 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation  
(with Per – Capita Income) 
0.92 -0.93 0.23 
a. Includes externally aided projects. 
  
 
Source: World Bank(1995) 
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Annexure 5 – Planning Commission Letter on CSS data 
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Annexure – 5 (contd.) 
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Annexure 6 – CAG’s Manual of Standing Orders 
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241 
242 
243 
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Annexure 7 – Pending CSS Audit Certificates in Kerala 
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Annexure 8 – Caste and Community of the MLAs in Bihar % 
  1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 TOTAL  
Upper Castes  46 45.9 46.2 44.8 42 42.8 40.8 36.5 38.5 34.5 21.8 23.1 30 38.1 
Brahmin  12.1 10 13.8 11 9.4 11 7.1 12.3 10.8 8.3 3.1 3.1 4.9 9.1 
Bhumihar  10 12.5 8.8 11.6 10.3 10.4 10.2 9.8 10.5 11.1 5.8 7.1 9.5 9.8 
Bengali  1.5 0.6 0.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.3 –  1.4 
Rajput  14.2 17.2 19.1 17.2 17.6 17.6 18.5 11.4 14.5 12.7 9.5 11.4 14 15 
Kayastha  8.2 5.6 3.4 3.1 2.2 1.3 2.8 1.8 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.2 1.6 2.8 
Backward Castes  19.3 18.8 23.6 26 27.9 24.9 27.7 29 25.3 34.2 43.6 35.2 34.5 28.4 
Yadav  7.9 6.6 9.4 11.6 15 11 15.4 13.8 14.5 19.1 25.8 20.7 22.6 14.8 
Kurmi  3.6 3.8 4.4 4.1 3.8 6 3.7 6.2 5.2 4.9 5.8 4.6 4.5 4.7 
Koeri  4.5 5.3 6 4.7 2.8 4.1 4.6 2.8 2.8 4 6.8 5.9 4.9 4.5 
Baniya  3.3 3.1 3.8 5.6 6.3 3.8 4 6.2 2.8 6.2 5.2 4 2.5 4.4 
Extremely Backward Castes 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.8 0.6 3.1 5.2 5.3 1.7 
Scheduled Castes  13.9 14.7 13.2 13.5 14.1 13.8 13.8 14.5 14.8 14.8 15.1 14.8 16.9 14.4 
Scheduled Tribes  10.9 11.2 9 9.2 8.8 8.9 8.5 8.6 8.9 9 8.2 8.9 –  8.7 
Santhal  2.7 2.2 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 –  1.2 
Munda  1.2 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.2 –  0.9 
Oraon  0.6 0.9 0.6 0.3 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 –  0.7 
Others  6.4 7.2 7.2 6.3 6 5.7 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.5 5.8 5.9 –  5.9 
 Religious Minorities   7.60 8.10 7.20 5.9 6.3 8.5 8 9.5 10.8 6.8 7.7 9.6 9.5 8.1 
 Muslims   7.6 7.8 6.6 5.6 6 8.2 7.7 8.9 10.2 6.2 7.1 9.3 9.5 7.7 
 Christians    –   0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3   –    –   0.3 
 Parsis    –    –    –    –    –    –    –    –   0.3  –    –    –    –   0 
 Sikhs    –    –    –    –    –    –    –   0.3   –   0.3 0.3 0.3  –   0.1 
 Unidentified   0.9 0.3  –    –    –   0.3 0.6 0.3  –    –  0.3 3.1 3.7 0.7 
 TOTAL   99.80 99.70 100.10 100.00 100.00 100.10 100.00 99.90 100.10 99.90 99.80 99.90 99.90 100.00 
  
 
(N=330) 
 
(N=319) 
 
(N=319)  (N=319) 
 
(N=319)  (N=318)  (N=325)  (N=325)  (N=325)  (N=324)  (N=325)  (N=324)  (N=243) (N=4115)   
     (99.6)      Source: Robin (2009: 100 Appendix 4)                                                  (100.1) 
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Annexure 9 – Deficiencies in CSS Expenditure Tracking 
 
KANWAL NATH        D.O.No.18 – DAI/2006 
DEPUTY COMPTROLLER             OFFICE OF THE  
AND AUDITOR GENERAL              COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR
                       GENERAL OF INDIA 
                  10, BAHADUR SHAH ZAFAR MARG, 
           New Delhi –110 002 
 
  
                   April 05, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Dear Ms. Kaur, 
 
  As you are aware, at the meeting of the Expert Group on restructuring of 
Centrally Sponsored Schemed held on 30th January 2006, the Chairman had 
requested me for a note on suggestions about bow the Indian Audit & Accounts 
Department can assist in tracking of funds released under the Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes. 
 
I enclose a note on the subject.  This may kindly be put up to the Chairman of the 
Expert Group. 
 
Best wishes,               Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
                         Sd/- 
(Kanwal Nath) 
 
 
 
 
 Ms Gurjot Kaur, 
 Adviser (PC/T/PO&RM) 
 Planning Commission, 
 Yojana Bhawan, 
 New Delhi –110001 
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Subject: Restructuring of Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes 
 
Reference: D.O letter No. M-12017/16/05 – PC dated 27 January 2006  
        from Advisor (PC/T/PO&RM). Planning Commission.  
 
 
1. This note is in response to the meeting on 30 January 2006 of the 
Expert Group set up to develop concrete proposals for restructuring the 
centrally sponsored schemes, which was attended by the Deputy Comptroller 
and Auditor General, Shri Kanwal Nath. The meeting requested the Deputy 
Comptroller and Auditor General to suggest as to how Indian Audit & 
Accounts Department (IA&AD) can assist of the funds released under 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes. 
  
2. IA & ID may be able to contribute significantly to the management  
of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes in relation to (i) tracking of the funds and 
(ii) correctness and completeness of performance information, including the 
expenditure. 
 
Tracking of the funds down to the end-use 
3. This is an accounting function. In the existing system, the amounts 
under Centrally Sponsored Schemes are released by the Central Government 
through a variety of channels. The amounts released to all or most of them 
are booked as final expenditure in the books of the Union Government, even 
when the whole or part of it may not have been utilized for the purpose for 
which the funds were appropriated during the year. 
 
4. Some of the channels of release of the funds are: 
 
To state governments, when the amounts are further released/ spent 
through the state budget. 
Directly to state autonomous bodies (viz. DRDA etc.) 
To central autonomous bodies for specific tasks/jobs (viz. research 
etc.). 
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5. The existing procedure does not facilitate capture, at any given point of 
time, of (i) amounts actually utilized for the end-use, (ii) amounts in transit viz. 
advances to local bodies/ PRI or to the executing departments (viz. PWD, 
PHED, etc.). And (iii) unspent amounts with the state governments / agencies. 
 
6. While the accounts of most state governments are compiled in the A&E 
offices of Indian Audit and Account Department, the accounts of stat 
autonomous bodies and all NGOs are maintained by the bodies themselves. 
Only the vouchers for expenditure from the state budget are received in A&E 
offices. 
 
7. We have examined the matter on the basis of our experience in 
auditing the Centrally Sponsored Schemes over the years and have the 
following suggestions to make. 
 
8. The current procedure of receipt of Utilisation Certificates (UCs) from 
the implementing agencies and further release of assistance by the 
administrative Ministries of the Central Government on the basis of such UCs 
is clearly deficient in the absence of any reasonable assurance about the 
expenditure actually having been incurred for the purpose for which fund were 
released. This system has to be replaced by a system of UCs backed by 
actual vouchers. Pending a decision on the detailed procedure of audit and 
furnishing of audit certificates, an immediate stipulation could be made that 
the statutory auditors in respect of the non-government implementing 
agencies (DRDAs, Zilla Parishads, NGOs etc.,) should include a statement in 
their audit certificate that they have actually the vouchers in support of the 
UCs furnished by such bodies. This alone should go a long way in bringing 
about a minimum modicum of discipline in the system at the grass root level. 
 
9. Coming to the expenditure incurred on Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes through the State Budget, the Accountants General (Accounts & 
Entitlements) in the States would not be able to link such expenditure unless 
the expenditure incurred on a scheme can be ascertained across all functional 
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Major heads of account involved, this will be possible if the State 
Governments furnish a plan-budget link document to the Accountants General 
(Accounts & Entitlements). All States are not furnishing such documents 
despite requests from the Accountants General. 
 
10. Even accounts compiled by Accountants General (A&E) do not capture 
the data distinctly under each Centrally Sponsored Schemes in the absence 
of uniform plan-budget link and a distinct sub-head for each of the Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes. Moreover, the expenditure booked in the state accounts 
consists of expenditure for the end-use as well as advances to implementing 
agencies without any distinction between them. There is no coding or 
accounting rules prescribing coding of the expenditure by their type (end use, 
advance etc.).  
 
11. The autonomous bodies and NGOs also transfer the amounts received 
from the Union and state governments under Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
to local self governing institutions, suppliers and executing departments, 
which are essentially in the nature of advance, but are booked in their 
accounts as end-use expenditure. The problem of absence of coding by the 
type of expenditure exists here also, in the same manner as with the state 
government. 
 
12. In this background, it is indeed a challenge to track every rupee to its 
end use through the accounts. The prevailing system of watching the 
utilization through subsidiary books/registers, which is not linked to the 
accounts, is optional, time-consuming, and complex. More importantly, this 
system promotes disregard for accountability. 
 
13. If the State Governments could introduce a standard structure of 
classification of expenditure in the bills to distinguish advances, part 
payments, and final payments and ensure correct detailed classification on 
the vouchers at the initial stage itself, the Accountants General (Accounts and 
Entitlements) could attempt to generate scheme wise accounting reports 
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across the Grants, incorporating the requirement for multi departmental 
schemes. This information can then be supplied to Accountants 
General/Principal Accountants General (Audit) in the respective States so that 
they could examine and furnish the audit certificates. The Expert Group may 
like to consider recommending appropriate changes in the structure and 
classification in the bills/vouchers of the expenditure on Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes in the State Budgets. 
 
14. Thus AG (A&E) offices can be of assistance in tracking and delineating 
the amount shown as expenditure under end-use expenditure and amounts in 
transit under each Centrally Sponsored Scheme, if the following pre-requisites 
are taken care of: 
 
(i) In the accounts booked through state government budget, coding 
and colour of vouchers should capture them by the type of 
expenditure. Modification to the VLC system could be explored and 
implemented to capture the data on Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
by type of expenditure.  
(ii) It should by obligatory for all state governments to provide plan-
budget link and determine common sub-heads that identify each 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes programme distinctly. 
(iii) Administrative / codal provisions should be made to give effect to 
the above. 
 
15. As regards the funds released directly to the implementing 
agencies, it is pertinent to note that an account of the expenditure from 
such funds would ideally be required to be maintained by the Controller 
General of Accounts (CGA). Regardless of the agency which maintains 
the detailed accounts, the expenditure would need to be clearly 
identified as advance payment or part payment or final payment. The 
Accountants General (Audit) would not be able to certify the 
expenditure against the funds released directly to the implementing 
agencies as neither does the former receive any expenditure 
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statements from the agencies nor is the final expenditure routed 
through the State Government accounts. 
 
16. The following aspects, therefore, will need to be taken care of: 
  
(i) It should be mandatory for the autonomous bodies and NGOs to 
maintain their accounts on computer with read and download only 
access to both AG (A&E) and Pr. A.G./A.G. (Audit). 
 
(ii) As in the case of funds from the State Budge, a provision /system 
should be mandatory for autonomous bodies and NGOs to capture 
their expenditure that can be identified to the particular Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes and the type of expenditure. 
 
(iii) A system may be put in place to track the amount in transit to the 
end-use through accounts/subsidiary accounts rather than through 
registers. 
 
(iv) The autonomous bodies of the states should provide expenditure 
figures periodically in a pre-determined format and with pre-
determined details to the state As.G.(A&E) and Pr. A.G./AG (Audit). 
The vouchers and other documents should be retained by them. 
 
(v) NGOs and Central autonomous bodies should also provides similar 
information to the Chief Controller of Accounts with a copy to the 
principal auditor of the Ministry. 
 
(vi) The computerization of autonomous bodies/NGOs may be on a 
compatible platform to enable easy data consolidation. 
  
Correctness and completeness of accounts / performance information 
17.            Coming to audit, the orders releasing the funds to the 
implementing agencies would need to specify that the Accountant General 
(Audit) concerned would have unrestricted access to all the records relating to 
the utilization and accounting of the funds. A complete audit trail would need 
to be built into the proposed restructuring of Centrally Sponsored Schemes so 
that the Accountant General (Audit) could secure the required assurance of 
the correctness and completeness of the expenditure to be certified in audit. 
This would have to be in addition to the statutory audit already provided. 
18.            The audit function can be fulfilled by our state audit offices for 
expenditure by the state government and state autonomous bodies. Our 
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Principal Audit Offices for the central ministries can perform this role for funds 
released to the central autonomous bodies and directly to NGOs. For this 
purpose following system will need to be established: 
 
(i) The Pr.A.G.(Au)/AG(Audit) should have free and complete access 
to the accounts, accounting documents and other related 
documents of the state/central autonomous bodies, PRIs and 
Urban Local Bodies. 
 
(ii) The Audit Office should have access on-line (read and download 
only) to the accounts of the self-accounting autonomous bodies and 
NGOs receiving funds for implementation of the Centrally Schemes. 
They should also have physical access and authority to 
inspect/audit the accounts and related documents in the same 
manner as the direct government expenditure. This could be made 
a condition of sanction of grant. 
 
(iii) A comprehensive form of certification may be introduced for the 
accounts and utilisation, which should be provided by the chief 
executive of the NGOs and autonomous bodies (where necessary 
PRI/ULB) about the correctness and completeness of data. 
 
(iv) Pr. A.G./A.G. (Audit) could earmark a portion of his resource for 
concurrent random verification of the correctness and 
completeness of data provided and maintained by the implementing 
authorities across the state(s). Such random verification should be 
able to detect the errors in reporting without estimating the full 
impact of it. 
 
(v) Where the error in accounts / data is significant, comprehensive 
audit/verification could be undertaken. 
 
(vi) Detailed performance audit of individual programmes may be 
conducted by IA & AD as per the existing practice. The result of 
concurrent verification can form a valuable input for risk 
assessment and planning of performance audits. 
 
(vii) A system of audit certification of accounts of each Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes by each implementing agency (Government 
or non-Government) may be introduced. The method and agency 
for certification may be determined in consultation with CAG. 
 
19. The work being of colossal dimensions, it may be appropriate to carry  
out a mapping exercise together with the Planning Commission and selected 
state governments, if necessary by involving an expert consultant/agency. 
This exploratory pilot study will be able to focus on the system required to be 
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put in place along with the modifications to the existing system and could also 
highlight the feasibility and magnitude of the issue. 
 
20. Programmes with huge investments are implemented under Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes by the Central Government at widely dispersed location 
and under a variety of management and delivery channels. The dispersed 
management and delivery system with the functionaries under different lines 
of administrative control ought to the matched comprehensive, strong and 
enforceable accountability system and procedures and a very high degree of 
transparency. Our Audit Reports have come out with findings of large scales 
unauthorized utilisation and misuse, serious errors or misrepresentations in 
performance reporting, evidence for utilisation and assets not being available 
etc. The Centrally Sponsored Schemes requires a very strong accountability 
chain under which every operational level functionary should be accountable 
to produce documentary physical evidence in support of the utilisation of 
every rupee. The accountability procedures should be backed by enforceable 
rules and a consistent system of Surveillance over the performance of the 
accountability system. 
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Annexure 10 – Request to Agri. Ministry for CSS Data 
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Annexure 11 – Request to Health Ministry for CSS Data 
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Annexure 12 – List of Persons Interviewed 
Sl. 
No. 
Name Designation Date/ Period 
1. Dr. N.C. Saxena 
Former Secretary, Planning 
Commission of India and Supreme 
Court Commissioner 
On many occasions 
between 1/1/06 and 
1/1/08 
2. 
Sudhir Kumar 
Officer on Special Duty to Railway 
Minister Lalu Yadav 
24/8/06 
3. Tarun Aurora Planning Commission of India 10/2/06 
4. R.Gopalakrishnan Prime Minister’s Office 11/5/07 
5. R.J.M. Pillai Principal Secretary, Bihar 31/1/06 
6. Mukund Prasad 
Former Chief Secretary, Bihar & 
Former Principal Secretary to Chief 
Minister, Bihar 
31/1/06 
7. S.M. Vijayanand 
Principal Secretary, Government of 
Kerala 
22/8/06 
8. Oommen Chandy Leader of the Opposition, Kerala 22/8/06 
9. Dr. Thomas Issac Finance Minister, Kerala 22/8/06 
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10. Dr. K.M. Abraham Principal Secretary, Kerala 23/8/06 
11. Dr. Praveen Jha 
Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, New Delhi 
1/3/06 
12. Nagesh Singh Planning Commission of India 30/1/06 
13. Arvind Verma Chairman, Expert Committee on CSS 11/1/06 
14. Aromar Revi TARU, New Delhi 22/12/05 
15. Sanjay Kumar 
Centre for the Study of Developing 
Societies (CSDS), New Delhi 
2/3/06 
16. Dr. B.K. Pradhan 
National Council for Applied 
Economic Research, (NCAER) New 
Delhi. 
24/3/06 
17. Prof. John Harriss London School of Economics 15/5/06 
18. Ravi Mittal Secretary, Government of Bihar 30/1/06 
19. Ritu Raj Former Police Officer, Bihar 1/2/06 
20. Dr. Jeffrey Witsoe Anthropologist who works on Bihar Many times in 2010 
 
